***Contemporary Japan: A Review of Far Eastern Affairs***
**January, 1942 Vol. XI No. 1**

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# Some Features

**Every successive year The Japan Year Book has surpassed its predecessors in all respects. This year's has been no exception.**

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


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# CONTEMPORARY JAPAN

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## MARCH OF EVENTS

*Japan Declares Self-Defence War*

Japan declared war on the United States of America and the British Empire on December 8, 1941. Prior to taking this decisive step, up to the very last minute, the Japanese Government continued its peaceful efforts that were started in April, 1941. Ever since Tokyo began negotiations with Washington, especially following the delivery of the Konoye message (August 28), particular endeavours were made to bring about satisfactory results to all concerned. To that end Japan dispatched Saburo Kurusu as a special envoy to assist Ambassador Nomura in order to facilitate the conference. The first meeting to (November 17) was followed by as many as the eighth, the Japanese envoys trying to make America recognize the realities in East Asia conceding to the utmost, patiently bearing what sounded intolerable.

In the note to Washington (November 20), for instance, Japan promised not to make any armed advance outside of French Indo-China to southwestern Asia and southern Pacific; to withdraw all land forces in French Indo-China when peace is restored between Japan and Chungking or a just peace is established in the Pacific region. The great note went to the extent of promising the recall of the Japanese troops in southern part of French Indo-China to northern part of the colony, should understanding be reached between Tokyo and Washington.

America, however, sticking to what it called the basic principles, insisted on Japan's carrying out rainbow conditions such as the wholesale withdrawal of the Japanese forces from China, rejection of the Nanking Government and denunciation of the Tripartite Pact. Furthermore, while Japan was thus doing everything to preserve the trans-Pacific peace, America headed the frantic efforts in consolidating the ABCD encirclement against Japan. It became all too evident

that Washington was deliberately dragging on the parley for the purpose of gaining time to make armed and economic threats against Japan more effective—threats which developed daily more outspoken.

Should Japan bend her knee before this overbearing pressure from across the Pacific, Japan's prestige would be lost, her object of the China affair would not be realized. What is worse, Japan would find her own existence endangered. Out of sheer necessity of self-defence, Japan had to rise. Japan accepted the American and British challenge.

Simultaneously with the declaration of war, the Japanese Government issued a statement, defining its attitude before the world. It started by saying; "It is the immutable policy of Japan to insure the stability of East Asia and to contribute to the cause of world peace, while the guiding principle of its foreign policy has been to carry out the aforesaid national policy by cultivating friendship with all nations."

***Japan's Attitude Clearly Defined***

"However, the United States of America and the British Empire, unwilling to alter their senseless policy of keeping East Asia permanently in a servile position, obstructed by all means the settlement of the China affair. Moreover, they instigated the Netherlands East Indies, menaced French Indo-China and resorted to all possible measures with a view to alienating Japan and Thailand.

"Finally, they went so far as to adopt the outrageous measure severing economic relations with Japan. Between non-belligerent Powers the rupture of economic relations constitutes a hostile action comparable to a challenge by armed force."

The statement pointed out how the Anglo-American aggressors had been consolidating the armed ring around Japan, menacing the very existence of the Empire. It emphasized how, under these provocative pressures, Japan patiently tried to preserve peace in the Pacific, prevent the spread of war into this part of the world, resorting to the best possible diplomatic means to achieve the end for eight long months.

It further added how Washington and London, refusing to recognize realities, went to the extent of depriving Japan of all hopes for maintaining peace, and how Japan, determined then to eliminate the root of evils in the work of permanent tranquility in East Asia, started the war of self-defence.

Out of the spirit and friendly consideration of the Tripartite Treaty, Germany and Italy, following the outbreak of the Japan-America war, declared (December 11) their participation in war against the United States. On

***Berlin and Rome in War with U.S.***





the same day Ambassador Hiroshi Oshima, Joachimvon Ribbentrop, Reich Foreign Minister, and Dino Alfieri, Italian Ambassador to Berlin, representing Japan, Germany and Italy, respectively, concluded a new agreement envisaging the joint pursuit of war aims against the United States of America and the British Empire, non-conclusion of separate peace and collaboration in building a new world order.

The three Axis Powers in the Tripartite Treaty (signed September 27, 1940) recognized that to provide all nations equitable share of enjoying rights and benefits inherent in man is the vital prerequisite to establishment of world peace, and pledged, under this conviction, to collaborate in order to realize the ultimate object of universal tranquility. It was recognized, that Germany and Italy should assume the leadership in reconstructing Europe and Africa, while Japan in that of East Asia.

Germany had already driven British who are opposed to this new European order out of the continent, and Japan has started war against America and Britain to build the East Asia new order. It has become quite natural that the three Axis Powers, in carrying out their common aim should further consolidate their stand, pledge their best efforts to achieve the final victory.

On the announcement of the German-Italian participation in the war of greater East Asia, Premier Hidéki Tohjo stated; "With the separation of the world into two camps, one which seeks arbitrarily to maintain the *status quo* and the other which is bent earnestly in setting up a just new order, an Armageddon unparalleled in history is taking place. However, with justice on our side and with strength that is assuring, I feel positive that victory shall be ours."

Sincerely congratulating the conclusion of the new war agreement at Berlin, Shighénori Togo, Foreign Minister, in a statement, among other things, said; "At this juncture, when the world stands at a great turning point, unprecedented in history, it is a source of great pleasure that Japan, with her confidence strengthened in winning a glorious victory and with her determination renewed, is marching toward construction of an equitable new order as well as of a moral world in close co-operation with her allies, Germany, Italy and others."

Fully five years passed since the anti-Comintern Pact was signed, and on the day it was to expire, November 25, delegates from six Powers (Japan, Germany, Italy, Manchoukuo, Hungary and Spain) met at the official residence of Führer Hitler at Berlin, formally signed another pact that extended

***Anti-Red Pact Strengthened***

its validity for another five years. At the same time seven new member-Powers became signatories to the pact; they are Bulgaria, Denmark, Finland, Croatia, Rumania, Slovakia and the Nanking Government. Thirteen States have thus voiced their united resolution to fight Bolshevism by further consolidating their common front. The significance of this enlarged anti-Comintern camp is regarded as most far reaching as it will form a vital element in building a new world order.

***Thai-Japan Fight British Aggression***

Persistent and frantic efforts by Britain to pull Thailand into its camp by bluffing and cajoling, propagandizing in particular about the "Japanese menace" to Thailand, meanwhile proving itself as an aggressor by concentrating a large number of troops along the borders of British Malaya and Burma, eventually convinced Thailand that Britain, not Japan, was a real menace. Thailand appreciated the true, peaceful aims of Japan; signed an agreement (December 8) between Thailand and Japan, Bangkok agreeing to provide all facilities to the Japanese troops in their free passage through the country.

Immediately the Japanese troops began peaceful march into Thailand and reached Bangkok (December 9) without a mishap, thus demonstrating how really Thailand had come to understand Japan. The Japanese started driving back the British, while carrying out forced landing of troops in northern Malaya in face of resistance. The curtain for the assault on the British outpost in the Far East, Singapore, then rose.

Clarifying Japan's peaceful advance into Thailand, Ambassador Téiji Tsubokami in Bangkok issued (December 9) a statement, saying: "The Japanese troops from the standpoint of the right of self-defence and of championing the cause of Thai independence were forced to take counter-offensive against British troops to check possible invasion." Relative to the free passage of the Japanese troops through Thailand, he declared: "The friendly and co-operative spirit on the part of the Japanese toward Thailand is unshakable in nature and will be further cemented."

***Thai-Japan Armed Alliance Signed***

Japan's peaceful advance into Thailand demonstrated in a convincing manner the solid friendship that exists between the two countries. In order, however, to cement definitely the friendly relations, Ambassador Téiji Tsubokami to Thailand, after a full discussion with the Thai Premier,





reached an understanding (December 11) on the formation of an offensive-defensive alliance between Bangkok and Tokyo.

Thailand thus decided to co-operate with Japan, based on the consciousness of an Oriental people, in face of the steady development of the war for constructing a new order. The significance of this new alliance in arms is bound to prove far reaching one.

***Hawaii Suffers Smashing Blows***

The air force of the Japanese Navy, with the outbreak of war, at early dawn of December 8 (December 7, Sunday, in America) gave smashing blitz blows on the American Pacific fleet in Pearl Harbour; sank two capital ships, heavily damaged four capital ships and four heavy cruisers, destroyed one aircraft-carrier, attacked the enemy air force with telling effects. In all, the blitz attack reduced the American fleet in the Pacific practically to nil—an amazingly brilliant achievement that took the world by surprise.

The blow that was administered to the American Navy that formed the background of American aggression in East Asia reversed the balance of sea strength between Japan and America in the Pacific in Japan's favour. Not only the western Pacific but all over the vast expanse of the Pacific has Japan extended her armed strength, occupying the most advantageous positions for operations in the South.

***Briton Navy Meets Defeat***

Their movements closely watched by the Japanese Navy, the flagship and pride of the British Far Eastern fleet *Prince of Wales*, and somewhat old but nonetheless formidable 30,000 tonner *Repulse* were discovered (11.30 a.m., December 10) by joint efforts of the submarines and air force, off Kuantan on the eastern coast of Malaya. The air force at once launched a relentless attack on these ships. The *Repulse* sank at 2.29 p.m. within one minute. The *Prince of Wales*, listing heavily toward starboard was put to flight. Hotly chased and pummelled further with repeated direct hits, the ship finally went to the bottom with a tremendous explosion. With the ship died Sir Tom Philips, commander-in-chief of the British Far Eastern fleet.

With the American Pacific sea power practically destroyed on the first day and the main strength of the British fleet in the Far East sent to the bottom on the third day of war, the so-called ABCD ring with the Anglo-American sea force as its mainstay, practically disappeared.

The first anniversary (November 30) of the conclusion of the Japan-

*Nation Celebrates Treaty Anniversary*

China Basic Treaty and the Japan-Manchoukuo-China Joint Declaration was marked with radio broadcasts by Premier Hidéki Tohjo and President Wang Ching-Wei, pledging mutual efforts to achieve universal peace and the building of the new order in East Asia.

At a dinner to celebrate the occasion at the Imperial Hotel, Tokyo, on the same day, Shighénori Togo, Foreign Minister, in his speech, declared; "The object of this treaty and joint declaration is to achieve the great common ideal of a new order in East Asia by mutually respecting their sovereignty, based on the moral basis of the Orient, maintaining close collaboration in political, economic and cultural endeavours and pursuing the course of co-existence and co-prosperity."

Congratulating the splendid progress made by the three Powers during the first year, taking especially emphatic note of the steady rise of the Nanking Government in prestige in the international political arena by having obtained recognition from 11 States, he admitted the presence of many difficulties ahead, but added: "I am firmly convinced that these three nations will be able to surmount these difficulties and to assure a bright future for East Asiatic nations as they strengthen their ties with iron will and proceed toward their lofty objectives with unity."

*Statement on Parley with N.E.I.*

Machinations of the United States and Britain behind the scenes were responsible for the breakdown in the economic negotiations between the Netherlands East Indies and Japan, it was revealed in a statement issued by the Government (December 12).

After tracing the proceedings of the negotiations, the statement said that whatever conciliatory attitude shown by the Dutch gradually stiffened under the influence of the secret manœuvres conducted by the United States and Britain, and on November 9, 1940, the East Indies Government adopted measures of restrictions on the export of rubber and tin to Manchoukuo and China. The Japanese Government, however, persevered in its efforts to arrive at an amicable solution of the problems confronting the two countries and sent Ambassador Kenkichi Yoshizawa as a plenipotentiary to resume the negotiations. On December 24 of that year a financial agreement was signed between the two Governments, but the hostility of the Dutch on Anglo-American instigation grew stronger daily until on February 1 the following year the Dutch authorities proclaimed that the Indies was opposed to





any inclusion of the royal colony within the East Asia co-prosperity sphere. On May 5 last, the Dutch Government tightened its controls over foreign exchange and destroyed what shred of hope there remained for success of the economic negotiations. The Japanese Government, therefore, was compelled to abandon them at the end on June 17. In spite of the Dutch assurances that they would maintain friendly relations with Japan as far as it lay in their power, the Netherlands East Indies Government on July 28 froze Japanese assets in the Indies in concert with the United States and Britain. At the same time, they pronounced null and void the oil and banking agreements with Japan.

*U.S.-British Interests Taken Over*

Controls over the assets, rights and interests of American and British nationals in China are progressing smoothly following the expropriation measures taken by Japan in view of the war of greater East Asia. All foreign residents in China expressed appreciation of the fair play and justice shown by the Japanese military authorities in this regard.

On the morning of December 8, the Japanese Army disarmed the United States Marines in Peking and took over all American and British banks, business establishments, colleges, schools, churches, hospitals, and similar steps were taken with respect to all American and British rights and interests in Tientsin.

Although all newspapers in Shanghai presenting American and British views have been completely suppressed, the *Shanghai Times* and the *Evening Post* will be permitted to continue business as these papers have pledged to co-operate with Japan for the establishment of the East Asia co-prospertiy sphere.

*Latin American Assets Frozen*

The Finance Ministry (December 12) designated the assets of Mexico, Costa Rica, Honduras, Guatemala, Nicaragua, Dominica, Cuba and Haiti as subject to the restrictions stipulated in the Foreigners' Transactions Controls Regulations in retaliation for the freezing of Japanese assets in these countries. The assets of Argentina, Brazil and Uruguay in Japan are not to be frozen, although they have joined the United States, Britain, the Netherlands East Indies and other Latin American countries which have frozen Japanese assets, because the Japanese Government recognizes the fact that Argentina, Brazil and Uruguay are showing considerable goodwill toward the Japanese in striking con-

trast to other nations which have declared war on Japan.

The exemptions from the restrictions of the Foreigners' Transactions Control Regulations which Colombia and El Salvador had enjoyed were cancelled (December 16) following the declaration of war by El Salvador on Japan and the Colombian severance of relations with Japan.

***Wartime Shipping Control***

A draft Wartime Shipping Management Ordinance, which is to empower the Government to place under its management all Japan-registered merchant ships and seamen, was approved (December 10) at the 21st plenary session of the National General Mobilization Inquiry Commission. Some of the main points of the ordinance are : the establishment of a semi-governmental Shipping Operation Association by reorganizing the existing Central Marine Transportation Control Association and Government compensations for war losses which crew members of the association's craft may suffer.

All Japanese steamships of over 100 tons and motor-schooners of over 150 tons will be requisitioned by the Government and then chartered by the Shipping Operation Association. The actual operation of ships, however, will be entrusted to the existing steamship companies on a commission basis and shipping bottoms will be allocated in accordance with the Government's marine transportation plans, as well as according to the programme of the Shipping Operation Association in consultation with the Communications Ministry.

***Free Money Promised***

Under no circumstances will a moratorium be declared in regard to bank deposits ; and in case banks should be destroyed by bombing, other financing institutions will pay out the needed funds, Finance Minister Okinori Kaya assured in a statement issued immediately after the outbreak of the war.

In case bills should be dishonoured on account of damages from bombing, the Bank of Japan, the Bank of Chosen or the Bank of Taiwan is to rediscount them in order that the flow of funds may be maintained. Should financing institutions demand redemption of their loans to various industrial firms, the Industrial Bank of Japan and the Hypothec Bank of Japan will undertake to guarantee or underwrite the loans. Appropriate measures are to be taken by the Government in case the frozen assets abroad are confiscated by the enemy countries. "These emergency measures," Mr. Kaya explained, "are aimed at preventing disturbance to our economic system in case some part or parts of our country should be subjected to bombing by enemy aircraft, to assure





the smooth operation of industry and accumulation of capital, to maintain order in wartime national life and to prevent agitation of the public psychology."

***Stocks Soar***

Following the news of the naval air force *blitzkrieg* on Pearl Harbour, Singapore, the Philippines and other enemy bases, new highs were registered in major shares on the board at the Tokyo Stock Exchange (December 8). Tokyo Exchange, new, set out at ¥109.90, only 20 sen higher than at the closing of the previous day, and went up to ¥126.00 at the close of the afternoon session. On December 15 the same security finished at ¥142.10.

***New Body to Attack Aluminium Industry***

The Industrial Equipment Corporation, the bill for the founding of which was passed by the extraordinary session of the Diet in November last, has set to work to tackle the aluminum industry as its initial task under the leadership of Ginjiro Fujihara, former Commerce and Industry Minister, president of the corporation. Hisatada Hirosé, former Welfare Minister, was appointed vice-president (December 4). At the meeting of the key members of the corporation (December 5), it was decided that the new organization should first put the aluminum industry into shape. For this purpose it was voted that aluminium manufacturers should equip their factories with a large number of rotary kilns to speed up the production of the light metal.

***War Budget***

The new additional war budget of ¥ 2,800,000,000 voted by the extraordinary session of the Diet which met (December 16) to deliberate on the Pacific war will bring the total war budget for the 1941 fiscal year up to ¥19,000,000,000 including ¥4,900,000,000, the original sum ; ¥3,800,000,000 the supplementary estimate, and the fresh addition.

To cover part of these mammoth expenses, the Government at the November extraordinary session of the Diet had secured its consent for increased taxation, chiefly in indirect taxes, and will submit a bill for increased direct taxes at the regular session to be convened toward the year-end. The rest is to be met by bond issues.

***Wartime Japan Sees Things Go in Order***

Wartime Japan, steadily carrying on reconstruction of all public organs in educational, industrial, financial, economic, and social fields as well as in international cultural efforts, witnessed the following events :

The Nippon Christianity Organization was newly formed and

formally recognized (November 24) by the Education Ministry. The new body embraces 34 evangelical organizations, 1,534 churches, 388 religious associations, 2,697 preachers and fully 260,000 members. It divides the Christian activities in Japan into two parts with the Nippon Tenshu Kokyo (Catholics) recognized in May last.

Japan and Brazil exchanged the ratifications (September 23) at Rio de Janeiro of a cultural treaty, effective December 5, 1941. It is similar in nature to the Italo-Japanese cultural pact and is expected to contribute much toward developing cultural intercourse between the two countries.

Delegates from Thailand, the Philippines, China, Manchoukuo, Turkey, Mongolia, numbering 50, gathered at the Matsumotoro Restaurant at Hibiya Park, Tokyo, (November 13) and resolved on a plan to urge all Asiatic peoples to form a common front against the Anglo-Saxons.

The Society for International Cultural Relations, Tokyo, announced (November 28) the receipt of seven essays on various phases of Japan, sponsored by the society to commemorate the 2600th anniversary of the founding of the Empire. They are: The Impressions of Japan" by Laurence Binyon, noted British art critic, poet and member of the Royal Museum; "The Origin of Japanese Culture" by Arthur David Waley, late assistant keeper in the department of prints and drawings, British Museum, and author of the *noh* plays of Japan, *The Tale of Genji*, *The Pillow-book* of Sei-Shonagon; "Kyoto" by Giacinto Auriti, former Italian Ambassador to Japan; "The Ukiyoé in Europe" by Louis V. Ludow, American poet and art critic; "The Primer on Bushido" by Arthur Lindsay Sadler, professor of Oriental studies at University of Sydney since 1922; "Re-Conception on Japan" by Chou Tso-jen, head of the literature department, University of Peking; and "Japan in History" by Dr. Kalidas Nag, professor of Oriental studies at University of Calcutta and a well-known authority on Asiatic culture.



# WAR IS ON US

*By SAKUTARO TACHI*

ON December 8, 1941, His Imperial Majesty the Emperor of Japan issued a Rescript, declaring war upon the United States of America and the British Empire. The Imperial Rescript declares: "To cultivate friendship among nations and to enjoy prosperity in common with all nations has always been the guiding principle of Our Empire's foreign policy. It has been truly unavoidable and far from Our wishes that our Empire has now been brought to cross swords with America and Britain."

Referring to the origin of the China affair and aggravation of the disturbances in East Asia due to aid given the Chungking régime by both America and Britain, the Imperial Rescript says:

"Although there has been re-established the National Government of China, with which Japan has effected neighbourly intercourse and co-operation, the régime which has survived at Chungking, relying upon American and British protection, still continues its fratricidal opposition. Eager for the realization of their inordinate ambition to dominate the Orient, both America and Britain, giving support to the Chungking régime, have aggravated the disturbances in East Asia. Moreover, these two Powers, inducing other countries to follow suit, increased military preparations on all sides of Our Empire to challenge us. They have obstructed by every means our peaceful commerce, and finally resorted to a direct severance of economic relations, menacing gravely the existence of Our Empire. Patiently have We waited and long have We endured, in the hope that Our Government might retrieve the situation in peace. But Our adversaries, showing not the least spirit of conciliation, have unduly delayed a settlement; and in the

meantime, they have intensified the economic and political pressure with a view to compel thereby Our Empire to submission. This trend of affairs would, if left unchecked, not only nullify Our Empire's efforts of many years for the sake of the stabilization of East Asia, but also endanger the very existence of Our nation. The situation being such as it is, Our Empire for its existence and self-defence has no other recourse but to appeal to arms and to crush every obstacle in its path."

The relations between Japan on the one hand and the United States and the British Empire on the other were friendly at first. Especially cordial were the relations between Japan and Britain for a time that they even concluded an alliance. Later, however, Britain became hostile to Japan, whose political and economic development she suspected might prove prejudicial to her interests in East Asia. The United States, while sticking to the Monroe Doctrine, which aims at non-intervention by non-American Powers in matters relating to the American continents also launched a vigorous policy toward the Pacific, by annexing Hawaii and also occupying the Philippines and Guam as a sequel to a war with Spain. Furthermore, she stoutly advocated the open door principle for China, prompted by the desire to find a new market in China for her industrial products. To secure the application of the principle to the entrie regions then constituting China, the United States advocated territorial integrity for China. The open door principle, which was originally advocated for commercial exploitation of China, was used for political purposes, having degenerated into an instrument for denying Japan her legitimate interests, despite the fact that Japan was entitled to special interests in China by her geographical propinquity. The United States also played the major rôle in obstructing Japan's actions in connection with the Siberian question and the Tsingtao issue.

At the Washington Conference, following the termination of the first European war, America urged Britain and Japan to terminate their alliance. The open door principle, stipulated by





the Nine-Power Treaty, which was concluded at the Washington Conference was different in substance from that envisaged by the Hay Note of 1899, and yet America and Britain forced it with their velveted, mailed fists upon the other countries which were represented at the Washington Conference (Note 1). Besides, America and Britain stubbornly refused to support the Shidéhara foreign policy, which, based upon the Washington agreements, was aimed at seeking a peaceful solution of all political and economic questions between Japan on the one hand and America, Britain and China on the other, by turning to China for the supply of raw materials, needed for the industrialization of Japan. Not only that, the United States enacted an anti-Japanese immigration law in 1924, the year after the disastrous earthquake in Tokyo and Yokohama, by defying the Gentlemen's Agreement of 1908. Further, America carried out a customs tariff reform, by disregarding vigorous represen-

Note 1. The open door principle, envisaged by the Hay Note of 1899 was intended to be applied to the spheres of influence or interests, possessed by the Powers in China, but the open door principle, stipulated by the Nine-Power Treaty, was intended to be applied to entire China. The very existence of spheres of influence or interests was first adduced as the reason for advocating the open door policy, but later it was denounced as conflicting with the open door policy. The major obligation of the Powers with their spheres of influence or interests in China in observing the open door policy was first an active and positive one to accord equal treatment to all nationals, excluding the Chinese, in their own spheres of influence or interests. Later, the obligation of the Powers except China in connection with their observance of the open door policy was interpreted to consist in refraining from entering into any agreement of such a nature as ran counter to the open door policy or from acquiring monopolistic or preferential concessions or undertakings of such a nature and also from supporting their nationals in acquiring such concessions and undertakings. Thus, it became a passive and negative obligation (cf. Paragraph 1, Article III of the Nine-Power Treaty). First, it was applied to designated commercial activities, but later it was applied generally to all commercial and industrial activities. At the Washington Conference, Baron Shidéhara, Japanese delegate, submitted a very moderate modification that the provisions of the Nine-Power Treaty should not be retroactive so as to prejudice the rights and interests enjoyed by the signatories before the conclusion of the treaty, pointing out a difference in substance between the open door principle, stipulated by the proposed Nine-Power Treaty and that enunciated by the Hay Note of 1899. Whereupon American Secretary of State Hughes emphatically declared that the open door principle had been recognized by and prevailing among the Powers since 1899 in almost the same sense as stipulated by the American-proposed Nine-Power Treaty, adding that the open door principle would be more clearly defined by the Nine-Power Treaty. However, this statement was entirely against the fact.

tations from Japanese traders. All those Anglo-American moves served to discredit the Shidéhara diplomacy in the eyes of the Japanese people. This, coupled with the Shidéhara diplomacy's failure in dealing with China, led to a popular outcry for a more energetic policy toward China.

At first, the United States had no large political and economic interests in China, but nonetheless she supported China against Japan in connection with the Tsingtao issue and other questions. Later, however, she made investments in China in trying to support her, which increased her interests there. By invoking the so-called Monroe Doctrine, the United States does not permit Japan to interfere in affairs relating to the American continents, but she has persistently assumed an attitude of interfering in East Asiatic problems against Japan.

In a memorandum, handed to Joseph C. Grew, the American Ambassador, at 8 a.m., December 8,1941, the Japanese Government stated :

> It is the immutable policy of the Japanese Government to insure the stability of East Asia and to promote world peace, and thereby to enable all nations to find each its proper place in the world.
>
> Ever since the China affair broke out owing to the failure on the part of China to comprehend Japan's true intentions, the Japanese Government has striven for the restoration of peace and it has consistently exerted its best efforts to prevent the extension of warlike disturbances. It was also to that end that in September last year Japan concluded the Tripartite Pact with Germany and Italy.

The current China affair was started by Chinese troops at the Marco Polo Bridge in north China when they wantonly attacked the Japanese garrison. The measure taken by the Japanese forces in self-defence was resisted by the Chinese troops, with the result that hostilities spread to all parts of China. With the extension of hostilities, Japan found it imperative to seek a fundamental solution of the situation in East Asia and endeavoured to construct a sphere of common prosperity throughout greater East Asia. In order to frustrate Japan's endeavours, Britain and America in collusion set up the so-called ABCD encirclement camp against Japan, by enlisting the support of





Chungking, the Dutch East Indies and Australia. They severed economic relations with Japan and strengthened their war preparations in order to coerce Japan into submission. Thus, a situation arose in which a further waste of time on the part of Japan would have cost herself her very existence.

Japan, who draws a clear demarcation between East Asiatic problems and European questions, desires to solve the former without European interference. On the other hand, she has found it necessary to implement measures against America and Britain, who have been attempting to frustrate her efforts by aiding the Chungking régime. She has been also called upon to provide against the Red menace. This is the reason why she concluded the Three-Power Pact with Germany and Italy, which explicitly provides for Japan's leadership in East Asia against Western intervention in that part of the world. Japan's memorandum to the United States of America also makes it clear that Japan concluded the Tripartite Pact with Germany and Italy, actuated by the desire to restore peace and to prevent a further extension of the war. The more the ABCD encirclement line is tightened, the closer will the bonds between Japan, Germany and Italy be drawn.

As pointed out by the Japanese memorandum to the United States, both the United States and Britain have resorted to every possible means to assist the Chungking régime so as to obstruct the establishment of a general peace between Japan and China, interfering with Japan's constructive endeavours toward the stabilization of East Asia. Soon after the Tokyo parley between Japan and Britain for the settlement of the Tientsin issue, the United States abruptly notified Japan of her intention of terminating the Treaty of Commerce and Navigation of 1911. The Japanese memorandum to America discloses :

> Exerting pressure on the Netherlands East Indies, or menacing French Indo-China, the United States and Great Britain have attempted to frustrate Japan's aspiration to realize the ideal of common prosperity in co-operation with these regions. Furthermore, when Japan in accordance with the protocol with France took measures of joint defence of French Indo-China, both the American and British Governments

wilfully misinterpreted it as a threat to their own possessions, and inducing the Netherlands Government to follow suit, they enforced the assets freezing order, thus severing economic relations with Japan. While manifesting thus an obviously hostile attitude, these countries have strengthened their military preparations, perfecting an encirclement of Japan, and have brought about a situation which endangers the very existence of Japan.

As pointed out by the summary of the Japanese-American negotiations released by the Foreign Office on December 8, 1941, Japan concluded the protocol for joint defence of French Indo-China with France, because a survey of the prevailing international situation pointed to a possibility of French Indo-China's safety being menaced, and consequently of tranquillity of East Asia and safety of Japan being exposed to danger. The nature and extent of the military preparations consolidated by the ABCD line-up, referred to by the Japanese memorandum to the United States, will be dealt with later, as they have a close bearing upon Japan's declaration of war upon the United States and the British Empire.

A statement by the Japanese Government on December 8, 1941, *inter alia* says :

Despite such menace to the existence of Japan and the stability of East Asia, the Japanese Government, anxious to preserve the peace of the Pacific and to prevent the spread of warlike disturbances to all the world, conducted patiently and prudently for eight long months diplomatic negotiations with the United States. We urged upon the United States, and Britain at its back, and also other countries under the influence of the two Powers, reconsideration of their attitude. We showed the spirit of conciliation as far as it was compatible with both the existence and prestige of our Empire, and we endeavoured toward a peaceful settlement. We tried all that could be tried, and did all that could be done. However, the American Government, toying with Utopian principles, refused to recognize the plain realities of East Asia. Blinded by its material strength, it failed to see the real power of Japan. And in conjunction with associate Powers, the American Government increased military menace in the belief that it could thereby compel Japan's submission. No longer exists there any hope or a formula to maintain the peace of the Pacific in co-operation with the United States and associate Powers through the adjustment of our relations with them by peaceful means. The stability of East Asia and the existence of Japan are now in jeopardy. Even today they are directly attacking our armed forces.





Such being the situation, an Imperial Rescript, declaring war on the United States of America and the British Empire has been issued.

The Japanese-American parley was dragged on for a long time because "the American Government, always holding fast to theories in disregard of realities, and refusing to yield an inch on its impractical principles, caused undue delays in the negotiation," as pointed out by the Japanese memorandum to the United States. Limited space forbids expatiation upon all the American "impractical" or "Utopian" principles, but let it suffice to refer to the typical ones to which the United States Government "held fast" during its negotiation with Japan.

The Americans are a people who have a strong partiality to so-called principles. One is "Monroeism," another the principle of freedom of the seas, and still a third the principle of the open door. The Japanese-American negotiation, which preceded the outbreak of the Pacific war, was punctuated with American principles or theories. The most typical ones were the four principles, advocated by the United States as fundamental principles of international relations. The Washington talks struck a snag when Cordell Hull, the American Secretary of State, requested a clarification of Japan's attitude toward those four American principles, as well as toward the questions of the Three-Power Pact, of non-discriminatory treatment in international commerce and of evacuation of the Japanese troops from China and French Indo-China, on October 2, 1941, as revealed by the Foreign Office's summary of the Japanese-American negotiation. In the meantime, the third Konoye Cabinet resigned in the middle of October, 1941.

The fatal American four principles mentioned above are :

(1) Respect for the territorial integrity and sovereignty of each and all nations.
(2) Support of the principle of non-interference in the internal affairs of other countries.
(3) Support of the principle of equality, including equality of commercial opportunity.
(4) Non-disturbance of the *status quo* in the Pacific except as the *status quo* may be altered by peaceful means.

At a casual survey, these four American principles would appear to be fair and equitable, but they would not bear out a close scrutiny. The first principle advocating respect for territorial integrity may be proper in some cases when applied to a particular country as in the case of the Nine-Power Treaty, which was applied to China, but it will not bring about equitable and fair results when applied equally to all the countries. Territorial integrity, as applied to China, was advocated to reinforce the principle of the open door, to which it was an accessory. The principle of territorial integrity, which implies maintenance of the territorial *status quo* and respect for the vested rights to territory, tends to perpetuate the distinction between the "haves" and "have-nots."

The fourth principle, which stands for non-disturbance of the *status quo* in the Pacific except through peaceful means, is different from the first principle of territorial integrity in so far as its application is limited to the Pacific area and it is applied to matters other than territory, but as far as territorial matters are concerned its significance is almost the same as that of the first principle. Besides, the Stimson doctrine is injected into the fourth principle, as it refuses to recognize any change in territory and other matters, brought about by war or other forcible means. Inasmuch as the fourth principle incorporates the Stimson doctrine, which refuses to recognize the Manchoukuo Empire, its unqualified approval on the part of Japan would result in shattering her project for the construction of a co-prosperity sphere in greater East Asia, bringing to naught her strenuous efforts and heavy sacrifices in the construction of a new order in that part of the world.

The third principle of equality of commercial opportunity or non-discriminatory treatment in international commerce is full of ambiguities. It is not clear whether equal treatment will be given to foreign nationals or to nationals of the country as well, and what commercial affairs will be involved in the said equal treatment. In case the subjects of a country and the





foreign nationals are to be treated equally without any discrimination, such a non-discriminatory treatment will be confronted with numerous cases in which the prevailing realities will render it impossible to apply the principle. On the other hand, if equality of commercial opportunity is to be accorded to the foreign nationals excluding the subjects of the designated country, the result will be a universal application of the open door principle (Note 2), which has hitherto been applied to China only, universally to all the countries in connection with commerce. In such an event, both Japan and the United States will find themselves in a position similar to China. Both Japan and America will be compelled to accord equal, non-discriminatory treatment to all foreign nationals, allowing themselves to be subjected to various restrictions in the execution of their economic and financial policies. If the principle is to be applied to China only, this will be nothing more or less than a reaffirmation of the open door principle, stipulated by the Nine-Power Treaty. But nonetheless it seems that the Japanese Government during its recent negotiation with America expressed its readiness to approve the principle, in case it was equally applied to all the countries. On the part of the United States, however, she apparently lacked confidence in the universal application of a principle she has professed herself to be so fond of. Danger lurking in proposing or accepting an abstract principle shows itself in a general principle like this, which appears at the first glance to be innocuous.

The second principle of non-interference in the internal affairs of other countries is but natural in the light of interna-

Note 2. The open door principle in China is intended to regulate the relations among the Powers interested in China, not the relations between China and other Powers. The Nine-Power Treaty in Article I, paragraph 3, provides that all the signatories with the exception of China pledge their endeavours to establish effectively and maintain the principle of equality of commercial and industrial opportunity among all nationals throughout the Chinese territory, but it is generally interpreted that the term "all nationals" does not include the Chinese people. Otherwise, the Chinese Government would be compelled to make all foreign nationals participate in the benefits which it gives to the Chinese people. Such an interpretation, however, is not accepted by the Chinese Government or by foreign Governments. Therefore, the open door principle in China means equality of opportunity for foreign nationals, excluding the Chinese people.

tional law, unlike the first, third and fourth principles. Even this principle, however, cannot be applied unlimitedly under international law. Even setting aside those cases which are recognized as based on treaties, the right of self-defence or self-preservation may be invoked to carry out interference in the internal affairs of other countries in case of necessity, while one country may naturally intervene in the domestic affairs of another country to protect its resident nationals. It is dangerous to recognize the principle of non-interference in the internal affairs of other countries as an absolute and unlimited one.

As already pointed out, it would be fraught with unforeseen danger to advocate or accept abstract principles. The United States Government in its negotiation with Japan, "toying with Utopian principles, refused to recognize the plain realities of East Asia," according to the Japanese Government's statement, issued on December 8, 1941. In other words, the United States Government refused to treat Japan on an equal footing by attempting to force high-handedly upon Japan those abstract principles, which had slight, if any, connections with the pending questions.

While continuing its negotiation with Japan for an amicable settlement of the Pacific question, the United States Government not only severed economic relations with Japan, but resorted to various measures for bringing pressure to bear upon Japan in conjunction with Britain and its satellites. The result was the organization of the ABCD encirclement camp against Japan. In addition, the United States frantically launched a mammoth naval building plan, while strengthening her naval and air bases in the Pacific. Since August, 1940, military preparations were rushed in the Philippine Islands, evidently with a view to opening hostilities, as evidenced from construction of air bases, reinforcements of the garrisons, an increase in the submarine flotillas, imports of large numbers of aircraft, arms, ammunition and other war accessories installation of anti-aircraft batteries along the sea-coast, mining of Manila Bay and arming of American merchant vessels plying in the western Pacific. Furthermore, the United States submitted a proposal to the British Government for the joint use of Singapore and also reportedly requested the Netherlands East Indies and Australian Governments for the loan of military bases. A plan also was mooted by the United States for organizing an air patrol over the Burma Road, the only supply route for the Chiang Kai-shek régime, in order to prevent it from collapsing.





On the other hand, the Governor of Malaya suddenly proclaimed a state of emergency over the Federated States, while Admiral Sir Thomas Philips was appointed Commander-in-Chief of the British Far Eastern Fleet, which was organized on an equal footing with the British Mediterranean Fleet. Reinforcements of artillerymen and engineers were dispatched to Malaya from England, while additional warships were sent to Singapore from India and South Africa. Under the pretext of defending Malaya, the British authorities concentrated large troops along the border between Malaya and Thailand, threatening to invade the latter country at a moment's notice. The United States also sent her aeroplanes to reinforce the British air force.

At the same time, military negotiations apparently got under way between Britain and the Chungking régime for the protection of the Burma Road. Thus, the war preparations among Britain, Chungking and America against Japan made a steady progress as time went on. On the part of the Netherlands East Indies, it had already ordered a general mobilization against a possible war with Japan. The ABCD encirclement of Japan was further strengthened with the addition of Australia. And nobody could be sure whether the Soviet Union would not join it. A powerful alignment among the ABCD countries, political, economic and military, was designed to check Japan's southward advance effectively, creating a situation in which hostilities might break out at any moment. "Thus, the earnest hope of the Japanese Government to adjust Japanese-American relations and to preserve and promote the peace of the Pacific through co-operation with the American Government has finally been lost," as disclosed by the Japanese Government's memo-

randum to the United States. The memorandum concludes:

> The Japanese Government regrets to have to notify hereby the America Government that in view of the attitude of the American Government, it cannot but consider that it is impossible to reach an agreement through further negotiations.

The Imperial Rescript, referred to at the beginning of this article, declaring war upon the United States of America and the British Empire, was promulgated at 11 a.m., December 8, 1941. Immediately, the American and British Embassies and the Canadian and Australian Legations in Tokyo were notified by the Japanese Government of the existence of a state of war between Japan and the respective countries on and after December 8, 1941. There is not the slightest doubt that a declaration of war, as stipulated by the Third Treaty of the Hague, had been in force following this notification. The question, however, remains whether the memorandum, handed by Shighénori Togo, the Foreign Minister, to Joseph C. Grew, the American Ambassador, at 7:30 a.m., December 8, represented Japan's declaration of war upon the United States.

At the outbreak of the Russo-Japanese War (1904–5), Mr. Kurino, the then Japanese Minister at St. Petersburg, on February 6, 1904, expressly declared to the Russian Government the termination of the negotiation and the right reserved by his Government to take independent action. At the same time, the Japanese Minister announced his intention to leave for home with his legation staff members. This is regarded by Professor Westlake as implying a declaration of the start of hostilities (Westlake: *International Law, War*, p. 25). But the writer hesitates to regard the Japanese memorandum as a declaration of war upon the United States, because it does not contain any statement which may be interpreted to reserve the right to take independent action on the part of Japan.

The Third Treaty of the Hague stipulates that hostilities shall not be opened without a declaration of war or without serving an ultimatum, which contains a notice of opening of hostilities on certain conditions. However, it has failed to stipulate





the length of time to elapse between the said notice and the opening of actual hostilities. Hence hostilities may be started simultaneously with the declaration of war. It has also failed to prohibit a hostile act which may be entirely unexpected by the other party. In short, the treaty has failed to realize the object which it envisages. It remains as a mere bluff or simulacrum. In this connection, it can be hardly expected that a State should give ample notice of hostilities to its adversary and thereby give the latter enough time to take counter-measures, when it wages a war in which it stakes its very existence. Considered in this light, the Third Treaty of the Hague is possessed of no *raison d'être*. Such a treaty as is nothing more or less than a bluff or simulacrum will be overruled in case of emergency by the right of self-preservation, which prevails over the provisions of all international commitments.

Some contend that war as an instrument of national policy violates the provisions of the Anti-War Pact. But it must be remembered that the Anti-War Pact is an impossible one without meeting the actual requirements of international life, because it is aimed at outlawing war or employment of other forcible means as an instrument of national policy without providing a reasonable way for the settlement of international disputes or conflicts. As a matter of fact, the signatories of the pact have recognized the right of self-defence which they reserved in adhering to the agreement. In its note to the Powers concerned in June, 1928, the United States Government made it clear that the American proposal for the Anti-War Pact contained nothing limiting or violating the right of self-defence, which is inherent in every sovereign State and involved in every international agreement. It is quite natural.

In dealing with the ABCD encirclement camp, which has been strengthened with an evident intention to wage war on her, Japan should not be criticized for violating the Anti-War Pact, simply because she has invoked her right of self-defence or self-preservation, and started hostilities by forestalling the moves of her adversaries.

Both the United States and the British Empire profess to champion the cause of liberalism and world peace as well as international equality. And yet they refuse to recognize racial equality (Note 3). As regards international equality, they also refuse to recognize it under one pretext or another. Prompted by the desire to safeguard their vast territories, they advocate the maintenance of the *status quo*, including their acquired rights. Entirely forgetting their past careers, they attempt to restrain the natural development of rising nations, denying them their living space. They themselves wield mighty power, but they do everything possible to prevent others from acquiring power They advocate disarmament, simply because they want to retain their comparative strong positions in armaments. Their "pious" endeavours for the maintenance of world peace have only resulted in causing world-wide disturbances.

On the part of the United States, she adheres to the Monroe Doctrine for the American continents, while obstructing Japan's natural development in the Asiatic continent by extending her political activity to East Asia. Some statesmen in America and Britain seem to realize the necessity for recognizing proper living space for other nations, as well as the fairness of recognizing a doctrine similar to "Monroeism" for other continents than the American ones, but do not see their way to carrying out their opinions (Note 4).

The mounting menace from Britain and America has caused Japan to tighten her relations with Germany and Italy in her fforts to settle the East Asiatic imbroglio separately from the Europe issue. Economic pressure brought by America and Britain to bear upon Japan is designed to suffocate her. It is

Note 3. The immigration law, now in force in the United States, is highly discriminatory against Japan, whose nationals are denied the privilege of entry on the quota system, simply because they belong to the yellow race.

At the Versailles Peace Conference, following the termination of the first European war, Japan put forth strenuous efforts to incorporate the principle of racial equality in the League of Nations Covenant, but in vain, mainly due to Anglo-American opposition. Japan had to be content with the insertion of the phrase, "by the enforcement of the principle of equality of nations and just treatment of their nationals" in the preamble of the Covenant.





as hostile as military action. No wonder that Japan should invoke her right of self-preservation when Anglo-American military action has come on top of economic pressure against her. All treaty provisions could not restrain Japan from invoking her right of self-preservation, which has led to her declaration of war upon the United States of America and the British Empire.

Note 4. The joint Roosevelt-Churchill declaration of August 24, 1941, pledges respect of the United States and Great Britain for the existing obligations in economic matters and promises to do everything possible on the part of the two countries so as to enable all countries, irrespective of whether large or small, victor or vanquished, to acquire under equal conditions commerce and raw materials, needed for their economic prosperity. This joint declaration apparently was issued by President Roosevelt and Prime Minister Churchill to remove the major cause for the failure of the League of Nations, namely economic nequality, which prevented the "have-nots" from acquiring necessary raw materials and foodstuffs, bringing home to them the necessity for securing living space, while no measure was taken by the "haves" to retrieve the situation. It is highly problematical, however, whether economic equality will be realized under the patronizing attitude of America and Britain, especially since the League of Nations has failed to attain it.

With regard to the Monroe Doctrine, Mr. Stephen Early, the White House Secretary, in the summer of 1941, apparently under instructions of President Roosevelt stated that the countries in the Western Hemisphere would jointly decide upon the disposition and administration of the possessions in the Western Hemisphere of those countries in Europe, conquered by Germany, The White House Secretary added that a similar regional principle would be recognized for other continents and that the United States Government would ask no voice in the disposition of French Indo-China, because of its place in the sphere of Asiatic influence.

Later developments of the international situation, however, have clearly demonstrated that President Roosevelt has no intention whatever to recognize such a regional principle for other continents.

# THE PACIFIC WAR IN THE DIET

*By ISOJIRO FURUSAWA*

AN Imperial Rescript was issued on December 8, 1941, declaring war on the United States of America and the British Empire. A week later, that is, on December 15, the seventy-eighth session of the Diet was convened. This epochal meeting was held fully one month after the preceding seventy-seventh session of the Legislature, through which the Japanese nation expressed its firm resolution to cope with any emergency, confident of the realization of the larger policy of the country. By dispelling the dark clouds which had hovered over the Pacific in the past nine months, the Government, by giving full play to the national will, grasped the timely opportunity to achieve a historic result. In other words, the seventy-eighth session of the Diet was called to put finishing touches to the business initiated by the preceding session, which reviewed the nine-month old negotiations with the United States for an amicable solution of the Pacific *impasse*. Both these two sessions will not only occupy a prominent place in Japan's parliamentary annals, but will be forever remembered by the nation for their special significance.

At the outset, due attention should be paid to the unique nature of the war of greater East Asia and to the consequent effects on the world situation. The so-called Anglo-American "democratic" group is confronted with the Axis alignment, led by Japan, Germany and Italy. The point of contention between them is that, while the former favours the maintenance of the *status quo*, the latter is determined to create a new world order. No country on earth can now safeguard its national existence, without being involved in this inter-Power struggle. It is true





that there are certain countries which are professing neutrality in the conflict between the "democracies" and the Axis *bloc*, but they are bound, sooner or later, to clarify their attitude, thereby dividing the world into two camps—one standing for the security of the *status quo*, namely, the old order, and the other demanding the destruction of that set-up to install a new one. It is, therefore, no wonder that the Tohjo Cabinet, which replaced the third Konoye Ministry, jettisoned the two-pronged Konoye diplomacy directed toward maintaining closer relations with Germany and Italy, as well as seeking an understanding with the United States to facilitate the creation of a new order in East Asia. It may be said that Japan began her final and supreme efforts to terminate such an unworkable formula with the dispatch of Ambassador Saburo Kurusu to Washington on November 5, 1941, and conducted negotiations until November 26, when the White House resolutely declared to stand by its so-called three basic principles.

The war of greater East Asia is regarded as a sacred campaign, because it is being waged by Japan to initiate emancipation of East Asian peoples, uprooting the unscrupulous intrigues of America and the British Empire. It is undeniable that Anglo-American imperialism is bent upon establishing its economic hegemony by leading Japan and China in a war of attrition, so that these two Oriental countries will ultimately become their colonies. The Imperial Rescript issued on December 8, 1941, in part, says :

> It has been truly unaviodable and far from Our wishes that Our Empire has now been brought to cross swords with America and Britain.

Japan's ardent desire to insure the stability of East Asia, thereby contributing to world peace, has been nullified by America who, refusing to pay elastic heed to realities, was adhering to such Utopian principles as could not be applied to the actual international political situation. Since Britain aided by her Washington ally perfected an encirclement ring against Japan, marshalling the force of Chungking and the Dutch East

Indies, Tokyo had no other alternative but to resort to arms, however unwillingly, to protect its legitimate interests. Therefore, it is obvious that Japan was not even remotely inclined to precipitate hostilities.

There is no denying the fact that since April last, despite unbearable direct and indirect pressures, Japan sincerely attempted to terminate the mounting tenseness in the Pacific situation, but the utterly non-compromising attitude of the Anglo-American "democracy" frustrated her genuine endeavours, which were based on her traditional morality. The same national morality impelled Japan to strive hard for the prevention of the Sino-Japanese War of 1894–5 and the Russo-Japanese War of 1904–5. More recently, Japan's withdrawal from the League of Nations clearly disclosed her unsophisticated hankering after a new, abiding order of the world in replacement of the old, unjust one. Her severance of relations with Geneve caused the upsurgence of a world-wide new deal movement. All subsequent actions of Japan had been inspired by the same age-old morality to seek a new, abiding order of the world. The moral character of the war of greater East Asia is hinged on diffusing the spirit of *Hakko Ichiu*, which inspired the founding of the Japanese Empire, so as to enable all the peoples of East Asia to obtain their just places. Because of this fact, the current upheaval in East Asia is fundamentally different from the aggressive war, which is being waged by Britain and America to conquer other nations. It may be difficult to appreciate the meaning and character of the wartime Diet in Japan without taking due cognizance of this noteworthy dissimilarity.

Prior to the outbreak of the war of greater East Asia, the seventy-seventh extraordinary session of the Diet was convoked on November 15, and it was devoted to a review of the Japanese-American negotiations then progressing in Washington. Significantly enough, it took the opportunity of clarifying the extent of the limit of Japan's conciliatory attitude, both of the Government and the people, and of preparing the nation to face the worst eventuality in the event of a breakdown in the





parley. The seventy-eighth extraordinary session is called the wartime Diet, as it met while the war of greater East Asia was in full swing. On that occasion not only all details of the Japanese-American pourparler were revealed, but emphasis was laid on the moral character of the gigantomachy. While the wartime Diet, endorsing popular expectations, reinforced the national faith in undoubted victory, impressive scenes were witnessed in both the Houses of Peers and Representatives, where official statements were made announcing splendid naval achievements, unparalleled in the world naval history, attained by the Japanese Navy in Hawaii, off Malaya and in other places in the southwestern Pacific.

The seventy-seventh session of the Diet opened at a time when the Japanese-American negotiations were entering upon a delicate stage of development. Therefore, the nation was not taken into full confidence by the Government, which was obviously not in a position to keep the people informed of *sub judice* matters. As a result, the general public began to speculate whether the Konoye formula would be followed by the Tohjo Cabinet or whether the latter would scrap it. However, the gloomy atmosphere was somewhat cleared by the unanimous adoption of resolutions by the two branches of the Legislature, declaring that there was a limit to Japan's conciliation and urging the Government to stand firmly on its grounds against the propositions of Washington.

Now that war has started between the two Pacific Powers, the internal situation in the country has assumed an entirely different character, being free from the gloomy atmosphere of the past nine months. The Japanese nation has been clearly shown why and how the Pacific war has developed. The people are now solidly behind the Government in its prosecution of the war designed to liberate that part of the world from the bondage of Anglo-American oligarchy.

Addressing the seventy-eighth session, Premier General Hidéki Tohjo emphatically asserted that the United States of America submitted unreasonable proposals to Japan despite the

latter's conciliatory attitude. He added:

> Three points of the American proposals, which Japan could by no means accept were as follows: (1) Withdrawal of all Japanese military, naval, air and police forces from China and French Indo-China. (2) Withholding of support—military, political and economic—to any government or régime in China other than the Chungking administration. (3) Conclusion of an understanding that no agreement already entered into with any third Power shall be interpreted in such a way as to conflict with the establishment and preservation of peace throughout the Pacific area.
>
> In other words, the United States demanded of Japan to withdraw all her armed forces from China and French Indo-China; to repudiate the Nanking Government; and to renounce the Three-Power Pact. It became clear that the intention of the United States was to challenge Japan with a rupture of economic relations and military intimidation, and thereby to bring Japan to her knees. Had Japan accepted the American demands, not only the strenuous efforts of Japan for long years in the stabilization of greater East Asia would have been brought to naught, but also Japan's very existence would have been jeopardized and Japan's faith would have been lost, by being compelled to break her pledge given to her allies for co-operation in restoring world peace.
>
> Such a thing could never be borne by Japan under any circumstances. When things came to such a pass, Japan, though ardent in her desire for peace, had no course left her but to rise up with arms to safeguard her prestige and existence.

The Premier stressed that Japan would not lay down arms until the United States and the British Empire were completely defeated.

On the same occasion Foreign Minister Shighénori Togo declared:

> The American Government are said to be propagating mischievous reports to the effect that Japan suddenly waged war without warning, but it is the American Government themselves who first provoked us by assuming a decisively warlike attitude. It is no other than the Governments of the United States and Great Britain, who trampled upon Japan's earnest desire for the maintenance of peace and forced war upon us. At the previous session of the Imperial Diet, I stated clearly that there was a limit to Japan's conciliatory attitude. The American Government ought to have known this fully. The Government must have been fully aware, through the protracted negotiations, what constituted the limit in which Japan could acquiesce.
>
> They should naturally have expected what consequence would ensue if they forced demands upon us beyond that limit. If they truly misunderstood the statement clarifying the limit of our conciliatory attitude as implying a bargaining or bluff, we must conclude that the American Government were utterly blind to the actual situation.





The foregoing official statements rightly characterized Anglo-American diplomacy, which was based on hoax and unilateral concession. The leaders of America and Britain unfortunately underestimated the military and economic potentialities of Japan, while they painted too rosy a picture of their own preparedness. Their gross miscalculation cost President Roosevelt the *débâcle* of the United States Pacific fleet based at Hawaii on December 8 and Prime Minister Churchill the loss of the *Prince of Wales* and the *Repulse* off the Malay shores. The American Navy, which President Roosevelt was boasting to be second to none in the world, became a third-rate fleet almost overnight due to the Hawaiian disaster swiftly effected by the Japanese Navy. Simultaneously the main body of the British Far Eastern fleet became extinct with the sinking of the "unsinkable" *Prince of Wales* and the *Repulse* by the Japanese naval air force. Such astounding accomplishments, which created no small amount of sensation throughout the world, were duly reported in detail to the Diet by Navy Minister Admiral Shighétaro Shimada, thus adding to the national faith in final victory. Official announcements regarding military and naval successes at the initial stage of the war coincided well with the temper of the wartime Diet.

The Government submitted to the seventy-eighth session three budget bills, including an extraordinary military budget, which totalled 2,800,000,000 yen. These three measures were approved by the Diet on the very day of their introduction by dispensing with the committee stage, together with a bill relating to the issuance of government bonds. The extraordinary military estimates voted by the Diet from July, 1937, when the China affair broke out up to the seventy-eighth session reach the enormous figure of 29,005,760,000 yen. This is 150 times the military expenditure undergone during the Sino-Japanese War of 1894-5, which was little above the 200,000,000

yen mark and about 20 times the military expenses required for the Russo-Japanese War of 1904-5, which stood approximately at 1,500,000,000 yen. Roundly speaking, it can be said that this colossal budget figure is nearly 7 times the aggregate military expenses incurred during the Sino-Japanese War, the Russo-Japanese War, the first World War and the Manchurian incident. This feature of expansion in extraordinary expenditure clearly illustrates the spectacular development of Japan's economic resources. The following figures indicate the military expenses borne by the nation since Sino-Japanese War in the Meiji era :

| War or incident | (In 1,000 yen) |
|---|---|
| Sino-Japanese War | 200,472 |
| Russo-Japanese War | 1,508,472 |
| First World War | 881,661 |
| Manchurian incident | 1,931,250 |
| Total | 4,521,858 |

The extraordinary military costs since the outbreak of the China affair are follows :

| Date of approval by Diet | (In 1,000 yen) |
|---|---|
| Appropriated from the second reserve fund, 1937 | 10,198 |
| 71st Diet, August, 1937 | 307,208 |
| 72nd Diet, September, 1937 | 2,022,671 |
| 73rd Diet, March, 1938 | 4,850,000 |
| 74th Diet, March, 1939 | 4,605,000 |
| 75th Diet, March, 1940 | 4,460,000 |
| 76th Diet, February, 1941 | 1,000,000 |
| 76th Diet, February, 1941 | 4,880,000 |
| Appropriated from the second reserve fund, 1941 | 74,690 |
| 77th Diet, November, 1941 | 3,800,000 |
| 78th Diet, December, 1941 | 2,800,000 |
| Total | 29,005,767 |

If the ordinary budgets under general accounts since the start of the China affair are added, the net amount will reach the stupendous figure of more than 50 milliard yen, far exceeding the combined expenditures of the State in the past seventy years or so, beginning with the Meiji Restoration of 1868 and ending in 1936, the year before the outbreak of the China affair.

All these voluminous expenses have been so far met without





any interruption—a fact which testifies to the strength of Japan's financial fabric. Even if the current war were to continue for another five or ten years, Japan's economic resources would not be much adversely affected, greatly perhaps to the amazement of Great Britain and the United States, who had long ago expected that Japan would go bankrupt a few years after the Manchurian imbroglio.

It is generally believed that when a country becomes involved in war, its economic resources *ipso facto* suffer from a diminution. In the case of Japan, however, regardless of the contrary prediction of the Anglo-American "democracy," the country's economic power has been steadily replenished since the beginning of the Manchurian issue in 1931, with the result that the national economic structure has been laid on a foundation more and more stable. In this connection, it must be noted that only a fraction of the extraoadinary military estimates approved by the Diet since the flare up of the Manchurian incident has been inured as war expenses, while the bulk has been expended either in accumulating war materials or in expanding industrial production. For instance, funds invested for the expansion of industrial production throughout Japan, Manchoukuo and China since the culmination of the Mukden episode have been estimated at more than 23,000,000,000 yen. Again the goal of annual national savings, fixed by the Government reached 41,000,000,000 yen at the end of September, 1941, thus facilitating the absorption of 85 per cent. of the total government bond issues.

Finance Minister Okinori Kaya in his speech at the seventy-eighth session of the Diet categorically declared that the economic situation of Japan had remained calm since the commencement of the war of greater East Asia. He pointed out that no confusion prevailed in the credit side, and that no large-scale withdrawals of deposits from banks were reported, while all fields of industrial activity recorded a remarkable upswing. A serene and composed attitude maintained by financial and economic circles supplied fresh incentive to envigorate the

economic life of the nation, thereby revealing the intrinsic power of the people, as well as their abiding faith in ultimate victory. On the other hand, the stock markets in both New York and London registered a steady slump with the progress of the war; whereas the Tokyo stock market began moving upward. This phenomenon could only be explained through the medium of the popular Japanese confidence in a more profitable economic prospect, which is bound to become a *fait accompli* as a sequel to the Pacific war.

Needless to say that the South Sea region will play an important rôle in Japan's economic mobilization plan. The main objective of the war, which is now being waged by Japan against the ABCD *bloc* controlled by America and Britain, is to recover the rich natural resources of that Pacific area from the two "democratic" Powers, so that the East Asian peoples as a whole will share in their bounties. This economic aspect and moral significance of the war were fully clarified before the seventy-eighth session of the Diet.

Inclusion of the South Sea region, which has been a major supplier of raw materials to Japan, in the proposed East Asiatic co-prosperity sphere means a weighty gain to Japan's economic resources and a death blow to the Anglo-American economic domination. For political, economic and military reasons, the United States has long been in the habit of calling the South Seas as her "life-line," which starts from Dutch Harbour in the Aleutians in the north and extends to Manila in the south *via* Pearl Harbour, Midway Islands and Guam Island. But this American life-line has been shattered at various points by the Japanese Army and Navy since December 8 last.

The United States is endowed with a high percentage of economic self-sufficiency, but nonetheless she depends cn other countries for the supply of 14 items of important war materials. She entirely relies on outside markets for antimony, manganese, nickel, quinine, raw silk, chrome, hemp, rock-crystal, rubber and tin, while she has to import from foreign countries mica, mercurry, tungsten and copra, the domestic production of





such materials not being enough to meet the internal demand. All these essential products are obtainable in the western Pacific, especially in the South Sea region. Already the Japanese Navy has counter-blockaded America, by cutting off her sources of supply of rubber, tin, quinine, tungsten, manganese and chrome. The Japanese control over the sea-lane will seriously upset further war preparations of the ABCD line-up, particularly of America and Britain.

On the part of Japan, it is possible to establish her sphere of economic *lebensraum*, by prosecuting to a successful conclusion a battle on economic resources accompanied by a sea blockade. This point too was clearly thrashed out at the seventy-eighth session of the Diet, which went on record pledging to continue fighting America and Britain until the final victory was assured.

Premier General Hidéki Tohjo, who has severed diplomatic relations with Britain and America and has amortized the Konoye formula aimed at maintaining a balance of power both at home and abroad and avoiding friction, is a full general in active service, holding the portfolios of War and Home Affairs in addition to Premiership. Although his unique position enabled him to unify the High Command and the Government, he availed of the seventy-eighth session of the Diet to enunciate his policy against invoking martial law, in spite of the outbreak of the war of greater East Asia. Before a Lower House committee on a bill providing emergency control over speeches, meetings, publications and associations, the Premier in reply to an interpellation whether the envisaged emergency control would not be affected by the promulgation of martial law, said that he would do his utmost to avoid invoking such a measure during this total war period. He admitted that it was easy to enforce martial law, but pointed out its various accompanying evils which would entail the administration of the country by the force of arms. This considered statement of the Premier not only clarified his attitude toward home politics, but also demonstrated the fact that the wartime structure of Japan is

free from such tensions calling for an invocation of martial law.

Though the seventy-eighth session of the wartime Diet was held only for two days, it became of historic significance, for it transacted important epochal business. While on the one hand it served as an instrument to cement the bonds of unity between the people and the Government, on the other it illuminated the joint resolve to prosecute the war to a successful end.

In moving a resolution for the attainment of the objective of the war, which the House of Representatives adopted unanimously, Tatsunosuké Yamazaki stated :

> Japan has taken up arms, for there has been no course left open to her. Justice is bound to prevail. The entire nation is now firmly determined to pull through any difficulty ahead, being sparkled by a growing faith in convincing victory.... It must be remembered, however, that the United States of America and the British Empire, endowed with enormous resources, mean to become the last buttress of the cause of the old order. They are foes, who should never be made light of. There will be various difficulties ahead, which Japan will be called upon to overcome before defeating her enemies. We have achieved a signal victory at the beginning of the war, but we must renew our determination all the more firmly to go through any hardship and privation in the future, being carefully guarded against all possible intrigues and political warfare to be let loose by the adversaries. The whole people are upholding the Government, prompted by their sincere desire to render their services to the State. I trust that the Government reposes implicit confidence in the entire nation which is ready to sacrifice itself on the altar of the State.

His speech and the resolution strongly impressed the general public, which has become unsweveringly confident of the realization of the unchangeable policy of a greater East Asia co-prosperity sphere.



# JAPAN'S VICTORY IN HISTORICAL LIGHT

*By MASANORI ITO*

INCLUDING the Civil War, the United States Navy is generally considered to have been in seven wars and won seven victories, and so it was no boasting that Colonel Frank Knox, the American Secretary of the Navy, often spoke of the "unbeaten tradition" of his country's fleet. But that glorious tradition has been shattered by the débâcle in Hawaii where the proud standard of the American Navy was furled and shrouded in the black infamy of the greatest defeat in the history of world navies.

The victory of the Japanese Navy in Hawaiian waters is epoch-making. As the greatest decisive sea battles, it has been the rule generally to mention those of Tsushima and Trafalgar. But for the greatest victory won by a surprise attack, the achievement by the Japanese Navy in the assault on Pearl Harbour on December 8, 1941, is unparalleled in the naval history of the world.

The damages inflicted on the American Navy, according to the reports of the Imperial Headquarters, may be tabulated as follows :

| | Strength before the attack | Strength after the attack |
|---|---|---|
| Battleships | 9 | 1 |
| Aircraft carriers | 2 | 2 |
| Heavy cruisers | 8 | 4 |
| Light cruisers | 8 | 4 |
| Destroyers | 54 | 50 |
| Submarines | 24 | 20 |
| Air force | 700 | 240 |

It will have been seen that the American Pacific Fleet has

all but been lost. What remains only consists in the main of one capital ship, one aircraft carrier, the other having taken flight, and eight cruisers. The loss of five capital ships, namely, the *West Virginia*, *California*, *Arizona*, *Oklahoma*, *Utah* and the destruction almost beyond repairs of three capital ships, namely, the *Maryland*, *Tennessee*, and *Nevada*, have almost completely undermined the strategic position of the American Navy. Its effect on the naval war between Japan and the United States can hardly be over-estimated.

II

If the present writer is permitted to elaborate on the official reports, mention must be made of the destruction of the 1,000 feet dry dock at Pearl Harbour. Although no information is available as to the extent of the damage actually caused, there is good reason to assume that the Japanese Navy, making it an objective of its bombings from the beginning, inflicted sufficiently heavy damages on it as to put it out of operation. If so, the American Navy has lost, in addition to five capital ships gone to the bottom and three others of the same category put out of action for a long time, a section of the naval base so important that it may be called the heart of the naval facilities at Pearl Harbour. The extent of the damage caused must be said almost unfathomable because by reason of the loss of the dry dock, Pearl Harbour has ceased to function as the most important base for the main American Fleet. In consequence, the American base for naval and air operations against Japan has been thrown back some 2,400 miles.

Some of our readers must have wondered why no American capital ship had been dispatched to Manila. It must have appeared strange that the great port of Manila had harboured not a single unit of the American capital fleet. The simple reason was that at the naval base at Cavite, Manila, there is no dry dock for battleships. Battleships cannot be based at any port without adequate docks for their repairs. It would never be safe to engage in battle around such a port. A damaged





battleship without a base within easy reach can only go down to the bottom. In the battle of Jutland the British warships *Warrior* and *Sparrowhawk* sank on their way back to their base. On the other hand, three German warcraft, *Ostfriesland*, *Derfflinger*, and *Seydlitz*, although badly crippled, escaped sinking by limping into Wilhelmshaven in the nick of time.

Docks, so indispensable for naval warfare, are no simple affairs. Their construction require much of both time and material. An expenditure of anything like twenty million dollars, which would be the cost involved, would not be too much of a strain on a country like the United States, for instance, but it could not complete the project in less than a year and a half. The King George V dock at Singapore took four years to complete and 52,000 cubic yards of Portland cement in material. The dry dock at Pearl Harbour, what with a set-back experienced in the form of a collapse occuring during construction, consumed altogether a period of six years. Whatever may be the extent of the damage caused by the Japanese attack, until the docking facilities are rehabilitated, not only must the naval base at Pearl Harbour remain crippled, but the damaged three or four battleships lying there be left unrepaired and useless.

III

According to the Japanese *communiqué*, three battleships were heavily damaged in addition to the five units of the same category sunk. Had the dry dock been left intact, these ships would be repaired with utmost speed and rushed back into operation. But this possibility has been precluded from the American calculation what with the dock itself wrecked and cranes, motor generators and machine shops around the dock damaged to a greater or less extent. Although it is impossible to predict the date when the dock will be repaired, it is certain at least that the docking facilities at Pearl Harbour will not be available for some time to come. If the damaged ships are at once to be repaired they must be towed to either Mare Island,

opposite San Francisco, or Bremerton, near Seattle. But it is more likely that they are in no condition even to be towed.

Granting that one or two of them are fit to be so transferred to the west coast, it would be too hazardous an attempt when command of the sea around Hawaii remains in the hands of the Japanese Navy. The strategic operations of Japanese warcraft in Hawaiian waters remain a total secret. But that they would not overlook any enemy vessels crawling on their way at a tardy pace of a few miles an hour, seems beyond question. Nor is it likely that the American Navy will become foolhardy enough to embark on such an undertaking that would be tantamount to suicide. In the circumstances the damaged ships, even though left afloat, would be little better than those lost units as far as the actual naval war is concerned and must remain so for some considerable time to come. The writer therefore computes that the actual damages inflicted on the American Navy in the battle of Hawaii include eight capital ships, and draw the conclusion that the victory, in terms of actual achievement within a period of three short hours, must be considered of greatest historic importance. American Secretary of the Navy Knox has reported that only three capital ships were sunk and the others damaged. But the ships that cannot be put back into action are little better than lost.

It may be pertinent next to inquire what remains of the capital fleet of the American Navy. Prior to the war's outbreak there were 18 units including the over-age vessel *Utah*, of which mention has already been made. It might be more appropriate to say that only 17 were fit for action. Since of this number seven or eight have been lost either permanently or for a prolonged period of time, there now are 10 units left. Of this remaining number three, namely, the *Texas*, *New York*, and *Arkansas*, in consequence of the controversy raised with the British Navy over the issue of gun elevation in 1922, failed to be equipped with modernized main armaments. In other words, their 14-inch guns are unfit for action at distances beyond 20,000 yards. For this reason these three battleships





were formed into an independent squadron and kept in the Atlantic. They are obviously unfit for the war with Japan. The remaining strength of the American capital fleet may therefore be computed to be only seven in number, namely, the *Washington*, *North Carolina*, *Colorado*, *Mississippi*, *New Mexico*, *Idaho and Pennsylvania*. The margin of advantage that the American Navy once held in the ratio of 5 to 3 against Japan has now been reversed in favour of the Japanese Navy. It is highly ironical that the United States which since 1921 had consistently insisted on the 5 to 3 ratio found the same margin of superiority turned against herself in three brief hours of one ill-fated morning.

## IV

Next it is in order to look into the historic victory of the Japanese Navy. The term "historic" is purposely used here and the reason for it must be made clear. For it has of late become a rule to array adjectives in the superlative degree in reporting successes of Japanese arms. But the present writer has always made it his principle to comment on them in terms relative to historical facts. Therefore, it is all the more his pleasure that he can say that the victories achieved in the battles of Hawaii and Malaya are, without qualification, the greatest historic victories ever known.

Confining our attention to the naval war with the United States, which is the subject for the present discussion, the surprise attack on Pearl Harbour was historic for a three-fold reason. First, it was historic in its strategic conception. Second, it was historic in terms of the results achieved. Third, it was historic in arms and their application. For explanation, reference must be made to world history regarding two particular cases of naval warfare: the surprise attack made by the British naval air force on the naval port of Taranto on November 11, 1940; and the surprise attack made by Commandant Rizzo, of the Italian Navy, by penetrating the port of Fiume in May, 1917.

If it is found necessary to bring in for comparison the night attack made outside Port Arthur on February 9, 1904, by destroyers belonging to the First Fleet of the Japanese Navy, there of course can be no objection on the part of the writer. But it appears more appropriate to consider this naval incident in the light of the initiative-taking strategy adopted by the Japanese Navy at the time, or as an instance of the death-daring spirit which has been its tradition. The night attack outside Port Arthur was made on the eve of Japan's declaration of war against Russia and at once won its own niche in the world war annals. In the scope of results achieved it was regarded as a world record in itself. A dozen Japanese destroyers, forming three flotillas, made a surprise attack on Russian warcraft lying at anchor outside the port. This assault took place five minutes after midnight on the morning of February 9 and was directed against the Russian battleship fleet, resulting in heavy damages to the battleships *Letvizan* and *Tzezarevitch* and the heavy cruiser *Palrada*. Almost by one stroke Admiral Togo's battle fleet gained 20 per cent. against the enemy force. Russia, admitting her defeat, dismissed the commander-in-chief of the naval force based at Port Arthur, a naval event forming an interesting contrast with the present battle of Hawaii.

With all interesting features of the night attack on Port Arthur notwithstanding, the writer is confining his attention to the British attack on Taranto and the Italian sortie into Fiume for the present purpose, because the former was made by the use of aerial torpedoes and the latter by small craft venturing forth into an enemy base, and as such both easily lend themselves to comparison with the battle of Hawaii.

V

The battle of Taranto took place on the night of November 11, 1918, Armistice Day. Aeroplanes taking off the British aircraft carriers *Eagle* and *Illustrious* of the Mediterranean fleet, winging their way in moonlight, swooped down on the Italian capital ships lying in the southernmost port and inflicted heavy





damages on them. Before the assault was made the British Navy had knowledge of the presence of the Italian capital ships in Taranto and had their exact positions photographed from the air. With all those preparations completed beforehand, the assault was launched on the holiday night.

As to the damages wrought to the Italian battleships, British and Italian versions vary too widely to permit any accurate estimate. But according to British claims, supporting their position by means of aerial photographs, one battleship was sunk and two badly damaged, with the result of reducing the Italian capital fleet's strength by 50 per cent. According to what has been admitted by Italy, one ship was sunk, but the others were damaged within reparable limits without visible effect on the actual naval force of Italy. The present writer would give more credence to the Italian version. But seeing that there was a reshuffling in the command of the Italian Navy after this battle, Premier Mussolini must have had reason to be displeased with what had taken place at Taranto. The deduction may be permissible that Premier Mussolini, who had been dissatisfied with the navy which for six months after the war's outbreak had failed to give a true account of its own capacity, took the occasion of the battle of Taranto to give expression to his dissatisfied mind. For there can be no question but that with the order of valour and heroism of which Commandant Rizzo proved himself capable, as to be mentioned later, the Italian Navy should have inflicted heavier losses on the British Navy in the Mediterranean.

The battle of Taranto, apart from the results really achieved there, was unquestionably the first instance in world history of aircraft carriers conveying planes for an attack on enemy capital ships by means of aerial torpedoes. For this reason this battle, in its outline form, took the same line as the battle of Hawaii. Nevertheless, I call the victory at Hawaii one of historic import, because, in the points mentioned below, it was characterized by features which surpass any basis for comparison with the British victory at Taranto :

(a) Whereas the British aircraft carriers had only to proceed two hundred miles from their base to reach Taranto, the Japanese vessels had to cover a distance some 10 times as much.

(b) Whereas the British aircraft carrying torpedoes attacked the outer port of Taranto protected by but small defences, the Japanese torpedo-bearing planes penetrated to the heart of the enemy port behind almost perfect systems of defence.

(c) Whereas the British aeroplanes made a single sortie, the Japanese are believed to have made several repeated attacks.

(d) In the battle of Hawaii special submarines were employed for the first time in concert with air arms. Thus assaults were made simultaneously from the air and from under the water.

(e) Whereas at Taranto one capital ship was wrecked and two damaged, at Hawaii five capital ships were sunk and three badly crippled.

VI

On the historic victory of the Japanese Navy or on the strategy adopted for it, there may be no necessity to dwell further. But if anything is to be added from the standpoint of tactics it may be remarked that whereas, in the Mediterranean, attacks on naval ports may be always expected for geographic reasons, in the Pacific, the attack on Hawaii by air forces was something so grandiose in scale that it quite surpassed all strategic conceptions. It is more than probable that the American navy authorities had expected Japanese submarines to venture forth as far as the Hawaiian port and infest waters around it. Against such contingency preparations must have been made. But never did they imagine that large air forces would launch an assault over a distance of more than 2,500 miles. Because of this particular aspect the victory at Hawaii marks a new page in naval history.

Next, attention should be given to the aspect of the underwater craft penetrating into the port. Submarines, as they are, are unable to make their way into any port strongly defended. Since German submarines raided Scapa Flow in the





autumn of 1939 and sank the battleship *Royal Ark*, navies of the world had been paying special attention to the defences of their bases. But the Japanese Navy met the situation by the use of the special submersible boats it had developed. These specially designed boats made their way through the narrow passage into Pearl Harbour and closed in on the capital ships lying at anchor well within the naval base. Of the character of these submersible boats nothing is known. But that they are small craft is easy to presume. In this sense this new arm for attack might be termed a boat comparable to a battalion of death. The *communiqué* stating that "five failed to return" cannot be read without deep sentiment.

The activity of these submersible boats in the second World War marks a surprise appearance of arms and as such is worthy of being termed historic. Germany is said to have scored successes by the use of newly invented arms. The most successful of them all are parachutists who achieved the most outstanding success by making a surprise descent on the Belgian forts. But parachutists made their first appearance in 1937 and not in the present war. The submersible boats of the Japanese Navy are quite new arms which, although some whispers had been heard of them, had never been known until the battle of Hawaii. In the first test to which they were put, they actually sank one capital ship and inflicted heavy damages on two others. In their successful application as well, these submersible boats represent a surprise appearance of arms of historic import.

VII

Lastly, it may be observed that the strategy, as seen at Hawaii, of entering an enemy port is not necessarily in history. There are parallels, but these parallels are only few. The instances of historic fame are five in number. First, the surprise attack on the *Marblehead* by Lieutenant Cushing's torpedo boat in the American Civil War. Second, the raid of Wei Hai Wei by a Japanese torpedo flotilla in the Sino-Japanese War.

Third, the raid of Fiume by Commandant Rizzo in World War I. Fourth, entry into the Baltic of the British submarine E-5. Fifth, the raid of Scapa Flow by Commander Plyn of the German Navy in the present war. All these historic attempts succeeded in heavily damaging enemy battleships. But it is worthy of note that all these instances, with the exception of the second named, represented the exploits of individual ships or individual men. Organized attacks in formation are represented by two historic achievements only of the Japanese Navy, one in the war with China and the other in the current war with the United States.

The most remarkable feature of the battle at Pearl Harbour was the raid made by the submersibles as boats of death. The daring and the technique, by which they entered the port so well defended that even fish might have found it difficult to enter, must deservedly win a niche in the annals of the world. The order of heroism which was shown in this daring enterprise is a vindication of that spirit of loyalty which early sons of the Japanese Navy in January 1895 displayed at Wei Hai Wei.

From the foregoing it will be clear what was the magnitude of the success the Japanese Navy achieved at the outset of this war; how superb were the strategy and the technique of its application; how excellent were the arms employed and the men who were entrusted with them. But these facts must be already known from the accounts that have been in the news. Perhaps it would be more important that these facts will have been seen for what they really are worth: that they represent quite a record in the history of the world. It may well be concluded that the battle of Hawaii quite in itself made a history in point of (1) strategic conception, (2) results achieved, and (3) arms and techniques.

This single sea battle has had the effect of transferring the position of offensive superiority of the United States to Japan in the Pacific war. The American Navy will no doubt bend its every energy on new construction in order to recover its lost ratio of offensive superiority. But, as seen in the case of





the battleship *Washington*, which consumed 41 and a half months, it would be impossible to build a new capital ship in less than three years. Even granting that Japan built no ship in the meantime, it will be at least two and a half years before the American Navy is restored to its pre-war ratio of superiority. Meanwhile, Japan must make her preparations adequate in point of both armament and national living. The time won in which to achieve these ends should be regarded also as one important aspect of the victory won in the battle of Hawaii.

# KUOMINTANG-COMMUNIST RELATIONS AND JAPAN

*By KEN-ICHI HATANO*

IN order to present a comprehensive survey of the relations between the Kuomintang and Chinese Communist Parties, it is necessary that due importance should be attached to the dissolution of the New Fourth Army of the Red faction, which was forcibly realized by Chiang Kai-shek in January, 1941. However, the writer will refrain from giving a detailed explanation of this episode, as it was fully discussed in the article entitled "Chiang's Anti-Communist *coup d'état*," published in the last April issue of *Contemporary Japan*. On the present occasion, efforts will be made mainly to point out the causes which led to such a shake-up, because subsequent informations revealed its serious character, and for the reason that the recent trend of intercourse between the two partisan groups would defy any attempt to grasp its significance without a full understanding of the *débâcle*.

Three major causes are responsible for the dissolution. The first one is the struggle between the Kuomintang and Chinese Communist Parties aimed at the extension of their respective spheres of influence in the country. The provinces of Kiangsu and Anhwei, where the New Fourth Army had stabilized its sway, are astride over the Yangtze and are the most fertile areas of China. Prior to the outbreak of the Sino-Japanese hostilities in July, 1937, these two productive localities were under the control of the Kuomintang Party, which not only regards the entire region as its "Fatherland," but is strongly attached to it. Hence, when a change occurs in the situation in China in the future, it will undoubtedly move into this part.





The Kuomintang Party cannot tolerate even for sentimental reasons that this sector should be occupied by the opposite faction, especially since the latter threatened to organize its headquarters there by suspending its so-called guerilla warfare or maraudering operations.

The second cause is related to the first one. It signifies the junction effected by the Communist forces operating in the North and South. The Red Army in North China, i.e., the Eighteenth Group Army, known also as the Eighth Route Army, succeeded in establishing contacts with the New Fourth Army in northern Anhwei Province in August, 1940. To be more explicit, a detachment of some 15,000 strong belonging to the Eighteenth Group Army left Shansi Province under command of Hwang Ke-cheng in April, 1940, and making a detour of Shantung Province, entered northern Anhwei Province to join the New Fourth Army. This meant completion of a Red T, which the Communist Party had long been planning. The Red T starts from the Shensi-Kansu-Ningsia boundary district, the stronghold of the Communist Party, and traversing northern Shansi Province, pierces the heart of Hopeh and northern Shantung Provinces, from where Red contingents were sent down south to join the New Fourth Army.

Just as the Kuomintang Party was anxious to regain its control over Kiangsu and Anhwei Provinces to provide against future exigencies, the Chinese Communist Party had been preparing to perfect its Red T line anticipating a clash with the former, which is likely to be accentuated following the termination of the Sino-Japanese hostilities. As early as 1938 movements directed toward establishing a point of union were begun by the Red forces in north and south China, with the result that the New Fourth Army was formed. This latest organization immediately dispatched its fourth detachment to northern Kiangsu Province, entrusting it with the mission of guiding Communist activities in north China.

The junction effected in northern Anhui Province in August, 1940, by the Reds in north and south China

represented the attainment of the cherished desire of the Communists throughout the country during the past two years. It meant unification and strengthening of the *personnel* of the high command of the Communist armies, as well as revitalization of their fighting power through an interchange of effectives and war materials. In view of this line-up, the Communist troops in north and south China were able to extend their influence in an " air pocket " of the Sino-Japanese war zone in Kiangsu and Anhui Provinces neglected by the Japanese and Chungking forces, and to that end they rallied the local Communist leaders who had been dispersed since abandonment of their headquarters at Juichin in Kiangsu in 1934.

Chungking was aware of the seriousness of the Communist move. When the Red armies in north and south China launched their alliance drive, the Supreme War Council of the Chiang Kai-shek régime issued a series of orders designed to suppress it; but the Chinese Communist Party without paying any attention to such prohibitory measures vehemently carried out the junction between the Eighteenth Group Army and the New Fourth Army.

Confronted with an alarming situation, Chungking endeavoured to induce the Chinese Communist Party to concentrate all its forces in the Shensi-Kansu-Ningsia boundary district, northern Shansi Province, Chahar Province, Hopeh Province and Shantung Province north of the Yellow River, thereby hoping to round them up at an opportune moment—that is, in the event of a breakdown occuring in the relations between the two parties. To attain this objective, Chungking opened negotiations with the Red faction in July, 1940, but failed to reach an agreement even after six months' parley. Growing impatient, on December 9, 1940, it unilaterally ordered the Communist armies to station themselves north of the Yellow River, but as the New Fourth Army violated the ukase, General Ku Chu-tung carried out a *coup d'état* against it in January, 1941.

Relatively speaking, the third cause is not so important, except that it concerns the purging activities of General Ku.





There occurred sanguinary battles between the troops of Chungking under General Han Te-chin, one of General Ku's trusted lieutenants and former chairman of the provincial government of Kiangsu, and the New Fourth Army. In this regard it may be noted that since early in 1940 armed clashes were taking place, mostly ending in victories for the New Fourth Army. The biggest showdown occurred early in October the same year, when General Li Shou-wei, commander of the Eighty-ninth Army of the Han Te-chin forces, was killed in action. About the same time another contingent of General Han was defeated by the New Fourth Army at Hwangkiaochen in northern Kiangsu Province. All these factious disturbances eventually culminated in the staging of the *coup d'état* against the New Fourth Army. The plan in this respect was worked out by General Ku Chu-tung and his adherents, and it was upheld by General Ho Ying-chin, Chungking's War Minister, being finally approved by Chiang Kai-shek. It can be imagined that at the outset Chiang Kai-shek must have hesitated to sanction such a drastic step in deference to the Soviet Union and the Comintern, as well as to the Chinese Communist Party. But the imperative necessity of a long-sighted policy must have impelled him to give his approval and, to avoid tension with the Stalin Administration, he adroitly dismissed the whole incident as a case of military discipline.

The plan to dissolve the New Fourth Army was carefully mapped out and the action was undertaken all of a sudden in a spectacular manner. Although Chungking deserves credit for this move, there is no gainsaying the fact that for the time being it stimulated the popular sentiment of resisting Japan in unoccupied territory in favour of the Communist Party. While the general populace denounced the impudence of the New Fourth Army, they regarded Chungking's action against it as unduly severe, thus revealing their pro-Communist sympathy in the so-called war of resistance against Japan.

Taking full advantage of the popular sympathy, the Chinese Communist Party opened a general offensive against the Kuo-

mintang side from February to June, 1941, during which period inter-party relations suffered an unprecedented setback. However, the outbreak of the German-Soviet war on June 22 initiated a new turn and the party strife was called off. During the past six months mutual relations appeared composed on the surface.

Although no useful purpose would be served by reviewing the inter-party relations in the past twelve months, it would be meaningful to pay attention to the general offensive launched by the Chinese Communist Party against the Kuomintang *bloc* during the five months from February to June, 1941.

No less than three assaults were made by the Communists against the forces of Chungking, the first one being undertaken in protest against the order issued by the Supreme War Council of the Chiang régime dissolving the New Fourth Army. Apart from this military machine, the Chinese Communist Party has its own Supreme War Council at Yen-an in Shensi Province, to which the Red forces in the country have pledged their allegiance. Counter-manding the order of Chungking, the Yen-an council promptly issued a statement refusing to recognize the dissolution of the Fourth Army, and at the same time its spokesman outlined his party terms regarding adjustment of Yen-an-Chungking relations.

The second Communist offensive was in the nature of a reorganization of the Fourth Army. When the sensational *coup d'état* by General Ku Chu-tung was carried out, the Fourth Army suffered between 4,000 to 5,000 men in killed and taken prisoner, representing only about 10 per cent. loss in its total numerical strength. Consequently, its reorganization was effected without difficulty and the Yen-an Supreme War Council appointed Chen Yi as acting commander-in-chief and Chang Yun-yi as deputy commander-in-chief. Moreover, on February 18, 1941, the revamped Fourth Army was again reconstructed into seven divisions and new chiefs were appointed to head them.

The third offensive was in the form of a refusal on the part





of seven Communist delegates to attend a session of the People's Political Council at Chungking.

The People's Political Council, a rudimentary legislature under the Chiang administration, was set up in July, 1938, in pursuance of the decision arrived at an emergency national congress of the Kuomintang Party convoked in the spring of the same year. It has so far held six plenary sessions. The First People's Political Council concluded its session in December, 1940, when a general election took place. The first plenary session of the Second People's Political Council was held at Chungking from March 1 to March 10, 1941. The Chinese Communist Party, attaching significant importance to the deliberations of this form of legislature, sent seven delegates, including Mao Tze-tung, its leader, to the session of the First Council. When the first plenary session of the Second Council was convoked, the Yen-an régime unleashed its political attacks against the Kuomintang group. On February 15, Mao Tze-tung and six other Communist delegates informed the council secretariate by wire that their attendence would be conditional upon Chungking's acceptance of the solution of the New Fourth Army question on the basis of the 12-point scheme telegraphed simultaneously. The Chiang administration, however, suppressed the Yen-an communication, with the result that no reaction was caused among the general public. Resenting this pigeonholing tactics, the Chinese Communist Party made Mrs. Cheng Ying-chao (wife of Communist leader Chou En-lai) and Tung Pi-wu, two Yen-an delegates to the People's Political Council, submit a note to the council secretariate embodying the 12-point scheme and distribute the copies of the same among the council members. Its contents were published by the *China Press* in its issues of September 26 and 27, 1941.

The Communist manoeuvre proved effective inasmuch as the Kuomintang Party had to express its mind on the question. On March 6, Chiang Kai-shek mounted the rostrum during the sixth plenary session of the People's Political Council (the first plenary session of the Second People's Political Council) and

eloquently defended the disciplinary action taken against the Fourth Army. Carefully prepared and couched in guarded terms, his address scored a telling broadside against the Communist demand. Even the masses who had been sympathetic toward Yen-an became apparently disgusted with its obstinacy after hearing Chiang Kai-shek's speech, and as a consequence, the situation began to be favourable for Chungking.

By bringing the Fourth Army issue before the People's Political Council the Communist Party defeated its own purpose. It suffered the worst setback when on April 13 a neutrality pact was signed between Japan and the Soviet Union. The clarification of its stand toward the pact only increased the bewilderment of the Chinese people. The Chinese Communist Party's move to defend the diplomatic tie-up for the sake of Soviet Russia greatly forfeited the sympathy of public opinion in unoccupied territory. On the other hand, in the following month—in May—the Chinese Communist armies declined to participate in the large-scale campaign started by the Japanese expeditionary forces in Shansi Province. It was launched in southern Shansi Province on May 7, ending early in June in a signal victory for Japanese forces over Kuomintang troops under General Wei Li-huang. During the operation the Eighteenth Group Army of the Communist Party, which had taken up positions in northern Shansi Province, did not come to the rescue of the forces of Chungking.

The conclusion of the Japan-Soviet neutrality pact led the people in unoccupied China to fear that the Bolshevist Republic might change its policy toward China and that Yen-an might withdraw from the anti-Japanese front. Their misgivings increased when the Chinese Red Army refused to participate in the southern Shansi campaign. Voicing the popular dissatisfaction, the *Ta Kung Pao*, an influential Chungking newspaper, unleashed tirades against the Communist betrayal, and the strenuous efforts of veteran Communist Chou En-lai to exculpate his party failed to touch the chord of response.

Chou En-Lai had beforehand roused the wrath of Chung-





king by publishing his analysis of the international situation in the May 25 issue of the *Hsinhua* (New China), organ of the Chinese Communist Party. He urged China to continue her resistance against Japan in an independent way, generally deprecating any attempt to prosecute an imperialist war on the side of Great Britain and the United States. Although he raised no objection to receiving aids from the two "democratic" nations, he stressed the necessity of taking advantage of their frictions with Japan. These views of Chou En-lai irritated Chungking, which believes that its destiny is bound up with America and Britain.

During the period from March to June popular sympathy for the Chinese Communist Party deteriorated considerably; but when hostilities broke out between Germany and the Soviet Union on June 22, it was provided with a needed chance to eliminate internal difficulties. Chungking suddenly evinced a pro-Soviet stand and a *rapprochement* was effected between the Kuomintang and Communist Parties. In addition, discussions were held in Chungking aiming at the conclusion of a joint alliance between America, Britain, unoccupied China and the Soviet Republic.

It is no exaggeration to say that the Nazi-Soviet struggle has given the Chinese Communist Party a new lease of life, and it is working to profit by the new turn in the situation. At the outset of the Berlin-Moscow tussle Chou En-lai urged Chiang Kai-shek to defend Dr. Sun Yat-sen's Three People's Principles, pledging the full support of Yen-an to present a united front against Japan. The headquarters of the Chinese Communist Party on July 7 publicly announced that it would strive for the maintenance and solidification of a single-dimensional stand against Japan by assisting the international anti-Fascist rank, so that the alliance between America, Britain, Chungking and Soviet Russia would be reinforced as a sound opposition to the Axis team-work. Under cover of such demonstrations the Chinese Red group began to regain the confidence of the public.

At this juncture, the Chinese Communist Party received another fortunate break in the form of Washington's intervention in political squabbles. For a long time the United States was attaching importance to the maintenance of harmonious relations between the Kuomintang and Communist Parties, allegedly influenced by reports filed by pro-Yen-an writers like Edgar Snow, M. Wales, Agnes Smedley, Major Carlson and others. The Roosevelt Administration apparently regarded co-operation between the two Chinese factions as the main tower of China's resistance against Japan. That is why when relations between them reached the breaking point, it did not hesitate to give a blunt warning to Chungking. In this connection the *Tokyo Nichi Nichi Shimbun* in its issue of July 22,1941, reported that Nelson T. Johnson, American Ambassador to Chungking, strongly criticized Chiang Kai-shek for his vigorous policy toward Yen-an, and he reminded him that, while recognizing and supporting the anti-Japanese government in China, Washington could not remain indifferent to detrimental party strife. Subsequently, Dr. Laughlin Currie, President Roosevelt's emissary who personally investigated the relations between the Kuomintang and Communist Parties, declared that Chungking's fighting power was dependent on co-operation with Yen-an. Again, Dr. Owen Lattimore, an American authority on Mongolian affairs who assumed the post of adviser to the Chungking régime on July 19, 1941, began exerting his utmost to bring about unity between the two sections—a move which he has been advocating for many years.

It can be safely assumed that the pro-Communist attitude of the United States has strongly influenced the mind of the Chungking régime, which has already started advocating an appeasement policy toward the Yen-an set-up.

As the relations between the two organizations had been marked by comparative quietness in the past six months, it can be reasonably imagined that such a taciturn situation, in view of the current international upheaval, is likely to last for a considerable duration. So far as Japan is concerned, she should





refrain from entertaining wishful thinking regarding an early rupture between Chungking and Yen-an; on the contrary, she will be well-advised to implement measures on the assumption that the Kuomintang-Communist collaboration would last for some time to come.

It needs no argument to assert that whether the Chinese Communist Party remains an ally of the Kuomintang or advocates separation from the latter, it will remain as the enemy of Japan. Even when a general peace is established between Japan and China, the attitude of the former with regard to the Reds should not be altered in the least.

Why is the Chinese Communist Party Japan's enemy? Before answering this question it has to be noted that prior to the occurrence of the China affair, the Communist Party had been systematically inculcating anti-Japanism in the country. With the commencement of hostilities between the two nations, it at once became the propelling power of resistance against Japan. Moreover, when a general peace is concluded between the two neighbours, it will strive hard for the Bolshevization of the continent. Because of this concrete fact Japan should regard the Yen-an set-up as the common enemy of East Asia.

It is true that the Communist Party cannot be held solely responsible for all the anti-Japanese bickerings and movements in China, for the Kuomintang *bloc* has also to be blamed for its share in fomenting such disorders. Nevertheless, it has to be admitted that within the fold of the latter there were some advocates of appeasement with Japan, including Wang Ching-wei, and negotiations with Tokyo were conducted along that line. The majority of Kuomintang members are Fascist supporters of Chiang Kai-shek. Very few of them profess rabid anti-Japanism. Even the minor intransigent elements are making a very poor show of their mistaken doctrine. In strong contrast, however, the Chinese Communist Party from the very beginning raised the banner of anti-Japanism inspired and guided by the Third International. By formulating an incendiary policy against Japan, it organized the Chinese masses to resort

to malicious campaigns against the insular neighbour. As early as 1932 it dispatched a circular telegram declaring war on Japan, with the result that the anti-Japanese rancour began to grow rapidly and became outrightly virulent on August 1, 1935, when the Communist Party made a disparaging declaration against Japan. By staging the Sian incident, during which Chiang Kai-shek was imprisoned by the Northwestern Army in conjunction with the Red forces, the Yen-an war-mongers succeeded in dragging the Kuomintang Party into the anti-Japanese camp.

With the prolongation of the China affair, the Communist Party has steadily gained in power as the mainstay of resistance against Japan. Its influence must be taken into account by any Power dealing with China.

What course will be taken by the Chinese Reds in the future? The chaotic international situation does not indicate the conclusion of a general peace between Japan and China at an early date. Should there be a general peace after all, the Chinese Communist Party would immediately secede from the Kuomintang fold to undertake the Bolshevization of China. It would go ahead with its programme for carrying out a Socialist revolution in the "Celestial Empire." This is not a mere guess-work; in fact, it is based upon a sheaf of indisputable evidences.

The Chinese Communist Party professes to be loyal to the Three People's Principles, but its educational programme, as gathered from the material distributed to the members, pays no attention to the political philosophy of Dr. Sun Yat-sen. Its entire educational structure is designed to initiate a democratic revolution as a preliminary to a Socialist revolution—the fundamental creed of the organization. On more than one occasion intrigues centreing on this subversive principle have been brought to light. For instance, Hsu Te-li, experienced Communist leader and former teacher of Mao Tze-tung, in July, 1938, instructed the Communist members as follows:

> Under the prevailing circumstances, it is necessary that all Communists should support the Government to stengthen the anti-Japanese front and to prosecute resistance against Japan to a finish at least outwardly, refraining at the same time from giving open expressions to Communist ideologies. Under cover, however, the organization of all the Communist cells should be stabilized to guide the people to promote Bolshevik idealism and arrest mass psychology. Activities for extending the Communist sway must be directed at workers first and then to young people at various places and officers and men in the fighting services. The Sino-Japanese hostilities are expected to last another three years. Within this period the Communist network must be extended all over the country so as to mobilize the masses under the Red flag. It is of vital concern that cessation of the Sino-Japanese hostilities must pave the way for incorporation of the proletariat and the officers and men in the fighting services into the fold of the Communist Party. In that case, we shall easily rise to power and be able to realize the objective of a Socialist revolution without firing a single shot.





From the foregoing one can clearly visualize the baneful political influence of Chinese Communism. As the immutable policy of Japan is the creation of a greater East Asia co-prosperity sphere, she cannot but regard the Chinese Communist Party as public enemy. Hence, credits should be given to the negotiators of the basic treaty signed on November 30, 1941, between Japan and China for their correct appraisal of the situation and far-sightedness in adding a provision thereto, stipulating joint defence against the Comintern, which is absolutely necessary.

From now on there is only one course left open for Japan —that is, she must energetically apply the provisions of the basic treaty to stamp out the scourge of Communism—a task which she has already begun in dead earnest. Steps taken so far to maintain peace and order in north China, and the setting up of model zones in central china clearly illustrate how the two nations are presenting a united front against the Comintern diversionists. At present, a plan is under preparation to establish a 20-kilometre safety zone in north China on either side of the railway belt to stabilize peace and order, while in central

and south China it is contemplated to extend town limits with a view to eventually establishing inter-urban contacts. Co-ordinated defence measures against Communism are not only being executed in military spheres in north, central and South China, but also in political, economic, ideological and cultural fields.

According to authoritative reports and observations made by inspectors on the spot, all these measures are yielding satisfactory results in occupied area. However, Japan should not be inclined to unduly applaud these token successes. She should be firmly determined to destroy Red influences once and for all from this part of the world, especially when the Japanese nation is keenly aware of its obligation to posterity to eradicate Communism from the soil of Eastern Asia.



# BEAUTY IN SHADOWS

*By JUN-ICHIRO TANIZAKI*

ONE of the questions which arises, or is almost certain to arise, in the minds of Japanese who would have their houses built giving full expression to their concepts of artistic arrangements and consonant with their refined sensibilities, is how to achieve harmony between rooms designed and upholstered in native style and essentially foreign fixtures such as of electricity, gas and water supply. All these things might be scorned or ignored by those who follow the cult of tea, the tribe which might as lief seek quaint pleasures in rural solitude and indulge in fancies under thatched roofs. But those who have to live in urban society and provide decent living for their families could never leave out of accounts provisions for heating, lighting, or sanitation, all essentials of life in its modern and generally accepted sense of the term, no matter whatever their predilections or fancies might be as to forms and traditions that the country has jealously guarded. So those who would accept or admit into their house planning, contrivances inseparably woven with the present-day standard of living, impose on themselves assiduous studies of details such as might escape some other minds. For instance, they would never install a telephone in their houses without asking themselves the question where it might be best concealed, under the staircase, in a corner of a corridor, or somewhere as or less obtrusive. These people would never think of taking in an electric line through the garden except under ground, or permitting an electric switch to be fixed anywhere but within a closet or underneath a shelf placed against a drawing room wall, or suffering an electric cord to lie anywhere except behind a screen. It is no doubt to meet such

dictates of taste that there are nowadays offered on the market varieties of electric lamps or lamp stands designed to harmonize with the style of Japanese rooms; some after the pattern of paper-shaded stands which used to light bed chambers in old times; some shaped like paper-enclosed lanterns; and still others modelled after old fashioned candle-stands. I have had electric lamps made from old curiosities like oil lamps and sleeping room lanterns salvaged from second-hand furniture shops.

I have had the most trouble with room-heating arrangements. For of all things which are known by the generic term of stoves, I have found none so shaped as to harmonize with Japanese rooms. The electric heaters which meet with the most general approval are scarcely more agreeable in point of shape or design when admitted into Japanese style rooms. It occurred to me once that I might install a heater such as are used in tramcars within the cupboard under the pair of shelves on the wall next to the alcove, but the idea was dropped when it was felt how unnatural it would be to feel the winter without the sight of fire, and when it was seen how it precluded the pleasure of hearth-side family gatherings. After a sustained study of the question, I had built a large fireplace such as is commonly provided in farm-houses and had placed therein a set of electric coils. The device proved a fair success, though rather expensive for power consumption, but was found convenient enough for preparation of hot water and effective for heating the room. Trouble next was found with regard to the bathroom and the privy. A certain restaurant manager who is known for his lavish thoughts on art and design throughout his establishment, in providing the bathrooms for his guests, has shown consistent preference for wood to the exclusion of tiles from the tub or the floor around it. He was aware that tiles would have been by far preferable from the economic or practical point of view. But tiles, with all their glaring gloss, would appear quite objectionable when native woodwork is used for the ceiling, pillars and wainscoting. They are less glaring when the room is new and its woodwork





fresh, but when time has seasoned the woodwork and brought out grain effects on its face, the glossy white of tiles stands out in incongruity and discord like a piece of bamboo fastened onto to a wood tree.

Now as for privies, I must say that I am moved to a keen sense of appreciation of Japanese architecture whenever I am shown at a monastery in Kyoto or in Nara a privy, old-fashioned, darksome and always cleanly kept. Much has been said of the quiet and suavity of tea-rooms, but more should be noted of the nerve-soothing atmosphere of privies as developed by ancient native architecture. They are invariably placed apart from the main building in the shadow of moss-covered plants or trees of sweet scented verdure and reached by a corridor. The subdued light admitted into the place and reflected on the paper screening the window provides an atmosphere agreeably conducive to meditation which is satisfying. Or, when the window there is open, one may look out on the garden around the place and seek whatever pleasure the trees or the landscape offer. There one is placed within walls of woodwork marked by pleasurable grain effects and in sight of the blue sky or of green foliage. The whole pleasurable effect would be impossible but for the twilight enveloping the place and the silence that so pervades it that even a tiny mosquito cannot buzz without causing disturbance. A further delightful feature is found in privies in the Kwanto part of the country, where a long narrow window is found close along the floor. Through this window which is for the purpose of sweeping out dust, one may listen to the raindrops dripping down from eaves or trees to spatter against the foot of a stone lantern post or to sink into the mossy carpet laid over a stepping stone in the garden. Nowhere do I listen to chirping insects or singing birds with a more poignant sense of appreciation; nowhere do I contemplate scenes of moonlit nights with a deeper measure of feeling. I have always found it so at all the seasons of the year. I have a feeling that *haiku* poets of our country must have been inspired with numberless themes for composition when they were in such privies.

In some sense, therefore, privies represent the most typical conceptions of Japanese architecture. It is hardly a surprise that our forefathers, who overlooked artistic values in few things and often hallowed them with an unerring poetic instinct should have bestowed thoughts on what otherwise would be the most filthy part of any house, and turned it into a place associable with artistic sentiments. If anything is to be said against it, being placed separate from the house itself, it is not without inconvenience for one just aroused from a slumber. On cold winter nights one may find the passage hardly pleasant or immune from the danger of catching cold. But as a Japanese writer has observed, "satisfaction of artistic sense is found in the cold," and this is especially applicable to the privy, if it is to be felt fully agreeable. There the air should be at the same temperature as outside. In water closets at hostelries of Western style one finds the places heated in winter, but I never can approve of that artificial atmosphere or relish the sense of being inside it.

## II

There is an increasing mode of modelling electric lamps on paper-screened chamber lanterns of old Japanese style. This fashion is an outcome of the general appreciation of qualities of our native paper, its softness and warmth. We are renewing our sentiment or attachment to our paper which has for some time been suffered to pass to the limbo. The paper-screened lamps now on the market are a proof of the general recognition of paper being better adapted than glass to Japanese houses and their upholstery.

Paper is said to have been invented in China. But paper of Western manufacture is quite different from that of Oriental make. The former strikes one only as an article of practical value. Its practicality is the only sensible feature. But we cannot look at the latter without sentiment. At the sight of Chinese or rice paper, or of Japanese paper we always awake to a feeling of its softness and even its warmth which is soothing





in its effect. Paper of Western make, like our varieties, is white, but its white is not the same white that is in that species of Japanese paper which is known as *ho-sho* or in white Chinese paper. The surface of Western paper has the hard appearance of throwing back the light that falls upon it, but the surface of thick *ho-sho* paper and Chinese paper, like that of snow that has just fallen, seems to take in whatever light that falls on it. No less distinct is the feel of our or Chinese paper. Its touch is tender and delicate; it is so soft that it makes no noise when it is folded. It is like touching a tree leaf, which may be stirred by the softest of breeze.

Anything glaring or glossy is not agreeable with our sensibilities. The Europeans often use for tableware silver, copper, iron, and nickel, which are kept well polished and shiny. But that is not our taste. True, we have water-heating kettles, cups, and *saké* warmers of silver, but in no instance is the metal so polished. On the contrary, we value such ware more when the metal is tarnished, bearing the stamp of time and use. It not seldom happens that servant maids, well meaning but new to their work, take silver ware and polish it up to the dismay of their masters.

Something similar may be said about the difference between our crystal and Chilean crystal which in late years has been imported in considerable quantities. Chilean crystal, as compared with our crystal, is much purer and more transparent. Our crystal which has since early times been produced in Koh-shu (Kai Province) is transparent, but its transparency is softened by a faint, misty cloud floating within, and therefore it is without that sense of cheapness which is conventionally associable with transparency. Our predilection is even such that we would prefer pieces of crystal containing non-transparent objects like blades of grass or pieces of plants. This attitude is shown in glasses as well. The Chinese glass ware to which the Dynasty of K'ien Lung gave its name looks less like glass than agate or some similar stones. The technique of glass manufacture was early known in the East, but failed to develop as in the West,

greater interest being transferred to pottery. The development of earthenware at the expense of glass perhaps must be ascribed to some peculiar racial traits. However, it means not that we disapprove anything glossy or lustrous, but rather that we prefer subdued tones and shades to thin transparency and glare. Whether an object of nature or of artifice, we favour that tone of light, shadowed and tempered, which is associable with the passage of time.

There is in Kyoto a restaurant called Waranji-ya which is as well known for its culinary art as for the taper stands used for lighting the rooms. When I went there this Spring I found that while I had kept myself away for some long time, the tapers had been displaced by electric lamps shaped and shaded like old-fashioned room lanterns. It was explained that the change had been made the previous year because there were many complaints against the dim candle light. But, I was told, the old-fashioned taper stands would be brought in if so desired. I was naturally in favour of what I had come in expectation of, and my wish was met. At the same moment I discovered that our lacquer ware appears at its best when seen in a subdued light. The rooms at this restaurant were small enclosed spaces each of four and a half mats and designed for tea ceremony. The alcove pillars and ceilings were deeply darkened adding to the gloom that was all-pervading. A paper-shaded electric lamp was hardly bright enough to light up the room. And when the lamp was replaced by a candle stand and the table and what was set thereon were seen in the low flickering light of the taper, I found in the lacquer ware before me that depth of tone which I had never imagined to be there. When I remained fascinated by the sight it dawned on my mind how our ancestors, after their discovery of lacquer and its possibilities, came to acquire the art of applying it to household and table articles and admire its effect.

Latterly, we have literally turned our backs on lacquer ware. Except at tea ceremonies or at formal dinners, we see nothing but porcelain on our tables. The only lacquer ware





which is seen in the form of tables and soup bowls is considered far from taste or art, if somehow indispensable. This degradation of lacquer ware seems due to the brilliancy added to rooms through changes of lighting methods. In point of fact, it is difficult to think of the beauty of lacquer ware without its association with gloom or shadow. Lacquer ware since earliest times is finished in black, dark or light red colour. Any of such finishes may be said a colour arising out of the accumulation of shadows. It is seemingly the most natural colour to be born out of the gloom that envelops it. Stationery cases, writing desks, and cupboards bearing showy embossed designs and finished in lustrous lacquer often strike me as too glaring and even crude. But once these objects are taken out of daylight and shown in the light, not of the sun or of an incandescent lamp, but of a taper, all the gloss and showiness varnish to give way to a new tone sober in appeal and tranquillizing in effect. It seems certain then that when our artisans of old varnished such ware with lacquer and ornamented it with patterns in gold, they had always before their minds the condition of light to pervade the room in which it was to be shown and the half light in which it should be observed. It seems as certain that gold was so often lavished on works of lacquer in full anticipation of the effect it would produce in the obscure atmosphere wherein it would find itself and of the dim light it would catch and throw back. In short, gold lacquer ware had never been intended to be seen in full flood of light. Its patterns had been so designed as to be observed only in half light, never in their entirety at a time, but one part in one moment and another in the next, with an appeal never loud but always satisfying to the eye that seeks æsthetic pleasures. The elaborate designs that are often wrought on gold lacquer ware are found only in their true value when the ware itself sinks in obscurity, concealing most portion of what otherwise would be too showy or gaudy, and thus attaining an order of suppression and elimination which art demands.

Porcelain for tableware is not necessarily objectionable.

But porcelain lacks both the sense of depth and the shade which lacquer ware has. Porcelain is cold to touch and heavy to hold, and because well conductive of heat, it is not satisfactory when used to hold any hot steaming stuff, the required Japanese manner being to hold such a vessel in one hand when the hot dish is being taken. Another objection is the sound, almost a metallic sound, that earthenware produces. Lacquer ware is soft to touch and light to hold. Whatever sound it may produce under a given condition it is either inaudible or negligible. I always find it pleasurable to take up a lacquer soup bowl and feel its weight and warmth on the palm of my hand. It gives me a feeling as of handling a new-born babe, its warmth and softness. It is for good reason that soup is served, as it always has been, in lacquer wooden bowls. Their place could never be replaced by porcelain ware. It would be far different to have soup served in any sort of porcelain ware. In the first place, the moment the bowl is uncovered, there will be a full exposure of all that is within, the soup with all its colour and ingredients. In the case of a lacquer bowl, there is a sensation of pleasure when the vessel is uncovered and conveyed to the mouth, the while one gazes within at the liquid placid and almost indistinguishable at the shaded bottom. It is not possible to discern at once what is in the watery shadows at the bottom. But it is possible to feel in the palm of the hand the movement of the liquid as it is stirred, to see the presence of steaming vapours from the small drops of water gathered along the upper edge of the bowl, and to relish a foretaste of the soup from the aroma wafted by the rising steam. The sensation that one experiences in the same moment is never comparable to what is possible from any soup served in European style, in flat, open, whitish dishes. It is a sensation, pleasurable and satisfying, and even tinged with that pleasure which is sought in the esoteric rites of Zen Buddhism.

Whenever I think of sitting before a table on which is placed a soup lacquer bowl and listening awhile to the faint sizzling noise coming from it before I proceed to relish what is





therein, I find myself in a happy trance of contentment. The state of meditative contentment attained at that moment must be akin to the mood in which people initiated in the rite of tea ceremony listen to the singing iron kettle and imagine the passage of soft zephyr through the pine trees forming a canopy over the roof of the tea house. It is often said that Japanese cuisine is more for the eye than for the palate, but I would rather say that under a condition such as mentioned above, Japanese dishes are something to be contemplated rather than to be seen.

The late Sohséki Natsumé, whose works represent in many ways the highest literary achievements of the last generation, wrote in his *Kusamakura* (Glass Pillow) how his artistic sense used to be stirred in sight of a variety of Japanese confectionary known as *yohkan*. His fancy was caught by its colour. Its colour is truly conducive to contemplation. Its surface opaque like some precious stone, blending itself with the light it catches, almost dream-like in its colour effect, this sweet stuff has a depth of tint and a complexity of appeal such as are found in no variety of Western confectionery. Compared with it, ice-cream appears simplicity itself, having nothing of what prompts explorative instinct or stirs the imagination. The appearance of *yohkan*, in all its characteristic colourfulness, takes on an even a deeper feature of contemplativeness when it is placed within a lacquer vessel and ensconsed in its shaded bottom where its tint emerges just barely above its dark background. When we put into our mouths a cold, smooth piece of this sweetstuff, we feel the whole shadow of the room transferred and transformed into that small sweet piece and melt away on the palate. Even when the sweet stuff is not so tasty as should be, we find the satisfaction of distinguishing a sensation of something of depth in its taste.

It is probable that in all countries the colours of foods served on the table are arranged for harmony with the colours of tableware or with those of the walls of the room. This seems particularly true of Japanese dishes which, when taken

in full light of day, or from whitish vessels, become half as appetizing as they would be otherwise. Taking for instance our bean soup, one of the commonest foods and almost indispensable at breakfast, its colour shows that it has developed in places but dimly lighted. One time I was invited to a tea party where I was served a bean soup. The room was lighted by tapers by no means too large or too bright, and the soup was in a wooden bowl of black lacquer. I had never imagined till that time that the soup which ordinarily I had taken almost as a matter of daily routine could appear so richly deep in colour and appetizing. It is likewise with *soy* sauce some varieties of which, such as are used with raw fish and pickled vegetables in the western part of the country, are thick and full of shadow, easily lending themselves to harmony with shade. White bean paste, bean curd, fish paste, grated yam soup, raw fish of white meat, or anything of like hues would be half as attractive when they are served in bright light. Even rice is no exception. It is most attractively fair to look on and appetizing when seen within a vessel of black lustrous lacquer. In very deed, when a rice box of black lacquer is uncovered and fresh cooked, steaming rice is shown therein, white and pure, each grain almost sparkling like a pearl, few Japanese fail to take in the sight with a deep, whole-hearted sense of appreciation. It becomes clear that all our foods are based on their intimate and inseparable relations with shadows.

## III

I make no claim to expert knowledge on architecture. But I am told that the beauty of Gothic architecture which often adorns churches in Europe and America lies in the steeples soaring and tossing up their tapered heads heavenwards. On the contrary, the temples and monasteries as they are built in this country are formed, first and above all, by covering a basic structure with a large tiled roof at the top, turning the whole conception of construction into the deep, expansive shadows provided under the eaves. As with temples, so with palatial





mansions as well as with lowly houses: that which stands out most conspicuous, when seen from exterior, is in one instance a tiled imposing roof and in the other a thatched roof; and in either instance the deep hovering shadows underneath the roof. Even in full daylight, in some instances, shadows cast under the eaves are so expansive that they appear as if they were caverns engulfing entrances, doors, walls, pillars, and all. This may be said of imposing structures as of the Chion-in or of the Honganji Temple, both of Kyoto, as well as of farmers' cottages of the countryside. In most specimens of our old architecture, when the portion below the eave is compared with the portion above, inclusive of the roof, the upper section, at least as it strikes the eye, seems heavier, more piled up and more expansive in space than the lower. Thus, wherever we are to put up a place for dwelling, we first of all provide a canopy in the form of a roof and its shadow on the ground, and next in this shaded space we build a house. This is not to say, of course, that Western houses are without roof. But there the roofs are chiefly to provide shelter from rain rather than to shut out the sun. That the prevailing idea is to take in as much sunshine and to provide as little shadow inside is apparent to any observer. If the roof of a Japanese structure is to be compared to an umbrella, the roof of a Western house is like a piece of headgear, and that a cap with no brim. The Western house is flooded with sunlight close up to the eaves.

The long projecting eaves of Japanese architecture may perhaps be explained by a number of factors such as prevalent conditions of weather, available building materials and so forth. For instance, when there was in this country no brick, glass, or cement to be used, it was probably found necessary to have projecting eaves against the winds or wind-borne rain that otherwise would strike the building sidewise. The Japanese, like any other people, must have found well-lighted rooms more convenient than gloomy ones. They probably could not simply help their darksome spaces within their dwellings. As beauty always evolves from actual conditions of life, so our forefathers,

compelled to live in shadowy rooms, discovered in process of time beauty in shadows and next learned how to turn shadows to beauty. As a matter of fact, the beauty of Japanese rooms means nothing if not the beauty of shadows, with their variations in depth. It is not strange that Western people are surprised to find in Japanese rooms only simplicity as of barrenness and grey walls, ornament conspicuous by its absence. They are surprised because they are strangers to the mysticism of shadows. It is our way to devise means to keep the sun out of our rooms which in themselves are designed never to be too bright. This is accomplished by providing an earthen eave or a verandah outside the room to remove it further from the sun. Within, the room is pervious only to the light of day which is reflected from the garden and passed through the paper of the screens around the room. This indirect, subdued and almost faint light is the element of the beauty of the room. The walls inside the room are purposely covered with sand-plaster of weak or low hue so that the incoming light may fall upon them and may be absorbed therein. The plaster used on storehouses, culinary quarters which often form outlying portions of houses, or on the walls of outgoing corridors, is not seldom glossy. But walls within the rooms are generally covered with sand-plaster and seldom if ever given a glossy finish. Glossy walls would be fatal to the effect sought of a half light. Our insistence is on that daylight which has been reduced to a twilight creeping and clinging, almost with its last, dying touch, upon the face of the walls shown in the grey of dusk; an effect subtle, ephemeral and yet lingering. This light effect thrown on the room walls is to us better than ornament, always pleasurable and never cloying. It is natural that the room walls, lest they should fall in dissonance with the light tone of the place, are sand-plastered in one hue, without design or pattern. Different hues may be used, but not in one and the same room, and even where varied hues are adopted, the change from one to another is well-nigh imperceptible. It is not a difference not so much of hue as of shade, a difference





only measurable by the finest sensibilities. But this difference in hue gives to each room a shadow effect distinct from other rooms.

Japanese drawing rooms as a rule are provided with alcoves within which picture scrolls are hung and flowers are arranged. The pictures and flowers, however, are there chiefly to give depth and tone to shadows and are less important as ornaments. Paintings are selected for the alcove with a view, first of all, to their harmony with the walls withinside of the alcove. It is for this reason that importance is attached to the mountings of scrolls quite as much as to the pictures or calligraphies traced thereon. Works of art, pictorial or calligraphic, however exquisite in themselves, would become valueless when they fail to be at unity with the alcoves in which they are displayed. By the same token a work of painting or calligraphy, seemingly with no mark to place it above mediocrity, may, when hung up in the alcove of a tea room, so blend with the general effect of internal arrangements that it at once imparts a new spirit and soul to both to itself and to the whole room. In such happy instances, that which enters into harmony with the general tone of the place is the grey of the paper which bears the work of art, or the ink which has taken on the mellow tone of time, or the cloth mounting on which time has left its impress. This tone or shade of time melts into the gradations of shade within the alcove and pervades the entire room.

When we visit ancient monasteries at Kyoto or Nara, we often find that scrolls of painting or calligraphy which are listed as special treasures are hung in the alcoves of rooms spacious and placed in the deep interior, for both drawing and reading. The alcoves at such places are as a rule shadowy even by day. In the small light that is there it is hardly possible to trace out the line of drawing or distinguish its colours. One only listens to what the guide recites and tries to call up the imagery which is all but lost in obscurity. But the work of painting, with its obscurity and all, appears quite

at home within the shadowy alcove. It seems then how unimportant is the dimness of artistic tracery. It is even felt that the picture should be dim and obscure exactly to that degree. In this case the scroll of painting is nothing but a space or a panel to catch the faint and impotent light that is permitted to penetrate the place. In brief, its service is akin to that of sand-plaster in other instances. It is from this point of view that in selection of scrolls for our alcoves we attach so much importance to the element or tone of time. New paintings which have not passed through the crucible of time, even if done in black only or in light colours, are apt to prove mortal to the shadows of alcoves, unless carefully selected.

If the Japanese room is compared to a painting in ink, the sliding paper screens will correspond to the part of the picture which is drawn in the lightest shade of ink and the alcove to the part rendered in the deepest shade. In sight of alcoves in well-designed Japanese rooms I often wonder at the artistic and subtle intellect the Japanese show regarding shadows and the dexterity with which they deal with light and shade. This wonderful faculty is accomplished without aid of any particular or elaborate artifice or device. Only a recess is created by means of plain wood and as plain walls, and the place thus made is so planned that the light admitted therein produces shadows behind devices and in recesses here and there. It all looks so simple, without artifice or design, yet the effect is there, definite and exquisite. As one gazes on the shadows filling alcove spaces behind the *otoshigaké*, or the frieze at the top front, or around the vase bearing arranged flowers and deposited on the dais, or underneath a pair of shelves fixed at different levels and next to the alcove, one knows why and how those shadows are produced there; and at the same time one is peculiarly sensible of the depth of tranquility and repose settled there as if an eternity of repose reigned those spaces of shadow. The sense of repose found there, uncanny in its force, may be just one of those instances which the Westerners have in mind when they speak of "the mysticism of the East." And this weird stirring





of the imagination is shared by us. For I remember how, in my childhood, I used to be seized by a chilling sensation of unnamable terror as I stood and looked at the shadowy interior of an alcove in a tea room or of a reading room at a monastery. And what is the secret of this esoteric force? The whole secret is to be found in the magic power of shadows. For if light was thrown upon the alcove dispelling the shadows from all its recesses, it would instantly turn into a space of flat blankness. To the genius of our forefathers we owe the art of screening off empty spaces and achieving, from the shadows produced therein by process of nature, effects deeper in the range of appeal than any mural painting or any piece of ornament. The process appears simple enough, but the attention and thought given in designing are deeper because they are not conspicuous. For although they may escape at first sight, there are a multitude of details each claiming elaboration, such as shaping and position of the side-window, depth of the top space behind the freize, height of the dais, and so forth.

## IV

Of all those things I am always most impressed by the sight of paper screens such as found in a monastic reading room. I always pause before it almost forgetting to pass on. It is the effect of light on the paper, a light colourless, flaccid but chastened to purity. The *shoin*, or reading rooms, at monateries were, as their name indicate, originally provided as studies and their windows were to provide light for reading. But what was originally provided to light the room seems in time to have been turned to the purpose of lighting the alcove. But in most instances those side-windows serve less for lighting than for screening and weakening to a proper degree the sunlight which strikes upon their paper sidewise before it penetrates withinside. And how cheerless and chilling is that light which is thrown on the window paper by reflection. The sunlight reflected from the garden has to pass under the eaves and across the verandah before it can reach the window screen. By that time and

through that course it has become so enfeebled, impotent, flaccid, and almost death-like grey, just alive enough to bring out the paper on the screen and show its colourlessness. In large monasteries the drawing rooms are so far removed from the gardens that the light that enters them is too weak to change; it is almost changeless all the year round, through its alternating seasons, day in, day out, rainy or fair, morning or noontime or at twilight. The shadows cast wherever the frame-pieces of the paper screen cross one another seem as if they were dust or sullies never to be removed from the paper. The grey light thrown by the paper screens is too weak to dispel the shadows that hover around the alcove. It is even thrown back by the shade and creates there a space dim, vague and indistinct,—a world between light and shade. Whenever I find myself in that atmosphere I become sensible of the quality of the light that fills the place and feel its presence with a relish which is almost undefinable. In the same moment I am overcome by the strange feeling that should I linger there I should become oblivious of time or its passage so that I should be a white-haired, aged man when I came out of the place. It is a sense, an abject sense of impotence against eternity.

As we make our way into any of such large monastic institutions, passing room after room, along the passage which almost at each step removes one further from the brillance of sunlight, we may come in sight of a folding-screen or a set of sliding screens of gold-foiled face, standing out of shadows in dream-like outlines by throwing back the faint light caught from the garden some way off. The faint gleam of gold, like the dimmed horizon in the glooming, falls feebly on the shadows which threaten to envelop it. Under no other condition does gold appear in more exquisite refinement. Its appeal is so impressive that I cannot pass by without turning back again and again to see it. As I pass from its front to its side view, there is a distinct play of light on the reflective face of the gold-foiled paper. It is a change of light not hurried or abrupt, but slow and almost sustained by moments, like the expression of a giant





passing from one mood to another. When I stand in its sight I can understand why our ancestors used gold on images of Buddha and on the walls of rooms for those born in the purple. The present generation which lives in well-lighted houses have no idea of the true aesthetic quality of gold. People of old who lived in shadowy houses not only found beauty in gold, but most probably were aware of its utility value. Gold used on screens and other things must have served as a reflector. Gold in the form of foil or of sprays was used not only for ornament, but also to supplement light by relfection. When gold was used for such purposes in houses where light never was too abundant, it is easy to understand why much value was given to the metal which is not to be tarnished like silver or others. Speaking of lacquer ware with embossed patterns in gold, I said it should be seen in a darksome place. This seems as well applicable to textile fabrics of old in which gold and silver threads were frequently used from the same motive. A good instance is the scapularies of brocade worn by Buddhist priests. The monasteries and temples of worship as they are built nowadays in urban places have generally their devotional halls so designed as to be airy and light in a modern fashion and for that reason offer no proper condition for observation of those priestly robes. There they only appear cheaply gaudy no matter what pontiffs of high accomplishments wear them. But when one takes part in rites performed at a temple of ancient tradition and by forms as time-honoured, it is seen how well and perfectly the brocade harmonizes with the furrowed skin of the officiating aged priest and the flickering taper lights streaming forth from the sanctuary. It is evident that the priestly robe serves to heighten the tone of solemn devotion that is immanent. This effect, like in the case of lacquer ware of gold embossed designs, is achieved when the fabric which would otherwise stand out in its gaudiness melts for the most part into the shaded atmosphere only to reveal broken and almost uncertain gleams of gold and silver.

V

I make no claim that the sentiment I am conscious of in sight of garments and robes used on the *noh* stage is shared by others. But whenever I see a *noh* production I feel that nothing is more becoming to the complexions of Japanese than the apparel of the *noh* stage. What is seen of it on the stage is often marked with brilliant and gaudy patterns, with abundant gold and silver. Such pieces of apparel are worn by players, who, unlike those of the *kabuki* stage, use neither paint nor powder. And their complexions, either ruddy brown peculiar to Japanese or light yellowish ivory colour, never stand out to better advantage than when seen in contradistinction with those heavily ornamented clothes. Their complexions appear instinct with a glow of life which is captivating in its sensuous force. Good effects are achieved with long-sleeved garments of bossed gold and silver patterns; warrior's dresses of dark green or of yellowish brown; garments donned by water-carriers or hunters; under-garments of plain white; or court costumes of wide skirts. These clothes are especially effective when worn by well-featured young players. Their complexions of youthful glow are brought out in fullness of sensuous appeal, almost voluptuous but not as of the fair sex, and quite its own.

Garments of scarcely less elaborate design are seen in some historical plays and posture-dances produced on the *kabuki* stage. It is common to say that the *kabuki* is richer in sensuous force than the *noh* drama. First or early impressions confirm this. But as one becomes a closer student, the reverse is found the case. It is admittedly true that at first sight the *kabuki* play is more spectacular and not seldom richer in elements of sensuous force. And the bright and high colours of the *kabuki* stage in all likelihood were fully approvable when the boards used to be lighted by tapers. But now that the Western method of lighting is adopted, the stage is flooded with light and in that brilliance the high colours of the *kabuki* drama often degenerate to crudity and vulgarity. As with the gaudy costumes, so with the art of facial make-up. However well





faces might be made up, there is nothing of nature about its fairness. On the contrary, the *noh* players are free from any sort of make-up. Their faces, necks, and hands are shown as they naturally are. Whatever fairness or captivating force discerned in them is natural to them, there being no trickery or delusion. *Kabuki* players who impersonate fair women or appear as heroes of handsome features often are, when seen off the stage, found despairingly disillusioning. But never so the *noh* players. What impresses me is the wonderful fact of players of the same complexion and the same skin colour as ours standing out in striking fairness when they present themselves in garments which seemingly appear so incongruous with their looks.

One time I saw "The Emperor" produced on the *noh* stage. The rôle of the Empress Yang Chi, of fabulous beauty, was played by a male actor whose hands, as shown out of the sleeves, struck me most deeply. I still well remember how fair they looked. As I gazed upon them in deep admiration, I looked at mine from time to time. The fairness of his hands, no doubt, was derived in no small measure from their delicate and artful movement, the wrists, palms, fingers and all; from the movement and deftly studied positions of his fingers in particular, but there was also a fairness of the skin which seemed to glow forth from a mysterious spring of youth within him. Mysterious, because his were nowise different from hands of ordinary Japanese; the same skin colour as mine. But his on the stage appeared almost bewitchingly fair, but mine resting on the laps nowise distinguishable from all others. What was seen of this *noh* player is as well discernible in others of the same stage. In this school of drama the performer's body is exposed to sight only in small parts, face, nape, hands from the wrist to finger-tips. In such rôles as that of the Empress Yang Chi the player does not even show his face, being masked throughout. But what little is visible of him is singularly impressive. Most of the players, if not in the same degree as he of whom I have spoken, with hands nowise differens from what

are common to us Japanese, prove that when they are on the stage, their hands are capable of developing a force fascinating in its appeal such as never imaginable in those clad in ordinary modern gear. I know of no other instance of beauty of such an order achieved by harmony of colours. It is certain that if the *noh* stage were to be given such brilliance as the *kabuki* stage is, its artistic effect thus created would at once be dispelled. It is therefore for good reason that the *noh* stage is shaded as it always has been. It remains so true to the convention which art demands. The older the building, the better. On the boards to which age has given a polish, the pillars and the panels glistening with the sombre imprint of time; on the boards where a large expanse of shadow stretching from the topmost beam to the end of the eaves presses its oppressive weight upon the performing players; upon such boards only can a *noh* play be produced to its full advantage. The recent tendency to produce it at a modern well-lit theatre, from this point of view, must be said ruinous and almost fatal in the result.

This is also true of the *kabuki* play in which shadow is inescapably an element of importance. As now seen, impersonations of female characters by male players are in no case convincing. It is impossible to feel them to be women. This is because the stage is too brightly illuminated. When the stage was lighted, not by electric lamps, as it is at present, but by tapers or oil-burning small lanterns, female impersonations must have been more successful or at least more realistic. It is often lamented that there are no longer such impersonators of femal characters as once there were. The fault is not so much with players as with the condition in which *kabuki* plays are now presented. No male player could expect to conceal all of his angular or rugged lines of masculinity when placed in a flood of incandescent brilliance. Players of old had the advantage of shadows which shielded from sight what should not be seen of masculinity. Whatever doubt I had on this point was removed when I saw the late Baiko play in a leading female





rôle towards the close of his brilliantly successful career.

From a man who is a keen student and an astute critic of the puppet show of Bunraku of Osaka I learned that at that theatre old-fashioned oil lamps used for some years to be employed for lighting even after the coming of the modern era of Meiji, and that the show, when it was presented in that fashion, was far more effective than it is now. Even as the puppet plays go, I believe that they are truer to and better expressive of the characters they represent than the human actors are as they are now seen on the *kabuki* stage. When those puppets were presented on the stage but partially and dimly lighted by oil lamps, invisible must have been hard lines peculiar to man-made figures and vanished must have been the invidious gloss of the hues painted on their faces. All figures must have been completely rounded out in their soft, sensuous lines and as life-like. Whenever I picture to myself the beauty of the ancient puppet show, I am tingled by a sensation imagined but nonetheless cogent.

## VI

How is it that this tendency to seek beauty in shadows so pronounced only in people of the East? People of the West too had had to live through many ages before they had electricity, gas or oil. But as far as my knowledge extends, there seems not a signle instance of any people of the West seeking pleasures in shadows. Whereas in the West the sun is taken as themes of song, Japanese poets have composed lines more of the moon than the sun. We Japanese have always conceived and presented ghosts without legs, the lower part of the body trailing off into darkness. Western ghosts are shown in complete bodies which are almost transparent. Even in such plays of the imagination or fantasy we must have a shade of pitch black, while the Western imagination gives transparency as of glass to creatures of the shades. Even in products of artcraft such as seen in daily life the colours we prefer are accumulations of shade, while those the Westerners favour are accumulations of sun rays. We find silver or copper ware more

pleasing when it is marked by rusty effects ; they would decry metal in such a state unclean and unsanitary, giving it a high polish. Their rooms are carefully guarded against shadow, the ceiling and the walls are often white washed or done in whitish hues. In designing gardens we place trees and plants to create shadowy spaces around them, but they lay out flat lawns of shrub.

How are we to explain this difference between their and our taste? Our attitude toward shadow owes to the Oriental characteristic of seeking contentment in whatever position we may find ourselves in and with whatever we may be given. Wherever shadows fall we, instead of quarreling with them, reconcile ourselves to them as something inescapable. Where but little light is permitted we resignedly make ourselves part of the shade and even try to seek beauty in it. On the contrary, the progressive races of the West have constantly striven to improvement. They turned from tapers to oil lamps, from oil to gas, from gas to electricity, always seeking more brilliancy, scrupulous to dispel every bit of shade.

Beside this disparity in temperament, a good reason seems to be in the difference of bodily colour. We have always set high value on white skin rather than dark. But the white of Japanese skins, even where fairness is distinct, is not the same white of white races. Individually seen, there are Japanese whiter than Westerners even as there are Westerners darker than Japanese. But the white of the one is not the white of the other, just as the darkness of the one is not the darkness of the other. When I lived in Yokohama I was frequently in company with Westerners, going to balls and dinner parties with them. It was my experience to discover at such places that those who seemed not so white at close range appeared distinctly different from the Japanese when observed from a distance. There were some Japanese women of whiter skin than Westerners, but even such women, once placed amidst Westerners, were at once distinguishable. This is because Japanese, however white, are never of that white which is of Westerners. The white of





Japanese is tinged by a faint shade. This shade is detectable even as are sullied objects in clear water when seen from above. Westerners' skins, in some instances may appear somewhat sullied on the surface but, in its true intrinsic quality, is clear and lucent, there being no tinge of shade as seen in Japanese. They are pure white from head to finger tips. So when a Japanese joins a group of them, he appears like a touch of thinned ink dropped on a white piece of paper. His sight is so dissonant with the general effect that it is disagreeable even to ourselves.

It is clear in what intimate relations we yellow-coloured people stand with shade. Since it is natural that people desire not to place themselves in positions of disadvantage any more than they can help, it is not surprising that the Japanese consciously seek shade in all articles and conditions of daily life and try to sink themselves within plays of shadow. True, our early ancestors were not conscious of their skin being shaded ; nor did they know of the existence of people whiter than they. But their sensibilities of colour, as a process of nature, have most probobly given birth to that taste for shade which is characteristic of the race. In other words, the colour of our skin has taught the race its principle of shade and shadow.

# PRICE CONTROL IN JAPAN

*By KAMÉKICHI TAKAHASHI*

PRICE control in Japan has been in a transitional stage during the past few years with the inevitable adoption of temporizing devices to meet development as the nation's wartime economy rapidly shifted from liberalistic to controlled economy.

Wartime price control to be effective must be administered to restrict advances of prices explicitly with a view to preventing a vicious inflation, while simultaneously ensuring adequate production of goods at low costs. The authorities, however, owing to difficulties encountered in the enforcement of control and emphasis necessary in connection with the establishment of controlled economy and also to their liberalistic outlook, were on many occasions predisposed to devote their total energies to curb such acts as violate the control laws and regulations. In other words, their efforts were merely focussed on restraining commodity prices from advancing.

It is also true that price control until quite recently had been enforced on a "short-term war" basis. This is most clearly evidenced by the fact that due stress had not been laid hitherto on the inseparable relations between the primary production costs and sales prices of goods. The policy has been to keep prices low at the sacrifice of the manufacturing enterprises. Such a policy apparently is beyond reproach when applied for a limited period, but would be highly detrimental to productive enterprises in the event of a long-range application, resulting in deterioration of the entire industries and a total economic collapse. Thus it may be said that Japan has entered upon the stage where she must divert her price control system on a short-period war basis to one on a long-range war footing.





It must be noted, too, that the price control system hitherto had been operated on the presupposition that the freedom of international trade would remain generally unmolestered. This erroneous presumption was not limited to price control only, but was the basis for operation of the whole structure of Japan's wartime economic control as well. Things have undergone categorical changes, however. As is well known, the scope of our dependency on international trade has suffered a serious shrinkage, and we are now obliged to shift the whole economic system toward an autarchic structure. There is no denying the fact that this country's price control policy should be completely recast in consonance with these developments.

It must not be overlooked, however, that the Government had ample reasons for pursuing the policy which subsequently was attended by undesirable repercussions. For in those days, a great majority of the people stubbornly adhered to the belief that an intensified tightness in supply of goods, *plus* mounting war expenditures and large-scale productivity expansion programmes, would inevitably cause a vicious inflation. Under such circumstances, the most important and immediate task assigned to the government authorities was to convince the people by action that price advances could be checked and placed well under control in wartime, thereby to win their confidence in controlled economy. Then, the adoption of measures to augment the production of goods was a secondary question. The public, to whom controlled economy was an entirely new thing, still adhered to the liberalistic economic principles that formerly governed the movements of commodity prices, consumption, demand and supply of goods, relations between supply of labour and wage rates and other economic factors.

Various problems and hitches encountered in connection with the administration of price control have gradually been solved. Once it was proved factually that price advances could be averted upon the perfection of the control system, the confidence of the general public in the Government's price control measures has been increasingly stabilized. Today none would

predict a failure of the Government's price policy. This is attributable not only to the broad change that has taken place in the psychology and views of the people, but also to the fact that the whole system of the economic control in this country has by this time been so greatly improved that it is fully efficient to prevent a collapse of wartime economy, regardless of drastic price advances or a supposedly acute inflation.

The next problem confronting this nation is correction of the remaining defects of the control system and augmentation of production and supply of goods, a phase which had hitherto been relatively neglected. With the importation of vital goods and materials seriously restricted by the outbreak of war, the question of expanding the production was never more important. The situation today is such that while the uneasiness of undue price advances has been averted, the accentuated tightness in supply of goods is liable to engender an uneasiness of possible lack of necessary supplies. At this juncture, it is essential to set up a new commodity price control system in order to forestall such an uneasiness of new character.

Another point which demands serious attention is that the Government's price control policy had formerly been ready to sacrifice even the key industries for the maintenance of commodity prices at low levels. This policy defied adverse criticism under those conditions which suggested that the war would terminate within a short period, but it is absolutely unpermissible today when the war is most likely to prove a protracted affair. Adherence to such a policy would inevitably weaken the foundation of the industries, reduce their productive capacity and run counter to its primary objective.

It is because of the foregoing elements that the Government has of late been re-examining its price policy. The former price control had in short been administered chiefly for purposes of controlling the sales prices or producers' prices, leaving the primary production costs practically untouched. The control of the latter costs was at least neglected. As time passed on, however, the primary production costs have risen





steadily, while sales prices have been rigidly kept low. Japan has now entered a stage where she must concentrate on the restriction and stabilization of the primary costs at low levels instead of laying too much stress on the control of sales prices.

These statements of the present writer may lead to a hasty conclusion that the Government's price control policy has been utterly illogical, but such is far from what he means. Those measures taken by the Government were sufficiently effective to deal with the situation at the outset, for it was no blunder then to presuppose that the manufacturers would manage their plants in line with the officially fixed sales prices and refrain from either employing workers or purchasing raw and other materials on an unprofitable basis, because both materials and labour were then abundantly available. Circumstances have undergone gradual changes as a result of increased tightness in supply of materials and labour, which naturally gave rise to sharp appreciation of the primary production costs, labour costs, scrambling among the manufacturers for labour, shady trading and various other undesirable factors. Thus it has become urgent to enforce such measures effectively and directly to prevent a further rise in the primary production costs.

The cardinal objectives of Japan's price control policy today and henceforth are, firstly, to prevent an appreciation of the primary production costs of goods and, secondly, to assure adequate production of necessary goods. Although the policy for the maintenance of commodity prices at low levels and that for ensuring the necessary production contradict each other, in Japan today it is quite permissible to raise the sales prices to a certain extent for the purpose of assuring the production considered necessary. This would have been disastrous in former times, because such a measure would have been liable to give rise to the fear of an inevitable vicious inflation or a collapse of the control. With such possibilities greatly minimized, Japan must and is able to exert greater efforts to expand production even by relaxing the sales price control.

Expansion of production does not solely mean quantitative

increase, but increased efficiency in the management and operation of factories and of labour as well. The latter is a vital necessity today in the face of tightness in the supply of materials and labour. The country's price control policy should thus be reformed in line with this demand. It is quite obvious that the low price policy must be maintained even in the future, but attempts should at the same time be made to expand the production even by effecting upward revisions of prices. Under conditions now prevailing, it is certain that such new measures would not cause dislocation of the low price policy. This does not mean to say, however, that the sales prices may be raised as soon as the primary production costs rise. Nor does it signify that the production can be expanded by increased business earnings resulting from price boosting. In the stage Japan is today, there is very little possibility of expanding production by means of swelled earnings. Moreover, such an arrangement would make maintenance of the low price policy impossible. Yet it is impossible to expect any expansion of production should the manufacturers be forced into a position where they are unable to earn the minimum profits necessary to sustain and expand their enterprises. What the writer means to say is that the sales prices may be raised, if necessary, to ensure minimum profits for the manufacturers.

In this respect prudent care should be taken in order to avoid a vicious spiral of rising primary production costs and sales price boosting. As one of such measures, the Government has since some time ago adopted the subsidy policy. It also has adopted the pool average price system. The application of this system to the sales prices and adoption of various other technical arrangements are conceivable. The price control measures in Japan hereafter will thus be re-formulated in line with this idea.

It is not difficult to attain smooth operation of wartime economy on the whole, but minor economic activities have thus far been unavoidably left uncontrolled. No effective measure, for instance, has yet been found to restrict the increasing num-





ber of cinema frequenters, travellers, and spendings for non-essentials. The only method to deal with these sections has been to absorb the public's floating purchasing power by means of price boosting and increased taxation. Herein lies the significance of the recent actions of the Government in effecting a broad and general increase of indirect taxes, raising the railway fares and tobacco prices. To some people increased indirect taxes may appear contradictory to the Government's low price policy, but such is not the case. The indirect tax increase is an essential measure to achieve the primary objective of the price control policy explained in the foregoing.

Turning to the immediate problem of preventing appreciation of the primary production costs of goods, it is quite apparent that this question cannot be solved unless the control of labour is perfected. The primary production cost in the main comprises labour wages and salaries. In the case of the cement industry, for example, the cost of its essential material, limestone, consists largely of labour wages, which is true with the other minerals, including transportation charges. The proportion of labour wages in the primary costs of other products may perhaps be even greater. Thus it is clear that without perfecting labour control, it would be impossible to prevent commodity prices from rising. Price control has attained the greatest success in Germany, whereas manifold difficulties are being experienced in Britain and the United States, especially in the latter country where commodity prices have been rising rapidly because control of labour is nearly impossible due to opposition from the strongly organized workers.

It was with the price-pegging device of September 18, 1939, that Japan took the first step toward the control of wages and other labour conditions. Previously the control of labour wages had been rather conspicious for its absence. In order to restrain labour wages from rising, it is necessary to prevent living costs from advancing, the greater proportion of which is represented in the cost for farm products. Thus it was after the September 18, 1939, price-pegging decree that the Government's

control was extended to certain categories of agricultural produces. However, fresh fish, green vegetables and other perishables advanced drastically in price as they were exempted from the control. Higher living costs inevitably boost labour wages and ultimately the production costs of goods. To meet such a situation the Agriculture and Forestry Ministry courageously embarked upon the difficult task of controlling the prices of farm products and of perfecting the distributing systems. Admittedly, there are still flaws in the measures and operation methods, but it is discernible that the Government is pushing with unshakable determination its programme of regulating the prices and distribution of perishables which formerly had been regarded as virtually impossible.

A still more important task has been to adjust and control demand and supply of labour in connection with the question of preventing the rise of the primary production costs and eradicating the evil cause of commodity price advances, briefly discussed in the foregoing. The Government was very cautious in dealing with this problem, but it promulgated on September 12, 1941, the Imperial Ordinance concerning Adjustment of Labour and several other ordinances governing the adjustment of labour, following due consultation with the National General Mobilization Commission. Under the provisions of these ordinances, permissions of the directors of the Vocational Guidance Institutes are required for the employment, discharge or removal of persons of working age. This effectively prevents frequent movements of workers from one place to another witnessed in the past and which caused undue expansion of labour costs to various industrial enterprises. It totally stopped the scrambling among the manufacturers for operatives. This drastic legal arrangement has deprived individuals of the freedom of choosing their fields of activities, but it was the only way left to control wartime labour situation. The ordinances further invest the Government with the far-reaching power to requisition workers, if necessary, and to assign them where needed. With these legal measures, the Government is now in a position effectively to





restrict labour wage advances. The Government is also expected to adopt measures to control wages for day-workers, which had hitherto been uncontrolled. With such a set-up, it is clear that it is no difficult matter to avoid advances of primary production costs, which had hitherto been found difficult to control.

All the foregoingly referred labour control measures are of rather negative characters, however, and inadequate by themselves to solve the prevailing industrial conditions. In other words, more positive measures are needed to increase labour efficiency. In this respect, the existing system to keep labour wages low on a general basis should be replaced by a new system whereunder compensations are increased in proportion with working efficiency. At the same time it is important to institute such devices as would place workers in proper places. It may be said that Japan has emerged from a period of negative labour control into a new one, requiring positive labour wage control measures aimed to increase the workers' efficiency.

The same is also true in the case of price control as a whole. The price control system today should not be operated simply to prevent price advances as hitherto, but new arrangements must be made to increase productive efficiency, to enable the manufacturers to produce better goods at proper costs and to achieve smooth flow of appropriate goods to places where needed. The position of the commodity price control in Japan at present varies widely from what was a few years ago.

# OUR NATIONAL GAME OF "GO"

*By SHIN KATO*

ONCE upon a time a Chinese wood-cutter lost his way in a deep mountain. While wandering here and there, he happened to see two old hermits with long white beards playing *go* in a wood. Being very fond of this game, he approached the players and saw how it went on. It was getting dark when he came to himself. It occurred to him that he must go back home. He took up his ax, which he had put near by, and to his great astonishment, found the handle rotten.

This is the best known of all the traditional stories of *go*. Hence, *go* has also come to be figuratively called "ran-ka" (rotten ax-handle). The legend mentioned above rightly indicates the interest characteristic of this game.

As it will be seen later on, *go* has various distinctive features. It contains so much manna of profound interest and philosophy, that we are too often liable, as the Chinese in the story above, to be enchanted with it. And there is a fear of its making one an Urashima-Taro or a Rip Van Winkle. So interesting and so attractive is this game, that it is now much in vogue in Germany and America, which, one might say, is a manifestation of Japanese culture.

The origin of *go* is not clearly traceable, but it is certain that it first sprang up in India or China. Then it was transplanted into Japan, where it has made so much progress and gained such popularity. Some are of the opinion that the famous wise emperors of old China, Yao and Shun, invented this game for the purpose of educating their foolish sons, Tan-chu and Shang-chun. But it seems to me a little too far-fetched a view.

It is generally believed that Kibi-no-Makibi, who had been





sent on an embassy to China together with Abé-no-Nakamaro in the seventh year of Tempyo (735 A.D.), was the first to introduce it to this country. Ever since that time this game has been popularized throughout the country, for it seems to fit in exactly with the nature of the Japanese people. But the first men that learned the game were priests. This is evidently attested by the fact that the oldest *go* note, or record, extant in Japan is that of a contest played by Saint Nichirén, the great priest of the Kamakura period, in the fifth year of Kencho (1253), and that the first professional *go*-player who made a livelihood by this game was a priest named Hon-imboh Sansa.

Hon-imboh Sansa was not only an expert *go*-player, but also a great man who served the three great personages, Nobunaga Oda, Hidéyoshi Toyotomi, and Iéyasu Tokugawa, as their useful tactician. Afterwards, when peace was restored, the Tokugawa Shogunate maintained the representative experts in *go* for the purpose of promoting it. Thanks to this patronage, they were able to devote themselves to the study of their art.

It is true that *go* is considerably popular in China, too; but there are no such great experts there as ours. Professionals are found in Japan alone. This fact shows how *go* is in a state of progress in this country. Nowadays our professional *go*-players are united under a foundation named Nippon Ki-in (Japan *Go* Institute) with the object of practising and propagating this art. It was quite recently that the Kido Hohkoku Kai (*Go* and Chess Patriotic Association) was established under the joint management of the Nipon Sangyo Hohkoku Kai (Japan Industrial Patriotic Association), the Nippon Ki-in (Japan *Go* Institute) and the Shohghi Taisei Kai (Chess Promoting Society). The object of this new association is to enable industrial workers to enjoy the interest and pleasure of *go* through the guidance of professional experts. It is also noteworthy that the authorities have come to consider it as an amusement for the soldiers at the front and for the wounded in hospitals.

What is the method of playing *go*, then?

*Go* is an indoor game which can be played with a square




board and round stones. Like chess, as a general rule, it is to be played by two persons. On the board, as shown in the above diagram, nineteen lines are drawn crosswise. As for the stones, they are black and white in colour. Generally, the the black stones are 181 and the white ones 180 in number so as to fill up all the crossed points on the boards. Accordingly, it is necessary that each of the stones should be equal in size and large enough to fill up the spot on which it is to be set. It is not necessary, however, that the number of the stones should be 361; for a game is always finished before all the stones are used up.

If a board and stones are obtained, no other things are needed. There is neither letter nor character marked on the





board and stones; hence, any foreigner can play this game freely if he understands how to play. As in chess and majong, it is quite unnecessary for beginners to learn the figures and characters first. In this respect *go* resembles music and can freely pass over the boundaries of any country.

The fact that the American *Go* Association in the United States and Der *Go* Bund in Germany are now growing with a rapid *tempo* proves that the game is never troubled with any language difficulty and can easily be an international favourite.

In Japan the *kaya* (torreya nucifera), *icho* (ginkgo) and *katsura* (Judas tree) are used as the material of boards, or *go-bangs*; but any other material will do as well. In Germany cardboards and celluloid balls are conveniently used instead. In Japan, however, beautiful wooden boards and balls of stone and shell are made irrespective of cost and time. In our country the sword was looked upon as the soul of the *samurai*. For this reason he wished to have an excellent sword. So is the case with the lovers of *go*, too. They naturally desire to have excellent boards and balls. The game of *go* is also considered as a means of self-culture, of which I shall speak more fully later.

As already stated, *go*, like chess, is usually played by two persons, one of whom uses the black stones and the other the white ones (all the round balls used in the game are called *ishi*, or stones, though the white ones are made of shells). These stones are alternately set on the board one by one and its final object is to occupy the larger spheres. As the first principle, the weaker player, who uses the black stones, begins first. Then the stronger player, who uses the white stones, sets one of his stones on the board, thus the two players alternately set their stones on the board one by one. Neither of them is allowed to set two or more stones on the board at a time, nor is he allowed, when his turn comes, to pass without setting a new stone on the board. The game comes to an end when there is no spot or point to be occupied. Then the points which have been occupied by each of the players are counted, and he who

has gained the greater number of points is the winner.

Simple and clear are the fundamental rules of the game. The principal ones are as follows :

In the first place, it must be remembered that those stones which are completely surrounded by the opponent's stones are to die. By " completely " is meant " crosswise," but not " obliquely " or " diagonally." Refer to diagram 1, in which




Diagram 1

all the white stones are killed by the surrounding black ones. If such a case happens, the owner of the black stones takes the dead white ones off the board and keeps them as prisoners. Lastly, when all the points occupied are reckoned, these white captives are to be set on the area occupied by the owner of the white





stones. To take prisoners is, therefore, to decrease the opponent's area. In this sense it is thought to be an important means to kill any of the antagonist's stones.

The second important rule to be remembered is that no stone can be put on any single empty point when it meets with an immediate death. (But it is allowed to put a stone on any single point left empty in case it can cause instantaneous death to the opponent's stone or stones).




Diagram 2

Diagram 2 clearly shows that no black stone can be set on any of the empty points surrounded by the white stones on the left side, for any new black stone would be killed as soon as it is set thereon. Refer to the first rule. But no white stone

can be set on the empty point in each of the right-hand sections of diagram 2, according to the second rule above-mentioned.

The last important rule, which is rather difficult to understand, is that a stone-group which has only one *mé* (eye) is to die, but if it has two *mé* (eyes), it is alive.

Without any diagram this would be difficult to understand. The *mé*, or "eye," means an empty point completely surrounded by stones of a similar kind. If any one-eyed group of stones is completely surrounded by the opponent's stones, as shown in the three cases on the right-hand side of diagram 3,




Diagram 3

the opponent can kill that stone-group by putting one of his





stones on that "eye." But look at the three groups of stones on the left-hand side. However completely the enemy may besiege them, such stone-groups are never threatened with death. This is because neither of the players is allowed to set on the board more than one stone at a time.

There is one thing which requires the attention of beginners. I have particularly said the "eye" or "eyes" surrounded by stones of a similar kind, but not a "vacant point or points" surrounded by a similar kind. In the left-hand section of diagram 3 it is clear at a sight that each of the groups is alive, but there are some cases in which a dead group seems to beginners to be living. A group of stones may have some vacant points




Diagram 4

in between, but it is often destined to have them reduced to one "eye," which means a sure death.

Look at diagram 4. Each of the groups has many vacant points in it, but they are all doomed to die, because the vacant points of each group can be reduced to one "eye."

The above are the three fundamental rules of *go*. Besides these, there are three minor rules. They are regulations for *koh*, *séki* and the method of reckoning the points secured by the players.




Diagram 5

*Koh* is the state in which each of the three groups of stones on the right-hand side of diagram 5 is put. The white stone of the upper-most group is surrounded on three sides by the black





stones. If, therefore, another black stone is set on the vacant point, the adjoining white stone will be taken prisoner. The case shown by the intermediate group denotes the state in which the white has been taken off. But this new black stone will be taken prisoner if a white stone is newly set on the vacant point. If so, the result will go back to the state of the topmost group. If the players continue to perform this process by turns, there will be no end. In order to prevent this endless repetition, it is arranged that in case of *koh* neither of the players can take off his opponent's stone by setting a stone on the vacant point before he sets a stone on any other vacant point. In other words, he cannot take off his opponent's new stone in this case immediately after his opponent has taken off his stone. At least once he must put a stone somewhere else on the board. The lowest group also shows that it is in a state of *koh*. This is an important *koh*, which may greatly affect the issue of the contest. In such a case the players must look for an important move somewhere else, which they cannot neglect. If any form of *koh* presents itself on the board, the contest will be a complex one.

By *séki* is meant the state in which neither of the parties can attack each other. In this situation, of course, there are no two separate "eyes;" and such stone-group is left untouched to the last. All the three groups on the left-hand side of diagram 5 are in a state of *séki*. The upper two groups are easy to understand. As for the lowest group, however, some beginners may wonder why it is in a state of *séki*. We leave the problem to their consideration. The question is why the white stones are to die if a white stone is newly set in and why the black stones are to die if another black stone is set in.

Lastly comes the method of counting the points secured. By the "point" is meant a "point crossed by lines." Dead stones left on the board must be distinguished from the living ones. These dead stones are taken off when the contest is over. When removed, they need not be surrounded by their opponent's stones anew. The dead black stones, which are sequestered

by the white party, are used to decrease the number of the points secured by the black party; that is to say, they are all set in the area secured by the black party. And as for the dead white stones, which are left in the area secured by the black party, they are taken off from the points where they are, and are placed together with the other prisoners (if there are any) in the areas secured by the white party. Then the vacant points secured by each of the parties are to be reckoned. He who has secured the greater number of vacant points is the winner or victor.

The above explanations, though roughly made, will serve the purpose of enabling beginners to gain an idea about the game of *go*.

In conclusion I would like to refer briefly to the special features of this game.

More than one thousand years have passed since *go* was entrusted to the hands of specialists. Though the rules and outfits are comparatively simple, the changes which appear on the board are illimitable. The late Hon-imboh Shusai, who is known to have been one of the best *go*-players in Japan, learned this game at the age of seven or eight and was looked upon as a prodigy or genius. He devoted his whole life to the study of *go* and died in his sixty-seventh year. In his later years he said: "How difficult a game, indeed, *go* is! I have studied it these many years and I find I cannot explore all the deep mysteries of it as yet."

Tens of thousands of enthusiasts have played it since it was begun, but never have similar phases occurred. It is for this reason that there is a boundless interest and pleasure in it. As there is so much profundity in it, so there is a great difference in the technique of beginners and experts. There are many kinds of games or matches, it is true, but no game is so full of profound variations as this. Therefore, no expert on *go* is ever proud of his art; all professionals go through constant practice and study to keep fit.

As I have mentioned that there is a wide gap in the





technique of beginners and experts, some may fear that a beginner cannot play with an expert. No such fear is needed, for there is an excellent handicap method in use. This does not mean to change the fundamental rule that players should set down stones alternately, but a player inferior in the art can beforehand station two to nine of his stones on the board. In some cases nine to fifteen stones even are stationed before the game is begun.

This handicap is often a charm for players. Some proudly say, "I have two stones stationed by him." Others say with a look of pride, "I first began with stationing five stones to him, but I have three stones stationed by him now."

Interesting it is to note that every player has his own tactics and his own way of playing. With regard to handicapping, there are many interesting stories. When the late Hon-imboh Shusai was still living, there was in Yokohama a very strong *go*-player. He was awfully skillful, especially when he played with inferiors in the art. When playing with him, they stationed more stones on the board than when they played with Shusai. A player, for instance, who used to station five stones against Shusai, must station six stones against this Yokohama man. Many amateur players thought him stronger than Shusai and called him "Ogre". They had long desired to know how much stronger he was than the expert Shusai. It was arranged through the good offices of a certain influential gentleman that a match should be played between the "Ogre" and Shusai.

On the appointed day the two players took their places before the board. Greatly to the surprise of the "Ogre" and the lookers-on, Hon-imboh calmly asked his opponent to station three stones on the board beforehand. In fact, Hon-imboh was the greatest of the experts and Mr. "Ogre" was no other than an amateur, though he thought himself the strongest *go*-player in Japan. Everybody had, therefore, naturally expected that Hon-imboh would take the white stones and that his rival would be contented with the black stones; that is to say, every-

body had expected that Mr. "Ogre" would only have the first move. So most naturally what Hon-imboh said astonished all the lookers-on. Mr. "Ogre," who thought himself disgraced, said to himself: "All right, I'll smart him." Three black stones were stationed and then the battle was begun. Black and white stones had alternately been put on the board for some time, when Mr. "Ogre's" chances grew worse and worse, and he was at last beaten.

It is said that when the contest was over, Mr. "Ogre" regretted that he had been proud of his art and remarked that a player should never boast of his art. Strange to tell, every player has some hard antagonists of his own to deal with.

In the game of *go* there is such a wide difference of art and such an interesting handicap system, that every player can enjoy it in his own way. Moreover, this social game often makes players very friendly. A *senryu* (short satire) says:

*Go gataki wa*
*Nikusa mo nikushi*
*Natsukashi-shi.*

My rival in *go*,
How I hate him;
Yet I love him still.

Indeed, *go* is a social game which transcends age and class.

We must not forget on the other hand that this game is very mathematical in its nature. Hence, it is often called a mental sport, and those who are skilled in *go* are generally known to have good calculating brains.

In chess there are various kinds of men, each of which has its own special characteristics, but in *go* every man, or stone, is endowed with an equal qualification. In this sense the game is democratic, and in a wider sense it is necessary that a small group of stones should be sacrificed to save a large group of stones. Sometimes a stone of forlorn hope is put down and sometimes a *furi kawari* (change) is performed in consideration of the whole situation.

The last thing to be specially kept in mind is that this





game contributes toward the schooling of mind and the culture of soul-force. Mr. Go-Seighén, one of the most proficient players of today, once said: "There are two methods of attaining proficiency in *go*, one of which is the study of tactics and the other the culture of the spirit. *Go* can be compared to a mirror. To polish the surface answers to the study of tactics, while to brighten the inner part corresponds to the culture of the spirit."

It is impossible for a hasty man to be a strong player unless he rectifies his hastiness. It is also impossible for an avaricious player to win the game unless he abandons his avaricious turn of mind. A timid person must learn to be brave; an imprudent man must learn to be prudent. One can cultivate himself through the game of *go*. There are not a few in the world who forget to take a wide view of things and are merely scrupulous about trifles. Persons of this temperament can make themselves broad-minded by learning *go*.

Let me conclude this little article by showing how deeply interesting this game is and what delicious food it makes for human thought. *Go*, as stated before, is not a game to be always enjoyed by two players. It is philosophical as well as mathematical. It is also enjoyable by a single person. He sits down before the board in a quiet room on an autumn night and takes up a well-known book of *go* in which are recorded contests fought by some prominent predecessors, or by some great experts at the risk of their lives, or between masters and their beloved disciples. Referring to one of these notes and studying their thoughtful art, he gently puts down his stones one by one. This profound interest would be quite beyond description.

# EARLY JAPANESE SETTLERS IN THE PHILIPPINES

*By SEI-ICHI IWAO*

THE earliest Japanese emigration to the South Sea region was to Luzon, the largest island of the Philippine group, and the one lying nearest to Japan, being separated from Formosa by a comparatively narrow stretch of water. The Japanese colony in this island was a large one, and was marked by various activities, and it would not be saying too much to state that the Japanese development of Luzon Island prepared the way for Japanese expansion to other South Sea countries.

Prior to the Japanese emigration to these islands, Japanese overseas development took the form of *wako*, that is, a combination of buccaneers and merchants. These merchant-buccaneers infested the coasts of China, particularly in the central and southern parts, and their marauding activities were kept up with impunity for centuries. The Ming Dynasty of China had suffered long from these *wako*, but eventually succeeded in devising effective defence works which were used with good effect against the buccaneers, at the same time suppressing turbulent elements at various points along the coast. Particularly successful in this were the Chinese generals Yu Ta-you and Tsi Chi-kuang, who dealt with the Japanese buccaneers toward the latter part of the Ming régime, the buccaneers in the province of Fukien being severely beaten, since which time the *wako* ceased to molest the Chinese. It is recorded in history, however, that the disappearance of the *wako* from the southern coast of China was a signal for increased shipping activity between Japan and other lands adjoining south China, including Formosa, Annam, and Luzon. History further shows that Formosa was raided by Japanese buccanneers from time to time for nearly thirty years following 1572, when the Japanese buccanners sustained a crushing defeat in Fukien Province in 1602, while as early as the year 1577 Japanese vessels were active in Shun-hwa, Kwang-nan, and other places in Annam.





### *Earlier Activities*

Japanese mercantile activity in Luzon ports can, according to various records and documents, be traced back to 1567. On July 23, 1567, Miguel Lopez de Legazpi, the Spanish conqueror of the Philippines, who began his work of subjugating the island of Luzon in 1570 and founded the city of Manila in May of the same year, wrote to King Philip of Spain informing him of the activities of the Japanese in Luzon. This letter was sent from the Philippine island of Cebu (Zebu), and in his communication he said in part:

> There are north of our colony (Cebu), or to be more exact, not very far to the northeast, the islands of Luzon and Mindoro. These islands are visited every year by the Chinese and Japanese for trading purposes. They bring raw silk, wool, bells, ceramics, perfumes, tin, cotton piece goods, and various other goods to these islands, from which they take home gold and wax. The natives of Luzon and Mindoro are Moros. They purchase goods brought by the Chinese and Japanese for purpose of sale among the inhabitants of the Philippine Islands.

The Spanish gave the King whatever information he had obtained from the natives of Cebu Island, and this showed that either the Japanese alone, or in conjunction with Chinese, visited Luzon and Mindoro for trading purposes every year.

In 1570 a Spanish fleet, led by Martin de Goiti, arrived in Luzon, and on June 6 he proclaimed the occupation of the island in the name of Philip II, King of Spain. The proclamation was made in Manila which city he entered in triumph. At the time there were but twenty Japanese and forty Chinese living in the city. In his report of the expedition, which was written in June, 1570, Martin de Goiti said:

> I found the town (Manila) inhabited by forty Chinese and another twenty Japanese in addition to natives. Some of them came aboard the Spanish ship to seek an interview with the commander. One of them was a Japanese, wearling a Theatin cap. We took him, therefore, for a Christian. When he was asked whether he was a Christian, he replied in the affirmative, giving his name as Pablo. He had an icon on his breast, and asked us for a rosary.

The Japanese in question may have been one of the pioneer Japanese settlers in Luzon. Pablo may have been converted to Christianity while still in Japan.

### *Japanese in Cagayan*

Again in 1573, Diego de Artieda sent a report on the Philippine

Islands to Philip II, this containing information as to conditions in Japan, which he must have obtained from the Moros. Though brief, the information was to the point, which fact demonstrates frequent intercouse between Luzon and Japan. Furthermore, about the year 1575, Juan Pacheco Maldonado in a letter to Philip II of Spain said that Japanese vessels called at Luzon every year for the purpose of exchanging silver for gold. Thus, about this time the trade between Japan and the Philippines grew ever brisker, the districts most frequented by the Japanese traders being Cagayan in the north, Pangasinan on Lingayen Bay in the centre, and Manila Bay in the southwest.

The Cagayan district lies at the northern extremity of Luzon, being separated from Formosa by the narrow Bashi Straits. Its proximity to Japan naturally led to commercial intercourse between the two countries, in addition to which it is blessed with numerous rivers navigable by galleys and sailing boats. In those days the sea between south China and northern Luzon could be crossed in two and a half days by sailing vessels. The Japanese vessels, too, which started their activities toward the south turned their attention first of all to northern Luzon Island.

On June 16, 1582, Gonzalo Ronquillo de Penalosa, Governor-General of the Philippines, in a letter to Philip II mentioned that a squadron led by Commander Juan Pablos de Carrion had been sent to Cagayan in the north for purposes of defence. Again on July 1 in the same year the Governor-General reported to the King of Spain that the Spanish squadron had met and fought against Japanese and Chinese vessels off Cagayan. It must be borne in mind in this connection that the Japanese vessels which had annually called at Cagayan had established a base at the mouth of the Cagayan River about this time. History also states that the Japanese had built a castle at the mouth of the river, but the exact situation of this castle has never been substantiated. The concensus of expert opinion is that it was built at Apari to the east of the mouth of the Cagayan River or possibly near Linao and facing Apari.

The Japanese who invaded Cagayan came in quest of gold, just as their predecessors had done in their early trade with the Philippines. Juan Pablos de Carrion, the Commander of the Spanish squadron, demanded the withdrawal of the Japanese from Cagayan, whereupon the Japanese leader demanded of the Spanish commander the payment of a large sum in gold as compensation. Not only was this counter-demand rejected, but the Japanese leader sensed that the Spanish authorities had all along been planning to confiscate all the gold that belonged to the Japanese, whereupon the 600 Japanese living there rose in rebellion and attacked the Spanish fort, only, however, to be beaten back, and finally compelled to withdraw from Cagayan. Again, in 1586, a merchant vessel, sent by a feudal lord in Kyushu named Ohmura visited Luzon, but with this single exception no Japanese ship called there, for the Spanish authorities had strengthened their defences against possible Japanese invasion and kept a constant watch for the attempted entry of vessels from Japan. After the establishment of the Tokugawa Shogunate at Yedo (Tokyo) in 1600, there was almost no trade between Japan and the Philippines, and what was done was carried on through the medium of Chinese ships which made connection with Japanese vessels at long intervals.





### "*Japanese Port*"

The Cagayan River in northern Luzon was the scene of visits by Japanese ships from early times, with the result that as already mentioned a Japanese colony existed there for a time, but there are also indications that Japanese vessels visited Pangasinan on the western coast of Luzon in early times. The Pangasinan district lies on the coast of Lingayen Bay and is fortunate in having many natural facilities for shipping. Intercourse between Pangasinan and China started as early as 1406, when the local chief began to pay tribute to the Ming Dynasty. The district of Fengchiashihlan, mentioned in Chinese history, is Pangasinan, as was demonstrated by George Philipps and Dr. Kiyoshi Wada.

In June, 1582, Miguel de Loarca sent a report on conditions in the Philippines from Arevalo in Panay Island to Philip II of Spain. The report says:

> Pangasinan Province lies about five leagues from Pangasinan Bay. The province is inhabited by about 4,000 peaceful people. They are quite civilized, mainly because they are engaged in commercial transactions with Chinese, Japanese, Borneans, and other natives in the Philippine Islands.

It is evident from this report that Japanese and Chinese were engaged in trade with Pangasinan as early as 1582. Pangasinan Bay mentioned in this report is Lingayen Bay.

Miguel de Loarca was one of the first Spaniards to visit the Philippines. It was under instructions from the Governor-General of the

Islands that he made his report to the King of Spain, giving, on the basis of first-hand information, an intimate description of the islands. His report also says :

> Another four leagues and we reach Puerto del Japan (Japanese port), which is inhabited by Spaniards and natives of the same stock as of the Pangasinanese.

This shows that the Japanese who visited Pangasinan to engage in commerce made the natives give the name of "Japanese Port" to one of the harbours.

At the beginning of the seventh century the Governor-General of the Philippine Islands referred, in an official document sent to the Spanish Government, to Japanese activities there. In his report to Philip III, King of Spain, in 1618 the Governor-General states that the province of Pangasinan was rich in game, so that from 60,000 to an occasional 80,000 head of deer are captured or killed in the province every year. The natives paid their taxes in deerskin. The Japanese manufactured leather of high quality from deerskin, so that this provided a great source of profit for the Japanese. The province is also blessed with good harbours, one of which, Agoo, is also named the "Japanese Port." This was the original port in the Philippines where Japanese traders commenced operations, as it is also the first port in the Philippines where the Spaniards came in contact with them. Another good port is Bolinao. These two ports are in every way superior to any other.

It appears that the "Japanese Port," Agoo, was quite equal to Bolinao, and judging from the fact that the Spaniards first met the Japanese at Agoo, it would appear conclusive that the latter had already established themselves there a considerable time before the Spanish conquest of the Philippines. Deerskin, the chief product of Pangasinan Province, may have been the principal item of trade in which the Japanese were engaged. Antonio de Morga, in his report on the Philippine Islands dated June 8, 1598, urged the immediate necessity for placing a ban on the deersking trade, pointing out the imminent danger of the extermination of the deer by reckless capture by the natived, including priests, for catering to the requirements of Japanese and Chinese merchants who exported the pelt to Japan.

There is no authentic record extant regarding the site of the "Japanese Port," which is given differently in the various charts and documents. It is, however, clear that the ancient Agoo was not situated where the present town is, though there is no doubt that it was on





the shore of Pangasinan Bay. Be that as it may, during the early stages of the Spanish occupation of the Philippines, Japanese vessels frequently called at Agoo in the inner part of Lingayen Bay for some time, with some Japanese settling there. Following the rapid growth of Manila, however, Japanese vessels made that city their regular port of call, with the result that Cagayan in the north and Agoo on Pangasinan Bay came to be ignored by them, this accounting for the failure of both Cagayan and Agoo to grow. The "Japanese Port," or Agoo, gradually began to fade from the people's memory, so that in the end nobody could be found who knew its exact situation. Pedro de Vera in his map gives the situation of Agoo near Lawag in the north, while Juan de la Concepcion gave it an entirely wrong location, placing it between Cape Bogeador and Currimao at the northern extremity of Luzon Island. *Nippon Ikoku Tsuho-sho* (Japan's Trade with Foreign Countries), a Japanese book published before 1636, the time when the Tokugawa Shogunate forbade Japanese emigration abroad, gives "Manyeiraku," "Hakashina," and "Kakayan" as key points of international trade in Luzon Island. They evidently refer respectively to Manila, Pangasinan, and Cagayan.

### *Japanese in Manila*

Here it will not be out of place to give a brief review of the history of Japanese emigration to Manila.

Prior to the conquest of the Philippines by the Spaniards there were already some Japanese residing at Manila. Following that event, however, which led to the concentration of the administrative powers at Manila, the port town made rapid growth. An increasingly large number of Chinese vessels visited the city, resulting in an increasingly large number of Chinese settlers there. The city naturally figured large in the China-Philippine trade at the beginning of the sixteenth century. History mentions the first arrival of Japanese vessels at Manila in the middle of the Tensho era (1573–1592), accompanied by emigration.

In June, 1584, the first Spanish vessel from Luzon arrived in Japan, entering the port of Hirado in Kyushu. It served as an occasion for the exchange of courtesies between the Japanese and Spanish authorities. Matsu-ura, the feudal lord at Hirado, entrusted the captain of the Spanish vessels with a message and present to the Spanish Governor-General of the Philippine Islands. The message solicited the Governor-General's good offices in opening trade between Japan and

the Philippines. Following this exchange of official courtesies several Japanese called at Manila every year.

De Vera, Governor-General of the Philippines, in a letter to King Philip II of Spain, dated June 26, 1586, enclosed the message he had received from Lord Matsu-ura, together with a translation, adding that the present he had received was being forwarded to the King, and also that eleven Christians, retainers of Don Bartolomé (Sumitada Ohmura), a feudal lord in Kyushu, had arrived at Manila from Nagasaki. It will be seen by this letter that following the example set by Lord Matsu-ura, another feudal lord, Ohmura, whose domain adjoined that of the former, also sent a merchant vessel to Manila. The following year, 1587, yet another Japanese vessel entered Manila harbour, with a full cargo of general merchandise and arms. The crew consisted of forty sailors from Hirado in addition to the crew who had manned the vessel sent by Lord Ohmura to Manila the previous year. The captain of the vessel brought a message from Lord Matsuura and his young brother, whose Christian name was Gaspar, to the Governor-General of the Philippines. The crew were cared for by the Spanish church at Manila during their stay in that city.

Japanese vessels on their peaceful mission called at Manila every year, and some Japanese taking passage in them settled at Manila.

A letter sent by Archbishop Domingo de Salazar to King Philip II on July 4, 1587, shows that the archbishop had invited ten leading Japanese who had arrived in Manila and obtained from them information anent conditions in Japan, especially with regard to Christianity. These people included Pablo Faranda Ziémon of Kyoto, Jeronimo Batanambe Zemoxero of Bungo, Juan Yanaguia Gueniemon of Sakayé, and Gavriel Nangano Yoyamor of Kyoto.

The vists of Japanese ships continued. In 1587, a Japanese vessel, owned by Joan Gayo, entered Manila harbour. Some of the crew, being suspected of complicity in the native insurrection which had then broken out, resulted in the hanging on June 13 of the following year after due trial, of Dionisio Fernandez, a Japanese interpreter. On July 15 in the same year, another Japanese ship, with a cargo of arms and provisions, arrived at Manila, but it is said that due to the rigid precautions taken by the Spanish authorities, no untoward incident occurred, and that after disposing of her cargo at Manila the boat departed.

A letter sent by Gomez Perez Dasmarinas, Governor-General of the Philippines to the King of Spain dated May 31, 1592, says that





some thirty or forty Japanese in the attire of Christian pilgrims had arrived at Manila three years previously, 1589, professedly to visit the local church.

Subsequent years witnessed several visits by Japanese ships with many Japanese passengers, some of whom were bent on commerce and others connected with the Christian faith, possibly emissaries.

Proceedings of the Committee of Enquiry of the Supreme Commission of Political Affairs of the Manila Government in connection with the mission sent by Hidéyoshi Toyotomi, who preceded Iyéyasu Tokugawa as Shogun, said on June 1, 1593 :

> The Japanese colony at Manila numbers more than three hundred. Another hundred fifty Japanese arrived at Manila with the Japanese mission in the same boat . . . . . Many of the Japanese at Manila have moved here from Cagayan, where they were active seven years ago.

Another part of the proceedings reads :

> Another two Japanese vessels are now on their way to Manila. Before the Japanese mission came to Manila, the Japanese colony numbered four hundred. The two Japanese vessels have carried three hundred Japanese, including the mission members. Another three hundred Japanese will arrive at Manila by another two Japanese ships, which are now *en route* to Manila.

The population of the Japanese colony at Manila was inconstant, but the general tendency was a steady increase with the arrival of every Japanese vessel. During the first decade after the first vessels were sent to Manila by the feudal lords Matsu-ura and Ohmura, the Japanese colony grew to about four hundred, showing a gradual increase. Incidentally it is worthy of notice that most of the Japanese who seized the mouth of the Cagayan River in northern Luzon Island finally settled in Manila.

On May 31, 1595, Francisco de las Missas in a letter to the King of Spain said :

> The Japanese colony at Manila is not so numerous as the Chinese, but it numbers one thousand at a time. The tendency is to its steady increase.

This shows how rapid and remarkable was the growth of the Japanese colony at Manila.

### *Strained Relations*

In the meantime the Shogun Hidéyoshi Toyotomi sent three missions to Manila, headed respectively by Magoshichiro Harada, Kiyémon Harada, and Munéhito Haségawa, demanding that the Spanish

authorities pay him tribute. This naturally seriously embittered the relations between Japan and the Philippines, which in turn caused the Spanish authorities at Manila to assume a stiff attitude toward the colony.

Some time prior to this the Governor-General, Dasmarinas, had a foretaste of the dreaded Japanese invasion in the form of sporadic raids at various points along the coast. Early in 1592 the Governor-General gave instructions to the military authorities and the Municipal Council at Manila to take adequate measures to forestall any attempted invasion by the Japanese:

> Inasmuch as fear of Japanese invasion is confirmed in various quarters and also as German pirates infest various points of the sea coast of the Philippines, numerous Japanese merchants in Manila must be segregated in a designated district in the suburbs of the town with all their arms confiscated, by way of eliminating any apprehension to be felt about them. At the same time, treatment to be accorded to Japanese servants must be considered, because they may set fire or cause similar disasters in this time of emergency, as they not only are numerous, but furthermore are permitted to enter the city limits freely, including our residences.

This instruction was a matter of moment to the Japanese residents at Manila. There had been a large number of Japanese residents in the city, some of whom were merchants, and many were servants employed by the Spaniards, but this instruction of the Governor-General's ordered all the Japanese residents to live in a specified district in the suburbs of Manila. This paved the way for the Japanese to lead a segregated life in the district named. In other words, the Japanese town in the suburbs of Manila had its inception the memorable order issued by the Governor-General.

The missions sent by Hidéyoshi Toyotomi put the Spanish authorities in Manila into a state of consternation for some time, but to their great relief there were no signs of the feared Japanese invasion. The message brought by the third Japanese mission headed by Munéhito Haségawa in 1593 to the Governor-General definitlely stated that a Japanese expedition would not be dispatched to the islands, this in consideration of the uninterrupted trade being then carried on between the two countries. In the same year three vessels were sent from Satsuma in Kyushu to Luzon for the purpose of trade, and this convinced the Governor-General that there existed no immediate danger of a Japanese invasion, and so on July 17, 1596, Francisco Tello de Guzman, the Governor-General, made a report to the King of Spain





to that effect.

The Spanish vessel *San Felipe*, which had sailed from Manila on July 12 of the same year for Mexico, having met with almost continual stormy weather on the way, was finally compelled to change her course and to seek shelter in the harbour of Urato in Tosa Province, Shikoku. The then Shogun Hidéyoshi Toyotomi ordered Nagamori Masuda, the local feudal lord, to confiscate the vessel and her cargo. During an investigation a *faux pas* on the part of one of the crew led to the execution by order of Hidéyoshi of twenty-six Christian fathers and believers, both Japanese and foreigners, at Nagasaki on January 3, 1597. The crew of the Spanish ship were sent back to Manila aboard several vessels. This so angered the Spanish authorities at Manila, that they sent a special envoy to Hidéyoshi on May 27 demanding a full explanation of the affair. The stiffened attitude of the Luzon authorities towards Japan was reflected in their manner of dealing with the colony at Manila. On June 27 of the same year Hernando de los Rios filed a petition with the King of Spain urging him to revise his policy toward Japan.

On June 8, 1598, Antonio de Morga, judge of the Supreme Court of Manila, in a report on conditions in the Philippines, recommended that all Japanese who should arrive at Manila aboard Japanese vessels should be repatriated and entry into the Philippines refused. He even recommended that all those Japanese who had settled in the Philippines be repatriated. In his works on the islands, also, he mentions that not a small number of the Japanese residents there were repatriated, while all who arrived at Manila aboard merchant vessel were sent back at the earliest possible opportunity with their arms taken from them while in Manila. One may safely judge that a great deal of this repatriating from Manila and other places in the Philippines came about as a sequel to Hidéyoshi's missions to the Governor-General.

### *The Red-seal Charter*

Not long after, however, both Hidéyoshi Toyotomi and Kayémon Harada, who had been responsible for aggravating the strained relations between Japan and the Philippines, died, and in the meantime Kiyomasa Kato, a feudal lord in Kyushu, sent a message to the Governor-General by the captain of a merchant vessel sailing from Kagoshima on December 4, 1596, for Manila, asking for the latter's courtesy in extending facilities to the vessel on its arrival at Manila, as well as for continued future friendship.

Trade between Japan and the Philippines, which had been suspended for three years or so, now began to improve, and it is on record that two Japanese merchant vessels, owned by Shichizayémon Yamashita, and some others arrived at Manila in November, 1600, while three others, having encountered severe storms on the way, failed to arrive. In the following year several ships owned by Juan Sandaya, Leon Kizayémon, and other natives of Satsuma, called at Manila carrying a message from Tintioguen, a divisional commander of the Satsuma clan, to the Governor-General.

Francisco Tello de Guzman in his military report to the Spanish Government drew attention to the restoration of peace between Japan and Korea, but anticipating that some 100,000 Japanese effectives who had now been released from their duties by the conclusion of the peace would be likely to seek a sphere of activity elsewhere, probably including Luzon. This report was illuminating to a degree anent Japanese developments overseas after the fall of the Toyotomi Shogunate, and one may easily imagine that some thousands of Japanese soldiers may have made their way to the Philippines, taking advantage of every merchant vessel leaving Japanese ports for Manila.

Following his momentous victory over the Toyotomi forces at Sékigahara in 1600, Iyéyasu Tokugawa established his headquarters at Yedo (Tokyo). In October of the following year he sent a message to the Spanish Governor-General of the Philippines, informing him that all Japanese trading vessels would be granted red-sealed charters and requesting him to refuse entry for trade to vessels not supplied with such. This was the origin of the famous red-seal charter system. Hirotaka Térasawa, Magistrate of Nagasaki, in a letter to the Governor-General of the Philippines, informed him of the inauguration of this system. The magistrate also informed the Governor-General that the Tokugawa Shogunate would grant these red-seal charters only to such vessels of Japanese registry as were designated by the Governor-General, and again requesting him to refuse entry to others.

Don Pedro de Acuna, the newly appointed Governor-General, acknowledged these letters from Iyéyasu Tokugawa and Hirotaka Térasawa in courteous terms, and proposed that six Japanese vessels should call at Manila every year, three in each half-year, and complying with the request from Japan that all vessels bearing the red-seal charters would be welcomed by the authorities at Manila, and that neither the vessels nor their cargoes should receive any kind of damage or be confiscated, and that vessels without the required charter should





not be admitted to the harbour.

With the formal understanding between the Tokugawa Shogunate and the Spanish Governor-General of the Philippines regarding trade between Japan and the Islands by means of the red-seal charter, the Tokugawa Shogunate granted red-seal charters to forty Japanese vessels engaged in this trade from 1601 to 1624. Many Japanese took passage on these special vessels to Manila, greatly aiding the growth of the colony there, so that early in the Tokugawa Shogunate the "Japanese Town" at Manila became the largest Japanese colony in the South Seas.

# JAPAN'S PERIODICALS—EXTRACTS

## JAPANESE CONCESSIONS IN CHINA

When I recently visited China for two months, I personally ascertained the conditions prevailing in Japanese concessions there. On the basis of that observation I desire to express my views regarding the effective solution of the problem of Japanese concessions in China, revealing at the same time the actual state of affairs confronting them. At the outset it can be said that since the officials of the various foreign settlements, particularly British and American, are exhibiting an extreme pro-Chungking feeling, the question of reorganizing them has assumed additional importance to Japan. There is no denying the fact that the pursuance of a provoking attitude by the British and American authorities toward our residents is hindering the disposal of the China affair, as well as the realization of our great ideal—the establishment of a new structure in Eastern Asia. A review of the past measures taken by the Japanese Government to meet the situation reveals that on one occasion it ordered the blockade of a settlement and made every possible effort to liquidate anti-Japanese activities there. In addition, it offered to surrender the adjacent Japanese concession by way of taking the lead in the matter. On another occasion it formed a plan for the creation of a Greater Shanghai adjoining the International Settlement with the ultimate object of absorbing the latter. This project created a furore in Shanghai foreign circles, and a rumour was circulated that Japan was contemplating the occupation of the International Settlement by force.

During my inspection of the foreign settlements I noticed that, of the various measures implemented by our Government, the one for the suppression of anti-Japanese activities had been fairly successful, but at the same time it appeared problematic whether it would be advisable for Japan to completely deny the existence of concessions in China. The schemes formulated by our Government to achieve this end are likely to prove ineffective. For instance, the proposal of surredering a certain Japanese concession on a reciprocative basis may not be followed by a similar action on the part of





interested foreign nations, especially of Britain and the United States; also the plan for constructing a Greater Shanghai appears unintelligent in view of the fact that the prosperity of Shanghai has become firmly assured through the great endeavours of Anglo-American capitalism during the past hundred years or so. Furthermore, such a scheme involves expenditure almost amounting to the total investments of Britian and America in the International Settlement—a procedure quite inconvenient to Japan at the present moment of emergency. On the other hand, the occupation of a foreign settlement in China is liable to bring about a complete destruction of its function and a rapid decline in its prosperity with the inevitable flight of wealthy and influential residents who have made it their centre of activities for years; in fact, such a step will convert a concession into an asylum for refugees and war-sufferers, imposing new difficulties to arrange for their evacuation and to re-build it into a prosperous modern city. The Shanghai foreign settlement has often served as a sanctuary or a safe anchorage for many Chinese citizens during civil strife and internal disturbances. Factually speaking, not only the Chinese and foreign residents, but also the Japanese residents desire the continuance of every foreign settlement in China.

The Nanking Government led by President Wang Ching-wei is agitating for the abolition of all foreign concessions as the sheetanchor of its foreign policy. Of course, the logic of such a demand cannot be perverted; nevertheless, it has to be considered whether the time is now ripe to initiate such an abrupt change. In the opinion of the writer, the leaders of Nanking are not in a position to undertake the reorganization of foreign concessions, for they have not yet fully consummated their administrative reconstruction, and their staff are neither efficient nor experienced enough in dealing with foreigners; hence, they will not be able to satisfactorily administer such regions populated by different nationalities. The Chaing Kai-shek administration succeeded in controlling the foreign settlements after ten years of persistent efforts amidst repeated setbacks, while the Nanking régime seems determined to attempt the transformation by one stroke. Politically, the Nanking Government is still in its infancy; on the contrary, when the Chiang Kai-shek government took up the issue of foreign settlements, it had already become an adult organization. One of the great handicaps of the Nanking Administration is that the territory which it considers under its *de jure* control is still occupied by Japanese troops. Its administrative activities are, therefore, restricted pending the final

disposal of the China affair. Consequently, Nanking should take up the question of the abolition of foreign concessions after it has completed its domestic reconstruction and has established economic independence.

It transpires that Chiang Kai-shek, who accomplished the unification of China and who knew how best to deal with foreign settlements, used to have the economic centre of his régime in the Shanghai International Zone, although outwardly he strongly advocated its recovery. He adopted such a policy because he was aptly conscious of the benefit derivable from the movement of the enormous amount of foreign capital held in that section and its inseparable relation with the Chinese capital. Under the circumstances, if the Nanking Government all of a sudden attempts to absorb the various foreign concessions into its administrative sphere, it is feared that it will receive an empty credit at the expense of what in time will become a valuable asset to it. Therefore, the sound policy for Nanking would be to assist the promotion of prosperity in the settlements by inducting wealthy and capable persons to stabilize economic collaboration.

During my sojourn in China, I listened to arguments suggesting the utilization of the diverse institutions and organizations in the foreign settlements in such a manner as would enhance the wealth of the cities in which they are located, and the strengthening of our control over them, entierely stamping out the anti-Japanese rancour and making them fall in line with our policy of creating a new order in the Far East, instead of trying to destroy or recover them. Such an opinion has crystallized partly because of the public having come to recognize fully the realities of present-day conditions in China, and partly because of the gradual decline of the influence of Britain and the United States throughout the continent stimulating the elimination of anti-Japanese atmosphere from the settlements.

To point out how in the past the Tientsin foreign settlement, particularly the British and French concessions, disregarded our interests, it may be reiterated that the settlement authorities hampered Japanese military operations by closing the Bangkok Bridge to our forces, that they facilitated the circulation of the *fapi* (Chungking dollar), that they protected the silver kept in the vaults of the Communications Bank and that they took no concrete steps to suppress anti-Japanese elements. Moreover, they aided smuggling operations to berate Japan. All these intimidations were successfully removed through the blockade of the settlement by Japanese troops during the one year following





June, 1939. After the blockade episode the British concession there employed the services of a Japanese adviser, and has since changed its attitude toward the Japanese authorities. The Japanese gendermerie in both concessions, British and French, have now been enabled to preserve peace and order, besides the performance of such duties as the arrest and extradition of criminals, suppression of anti-Japanese speeches and writings, strict censorship of objectionable films, etc. As the conditions in the settlement have become favourable to further expansion of the interests of the Japanese concession and our nationals residing there, the Japanese residents seem to be energetically contributing toward the development of the entire settlement, although they are not even remotely inclined to give up their concession. This being the situation, the settlement authorities are exhibiting an attitude of co-operation.

When the China affair broke out the Tientsin settlement attracted renewed attention. The Japanese residents dissolved the *Kyoyéki Kai* (the Common Benefit Association) on August I, 1938, as it was found no longer necessary. This organization was formed as far back as July I, 1930, as an introductory step to work for the surrender of the settlement so strongly advocated during the Manchurian affair. And to this body the entire assets of the Japanese *Mindan*, an executive organ of the Japanese concession in Tientsin, were trasferred. The *Kyoyéki Kai* also took over the educational activities of the *Mindan*, and had since been carrying on with its work until its dissolution when it surrendered unconditionally its assets, the liquidation being completed only in June this year.

With the outbreak of hostilities, the Japanese concession in Tientsin became soon overcrowded, thereby creating the necessity of permitting Japanese subjects to live and conduct their vocations outside the concecession. As a consequence, many Japanese residents purchased land in the locality south of the concession, the total area of land thus bought being estimated at 10,000 *tsubo* which constituted a *de facto* extension of the concession. In this connection it should be noted that the Japanese had to purchase land in the name of some imaginary Chinese, because the Chinese Government persistently maintained that the holding of perpetual lease of land by an alien was valid only in the foreign settlement located in a treaty port and in no other place. In Tientsin this restriction was scrupulously observed. However, as this method of buying land is considered dishonourable, our residents in Tientsin are anxious to see the solution of the land problem as soon

as possible, so that they may be able to purchase land in their own names in the future.

Another regrettable thing is that the present economic condition of Japan does not allow the investment of unlimited funds abroad, with the consequence that Japanese residents cannot extend their enterprises into a foreign concession in China adjoining a Japanese concession. That is why there are only four Japanese business houses in the British and French concessions in Tientsin. They are the Toh-a Kaiun, the Osaka Shosen Kaisha, the Bank of Chosen and the Mitsubishi Bank.

Since the beginning of the current China *impasse*, the International Settlement in Shanghai has been used as the nerve-centre of anti-Japanese activities. Of late, however, such malicious actions have greatly dwindled as a result of suitable measures taken by the Japanese authorities and of the eclipse of the Anglo-American influence there. Our policy toward the International Zone appears to be founded on the assumption that it will continue to exist, and hence, it lays stress on the expansion of operations of the Japanese residents. Since there is no exclusive Japanese concession in Shanghai, the measures to be taken there for the benefit of our residents must of necessity differ from those taken in Tientsin. We are, therefore, justly claiming an increase in our share of rights in the administrative affairs of the Shanghai Municipal Council.

It was in 1916 that Japan for the first time was given a single representation in the Shanghai Municipal Council. In 1927 with the addition of one more Japanese councillor, the Japanese representation was raised to two seats, while the Britis hand American representations were maintained at five and two respectively. This arrangement remained in operation until the outbreak of the China affair. With the progress of hostilities turning rapidly in favour of Japan, the population of Japanese in Shanghai began to exceed the number of foreign residents. The Japanese investments also began to climb which now at least occupy the second position in the finance of the international city. Even as early as 1936 when the Far Eastern turmoil had not developed, Japanese residents on the basis of their population strength demanded increased representation in the Shanghai Municpal Council, but their demand was not taken into account by Britain and America. Since 1937 the population of Japanese has swelled considerably with a corresponding rise in the number of electors. According to the 1939 census the number of electors for the municipal councillors were Britain





1,700, Japan 1,500, America 500 and others 500. The Japanese population in the city as on April 1, 1940, was estimated at 65,419. On the basis of that figure our residents attempted to elect an increased number of their representatives during the election of last Spring, but had to suffer defeats owing to the machinations of the Anglo-American clique. In view of the regulation that the payment of $14 as tax per *mow* of land qualifies a resident as voter, the British and American councillors persuaded their nationals owning land in the city to divide their properties into small holdings, being assisted in that direction by the Jardine Matheson & Co. and the Hongkong-Shanghai Bank. As a result, the number of British and American voters mounted to a large extent on the eve of the election.

The following figures indicate the respective positions of the foreign communities in 1935 (investments in £1,000):

| | Britain | Japan | America | Others |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Investments | £51,000 | 44,000 | 26,000 | — |
| House tax | 42.5% | 24.5% | 15% | 18% |
| Land tax | 82% | 6% | 7% | — |
| Voters | 1,284 | 893 | 400 | 1,273 |

The relation between the Japanese electors and the Anglo-American voters had since become estranged. And when a proposal to increase the land and house taxes by 40 per cent. was moved at the general meeting of tax-payers held in February this year, a violent friction ensued between our tax-payers opposing such a move and the foreign tax-payers supporting it, culminating in a deplorable shooting affray. The proposal, however, was passed against the will of our tax-payers.

Consequent upon the strong opposition put up by the Japanese side, there occurred a change for better in the attitude of British and American councillors, inasmuch as they organized a special Municipal Council in April this year consisting of 4 Chinese, 3 Japanese, 3 British, 3 American, 1 German and 2 other councillors. It was decided that this council should govern in principle the International Settlement in accordance with the provisions of the Land Law, but as regards the disposition of matters not included in the scope of such a measure consultations must be held with an advisory committee to be elected from among the residents of the city. This new plan to form a special organ deserves our careful attention to weigh its possible effects on our interests.

Incidentally, at the general meeting of the tax-payers held on

April 30, 1940, a 50 per cent. increase in land and house taxes was voted, and it was put into effect as from July 1 of this year. The relative procedure permitted the addition of a 50 per cent. super-tax to the basic tax amounts, i.e., 9/1000 of the assessed land value in the case of land tax, 18/1000 in the case of house tax and 16/1000 in the case of special house tax, the last one being applicable to a locality outside the International Settlement. The current year's plan envisages the raising of the previous year's tax figure, namely, the basic amount *plus* the 50 per cent. super-tax, by 40 per cent.

Though the consuls of the various foreign countries will not participate in the organization of the projected advisory committee, it is certain that they will exercise considerable influence to direct its decisions. Of the powers vested in the committee, nothing has been made known beyond the fact that it can make recommendations to the Municipal Council concerning new taxations and the issuance of new permits and the fees to be charged thereon. At any rate, there is no doubt that this committee has been designed as a special organ to replace the functions of the tax-payers' general meetings.

Our policy toward the International Settlement may be said to have already shown good results, because the voice of our councillors in the Municipal Council has become weighty, and because it has become possible for it to make decisions at its own discretion without calling a general meeting of the tax-payers. Apart from the increase of our influence in the Municipal Council, we have succeeded in making the police department of the Settlement Zone employ about 300 Japanese police officers, besides the appointment of a Japanese as vice-director.

As has already been mentioned earlier, the possibility of the various foreign settlements in China existing on a new basis in line with our national policy is fast developing. It is, therefore, our duty to broaden the intellecual vision of our residents and train persons capable of acquitting themselves creditably as bastions of the enlightened international localities. Also it is essential that we should steadfastly endeavour to prevent the withdrawal of the influence of Chinese nationals from the Shanghai international city in order to develop it as a worthy international zone with our residents as its core.

—Chikao Uyéda (The *Shina*, December, 1941)[1]

1 Chikao Uyéda was formerly professor at Tung Wen College, Shanghai, and is now professor at Daitoh Bunka Gaku-in.





## THE ACTIVITIES OF THE PUBLICATION CULTURE ASSOCIATION

The progress of the newly sponsored publication culture scheme undertaken by the Shuppan Bunka Kyokai (Japan Publication Culture Association), which was formed some six months ago as the mainspring of the project of rationalizing publishing industry, contains many interesting features. It is divided into two periods. While the first period covers the work completed during July and September, the second period comprises the activities during September 21 and December 20, 1941. Along with preliminary surveys conducted in the first period, a beginning was made by requiring every publisher to submit a detailed report on each prospective publication, so that the authorities of the association might intelligently decide whether such an undertaking should be approved or not. This is no doubt a vexatious task, especially when books and magazines they have to examine monthly are in the neighbourhood of 3,000 and 2,000 respectively.

With the object of facilitating their work, the authorities of the organization have adopted a novel quota system. They earmark a suitable quantity of paper to be allotted to every publisher varying according to his consumption record in the past, and designate a quantity equivalent thereto *minus* 10 per cent. reduction in supply required by the Material Mobilization Plan as "ordinary allotment." With this fixed volume of paper, the publisher is asked to carry on his business concentrating on the production of books conducive to the promotion of the culture of the nation. He is also directed to submit prior reports regarding future publication plans.

Under this system, every member publisher of the assoication can use as basic allotment up to 80 per cent. of the ordinary allotment for printing books and up to 90 per cent. of the said quota for publishing magazines (the ordinary allotment consisting of the basic allotment and the assessment allotment, the former covering 80 to 90 per cent. of the ordinary allotment). At the same time all these publications must be of such nature as will contribute to the building up of adequate national defence. On the other hand, if certain copies are found materially lacking to conform to this basic principle, the publishers concerned are ordered to reshape such writings. As regards those which are quite undesirable, the publishers are urged to scrap them in consonance with the association's policy of suppressing all printed matters highly injurious to the society.

The remaining portion of the ordinary allotment—20 per cent. in the case of books and 10 per cent. in the case of magazines—is called "assessment allotment" (*satei wariaté*), which cannot be used unless approved by the association. When a publisher member, having exhausted his ordinary paper quota, desires to print a further useful book, he has to file an application for a special allotment with the association which, after due scrutiny, finding the project a worthy one, sanctions the additional quantity of paper. Whenever a book or a magazine is to be published, it has so far been the practice of the association to make the publisher present an advance report called "publication planning report" outlining the nature of it and stating whether the paper to be used is to be drawn from his special allotment or ordinary allotment. It appears that the schedule for this report has been found too troublesome by some members of the association; yet it has undoubtedly served to prevent the appearance of a worthless or a carelessly compiled book because of the fact that the publisher himself has to familiarize beforehand with the contents of the manuscript and has to affix his seal to the required report after filling in the schedule. Meanwhile, the association has been steadily improving its examining capability, inasmuch as the amount of paper subject to its approval, i.e., the assessment allotment, was increased to 40 per cent. in the second period (September 21 to December 20) from 20 per cent. in the firs period. Simultaneously it stiffened the examination of prospective publications, thereby precluding the apperance of undesirable volumes. It plans to raise the ratio to 60 or 80 per cent. in the third period, and expects to control all book publications within the next six and nine months by carrying out previous examination.

As for magazines, the association believes that the assessment allotment may safely be fixed at 10 per cent. The current principal activities of the organization are as follows:

*Publication Planning*

During the first period (June 21 to September 30) the association received as many as 21,033 reports on publication planning, averaging 242 per day. Classified according to particulars, there were 4,723 magazine publication reports, 11,831 book publication reports and 4,479 copies of reports on continued publication of books (series or complete works). The figure for book publication reports is nearly double the total figure for the corresponding period in 1940, which fact dispels the so-called apprehension entertained by some quarters that the





publication control might paralyze the activities of publishers. However, it will probably be safe to consider the upward tendency as indicating a temporary rush of reports in the first period of the new control system. Moreover, as all the publication plans were not necessarily executed in the first period, some of them being left over for action during the second and third periods, the increase cannot be regarded as a barometer of publishing enterprises in the country.

Of these publication planning reports, those covered by the assessment allotment and special allotment were referred to the assement conference held once a week for consideration. As a preliminary, these reports were examined along definite lines by the various interested sections of the culture bureau, namely, the book section, the magazine section, the overseas section, the juvenile section and the text-book section, in some cases seeking the opinion of the diverse publication culture committees. The results of their examination not only formed the basis of the plans to be considered in the assessment conferences, but also afforded valuable data to the association to intelligently select books to be recommended to the general public.

Of the 606 applications for special allotments of paper for books presented during the first period, 281 (ratio 46.7 per cent.) were approved, 320 were turned down and 5 were dealt with as special cases. The following are the classified ratios of the successful applications for special allocations of paper for books of various descriptions:

| | |
|---|---|
| Cultural science | 47.7% |
| Natural science | 32.7 |
| Literary arts | 14.6 |
| Juvenile education | 3.7 |
| School text-books and reference books | 0.3 |
| Miscellaneous | 1.0 |

The significance of these classified ratios can only be seen after due consideration of the figures for the basic and assessment distributions. When we compare these ratios with the classifications of the ordinary publications for 1940, we may work out the following ratios:

| | |
|---|---|
| Cultural science | 40.6% |
| Natural science | 8.8 |
| Literary arts | 23.5 |

Comparing these with the ratios of approved application for special allotments mentioned above, we find a considerable rise in the ratio of natural science and a drop in that of literary arts.

At present when the strengthening of country's defence is of

paramount importance, it is natural that the cultural movements of the nation should be directed toward fostering the growth of the so-called "national defence science." Hence, there has occurred a marked rise in the ratio of natural science. Nevertheless, it must be realized that literary arts and general branches of learning which are beneficial to the cultivation of the mental progress of the nationals and the development of healthy thoughts among them should never be neglected; on the contrary, they must be tentatively encouraged, regardless of difficulties in obtaining adequate paper supplies to undertake publications popularizing these subjects. Generally speaking, it is only in the case of special allotments that books dealing with literary arts appear to be somewhat neglected. This is partly attributable to the fact that the number of applications for paper to publish this type of books has been fewer than in the preceding year, the drop being estimated at 4 per cent. As against this, the approval-ratio of the applications for assessment allotments has reached the mark of 22 per cent., maintaining almost the same rate of distribution in the previous year. A better showing, however, is noticeable in the case of basic quotas. Thus it may be said that, so far as apper supply is concerned, literary arts have not been neglected in the least as will be observed from the relevant data mentioned below:

| | Ratio to the total number of books submitted to the Home Office in 1940 | Suplementary allotment | | Assessment allotment | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| | | Ratio of the number of applications | Approval ratio | Ratio of the number of application | Approval ratio |
| Cultural science | 40.6% | 43.0% | 47.7% | 40.0% | 41.0% |
| Natural science | 8.8 | 25.0 | 32.7 | 16.3 | 17.0 |
| Learning & arts | 23.5 | 20.0 | 14.6 | 21.2 | 22.0 |
| Juvenile | 6.5 | 5.0 | 3.7 | 9.0 | 9.0 |
| Text-books | 8.3 | 5.0 | 0.3 | 11.5 | 9.0 |
| Miscellaneous | 11.9 | 2.0 | 1.0 | 2.0 | 2.0 |

Of the 168 applications for special allotments of paper for magazines, 37 were granted and 131 rejected, the ratio of the former being 22 per cent. The approval-ratios for magazines classified by descriptions to the total number of applications granted were:

| | |
|---|---|
| Engineering and technological magazines | 24.% |
| Learning | 13.5 |
| Agricultural journals | 13.5 |
| Scientific | 10.8 |
| Economic | 8.1 |





| | |
|---|---|
| Juvenile | 8.1% |
| Young men and female | 2.7 |
| Miscellaneous | 13.5 |

The above ratios are about the same as those of books.

From the foregoing it is clear that the ratios of magazines on natural science and cultural science are predominant, but their ratios of paper consumption to the total consumption for magazines are only 12.6 per cent. or so.

| | Approved allotments of paper for magazines | |
|---|---|---|
| | Number of the approvals given | Ratio to the total number of the approvals given |
| Learning | 5 | 13.5% |
| Economic | 3 | 8.1 |
| Educational | 1 | 2.7 |
| Scientific | 4 | 10.8 |
| Engineering and technological | 9 | 24.4 |
| Agricultural | 5 | 13.5 |
| Young men | 1 | 2.7 |
| Female | 1 | 2.7 |
| Juvenile | 3 | 8.1 |
| Miscellaneous | 5 | 13.5 |
| Total | 37 | |

These figures clearly illustrate the extent of purging effect on the magazine world under the publication planning system and its success in liquidating the appearance of obnoxious and cheap journals of no cultural value at all.

*Consolidation of Magazines*

The Metropolitan Police Board was the first to eliminate undesirable magazines and consolidate homogeneous ones in Tokyo. In June last year when the Japan Publication Cult re Association started its activities, it held a conference with the Home Office, the Metropolitan Police Board and all other interested government offices for the purpose of co-ordinating their respective efforts. It was decided at that conference that magazines subject to the Press Law should be dealt with chiefly by the Metropolitan Police Board, those subject to the Publication Law by the Home Office, and that the association should be entrusted with the work of consolidating homogeneous magazines as well as those which might voluntarily desire to amalgamate with other ones.

The kinds of magazines merged by the Home Office and the Metropolitan Police Board up to June last year were as follows:

| | | | | |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Economic magazines | 121 | consolidated | into about | 33 |
| Cinema | 25 | ,, | ,, | 9 |
| Photographic | 11 | ,, | ,, | 4 |
| Medical | — | ,, | ,, | — |
| Popular medicine | 33 | ,, | ,, | 11 |
| Health | 36 | ,, | ,, | 12 |
| Pharmaceutical | 30 | ,, | ,, | 6 |

Those dealt with by the association were:

| | | | | |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Female magazines | 54 | consolidated | into | 16 |
| Educational | 154 | ,, | ,, | 29 |
| Music (Western) | 17 | ,, | ,, | 8 |
| Modern fine arts | 39 | ,, | ,, | 8 |
| Industrial arts | 9 | ,, | ,, | 3 |
| Literary magazines distributed by a literary society exclusively to its members (*Bungaku Doh-nin Zasshi*) | 97 | ,, | ,, | 8 |
| Ancient fine arts | 4 | ,, | ,, | 2 |

The modes of consolidation worked out were as follows:

(1) First of all the authorities concerned ask all the publishers of magazines of similar nature to submit immediately their discontinuation reports; then they signle out a few of them and order them to purchase the business of 3 to 5 other magazines. Each of the buyer is then given an additional allotment of paper up to about 80 per cent. of the total volume of paper used to be consumed by the sold ones.

(2) The authorities on receipt of the discontinuation reports simultaneously from all the magzines of the same description, order some of them to publish new magazines as in the case of fine arts journals. On such an occasion each of the discontinued magazines is given a certain amount of comfort money.

(3) Another procedure is the voluntary amalgamation of magazines of similar types as has been done by the literary magazines distributed by the *Bungaku Doh-nin Zasshi*. More than 90 periodicals of indentical nature have been merged into 8 in this manner through the good offices of the Japan Youngmen's Literary Association.

The Kohdansha, the most prosperous and popular magazine publisher in Japan, has incorporated the *Fuji* with the *King* and the *Yyubén* with the *Ghéndai*. Similarly the Seicho-no-Iyé has consolidated its 16 publications into 2. The 13 journals connected with the Catholic





Church have been amalgamated into 4.

The last mode of voluntary consolidation is most desirable. In fact, our magazine world has been, so to say, "a medley of jewels and gravels." According to the investigation of the Metropolitan Police Board, there were several thousand magazines in our country. Most of them were started mainly for the purpose of money-making, with the result that their influences upon young men had been detrimental in many cases. Therefore, the authorities have done a service by dispensing with all undesirable periodicals, and also those ones which could be scrapped in the present time of emergency. We would suggest that they establish a "magazine structure" to promote effectively the now-advocated "national defence science" by improving the intrinsic qualities of existing magazines and intelligently readjusting the current paper distribution system.

The ratios of the quantity of paper used for the publication of various magazines during the period from July, 1939, to June, 1940, are noted below:

| | |
|---|---|
| Popular magazines | 33.1% |
| Female magazines | 21.5 |
| Juvenile | 12.6 |
| Synthetic | 5.5 |
| Young men's magazines | 2.6 |
| Cultural science | 8.1 |
| Natural science | 4.5 |
| Arts and crafts | 2.5 |
| Hobby | 2.4 |
| Welfare | 0.8 |
| Cinema | 2.8 |
| Examination manuals | 1.2 |
| Miscellaneous | 2.4 |

*Undesirable Books*

With the formation of the Japan Publication Culture Association the circulation of undesriable books has not only been greatly restricted, but also many of them have been exterminated. As a result of this purge, the authorities have decided to prohibit entirely the publication of the so-called *Tora-no-maki*—"ponies"—which are keys to school text-books, and which are calculated to do more harm than good to a student using them. The Education Ministry for a long time has felt the need of suppressing them, but has not taken any constructive step. Article 39 of the Regulations for the Enforcement of the National School Act stipulates: "Children shall not be allowed to

use a *Tora-no-maki*." But the Ministry has hitherto refrained from forbidding the use of it by children in their homes. However, with the inauguration of the new system of paper distribution by the association, the Ministry has strictly prohibited the supply of any quantity of paper to a publisher for the compilation of a *Tora-no-maki*. Consequently, several million pounds of paper has been saved, and it is anticipated that publishers of useful volumes may be supplied with additional quotas.

The Education Ministry has also decided to consolidate radically the 224 lecture-magazines (*Kohgiroku*) now in circulation, in view of the fact that most of them repeat lessons of practically same nature each year instead of revising them at suitable intervals to make them up-to-date. That a set stock of printed lessons sufficient to last several years can be readily made at present, thanks to the high efficiency of the modern art of printing, seems to have led the operators of lecture-magazines to indulge in this irresponsible practice. Accordingly, the association has effected amalgamation of the lecture-magazines in the following manner:

(1) Of the 224 existing lecture-magazines representing 84 operators, the association has secured the discontinuation of 158 representing 49 operators, leaving only 58 in circulation. At the same time it has been arranged that the operators who have lost their business should be absorbed into other branches of publishing industry after they have completed the distribution of their outstanding magazines, and the volume of paper saved by such curtailment should be appropriated to other publications. By means of this arrangement the liquidated operators are being provided with employment in preference to a partial monetary relief.

(2) The following are the kinds of lecture-magazines which have been suspended: Young Men's School 1, Mathematics 4, Martial Arts 2,Arts 2, Painting 4, Music 3, Medicine 5, Preparations for Railway Service Examination 10, Preparations for Communication Service Examination 6, Preparations for Police Service Examination 7, Preparations for Examination of Teachers 1, Etiquette 1, Sewing 7, Flower Arrangement 3, Composition 2, Letter-writing 2, Confectionery 1 and Miscellaneous 2.

Of the foregoing, preparations for police service examination magazines have been discontinued for the reason that the authorities found them quite unnecessary. Apart from the journals enumerated above, of the 22 military lecture-magazines all, with the exception of





one, have been dispensed with.

As regards translated works, which seem to be extremely popular with our reading public, the Government and the association have decided to suppress all unreliable ones. They will, however, encourage the Japanese rendering of useful foreign books, since they are of the opinion that an accurate knowledge of the drift of public opinion and trends of thoughts in foreign countries is necessary for the enlightenment of the people, particularly in time of war. For that reason they are paying close attention to the contents and quality of all newly published translated volumes. In view of the mounting difficulty in obtaining the rights of translating foreign books at the present moment of disruption in communications, they are arranging for an expedient for the advantage of the prospective translators: that is, they plan to let them undertake translation of worthy foreign books depositing a certain sum of money with the Home Office.

*Relations with Cultural Organizations*

The Japan Publication Culture Association is enjoying the support and co-operation of various institutions including the National Service Association, the Japan Compilers' Association (*Nippon Hénshusha Kyokai*), the Japan Critics' Association (*Nippon Hyoronka Kyokai*), the Japan Literary Arts Central Association (*Nipon Bunghei Chuoh-kai*) and the All-Japan Federation of Science and Technique Organization (*Zen Nippon Kagakujutsu Ghijutsu Dantai Rengokai*).

The Japan Compilers' Association was the first body to shape itself for collaboration with the Publication Culture Association, its members being essentially fit to participate in the rationalization of our publishing world. The Japan Critics' Association is also playing a rôle analogous to that of the compilers' fraternity, with the result that these two organizations have found it incumbent on their part to co-ordinate their activities. The National Service Association is also bound to co-operate with the Publication Culture Association to guide the course of Japan's publishing enterprise. The *Nippon Bunghei Chuohkai* consists of 12 bodies of literary men and writers and, therefore, it is essential that this institution should effectively work together with the association, especially when its missions include the extension of aids to the literateurs. The association's joint operation with the All-Japan Federation of Science and Technique Organization is extremely important at the present time when efficient and expert activities have to be arrested to the fullest extent to perfect our national defence. It

being almost impossible to employ at this stage an adequate number of expert technicians as examiners, the Japan Publication Culture Association has arranged to obtain the whole-hearted co-operation of the federation comprising all the expert establishments in the country, numbering 133.

—Shiro Tanaka (The *Bunghei Shunju*, November, 1941)[1]

## LIMITS OF ANGLO-AMERICAN RELATIONS WITH RUSSIA

Until a few months ago it was generally believed that once the hostilities between Germany and the Soviet Union developed into a major warfare, not only the foundation of the Communist set-up would become untenable, but there would occur a collapse of the Stalin Administration. For a long time it had been a foregone conclusion that a decisive battle between the two utterly irreconcilable ideologies was inevitable, but which side would come out victorious was considered difficult to predict.

Soon after the outbreak of the second European war, Germany displayed her superior military skill on the western front deeply impressing the entire world. However, the potentiality and armed strength of the Soviet Union remained a mystery as long as she kept out of the conflict. The swift movement of the Nazi *Wehrmacht* led the observers to conclude that in case of a showdown Chancellor Hitler would be able to make a short work of Soviet Russia. In fact, this belief was shared by the anti-Nazi *bloc* of nations during the early stage of the German-Soviet hostilities. It cannot be denied that the potentiality of the Communist State was underestimated to a great extent. When the Third Reich all of a sudden, shelving the expected invasion of Great Britain, opened hostilities against the Soviet Union, apparently a friendly nation then, the world was flabbergasted. The Anglo-American rejoicing at that unexpected turn of events was well revealed in the two nations' peremptory offer of support to the Soviet Union, irrespective of the diverse acts of betrayal committed by that country during the period of its so-called cordial relation with Germany. Hardly one month after the start of the Nazi-Communist struggle, an Anglo-Soviet military alliance was solemnized, while the United States pledged to dispatch war supplies in exchange of Russian raw products. Such an *entente cordiale* was due to the fact that both Washington and London were immensely impressed by the unexpected stubborn resistance of the Red Army. Hence, they sought to utilize it for the benefit of the "Democracies," although at the outset of the gigantomachy they feared the destruction of Bolshevist forces within a short time. As the war progressed, the Communist Republic showed a noteworthy sustaining power and complete unity of purposes, instead of repeating the lamentable showings of France and Britain in the early period of the current European war.

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The remarkable preparedness of the Soviet Union to face any exigency was on account of her long-standing realization of the truth that for all practical accomplishments she must rely on her own national strength, particularly when she is the only nation advocating Communism on a continent where capitalist countries are more prominent, and also because of the fact that she had long ago anticipated the outbreak of the current European disorder as a prelude to an attack against her avowed doctrine. For that reason she made it clear to her citizens that at some future date they might have to wage war all by themselves against a combination of nations, and at the same time she devoted her whole energy on the completion of her military preparedness. Although she succeeded in building a strong defence structure, her armed might was not found sufficient enough to meet the daily aggravating situation in Europe. As a result, she pursued a "shuttlecock" diplomacy prior to the outbreak of the present European upheaval. Apparently she desired to stay out of the war with a view to concentrating on the improvement of her potentiality to the highest possible degree in the best interest of her world policy. Consequently, she abruptly switched to the German side just before the commencement of the European war, despite the fact that a short while ago she took the lead in the abortive campaign for establishing an anti-Nazi front. She was quite aware that the Anglo-German tension was destined to culminate in a positive showdown and that she might have to wage war with Germany eventually. But to preclude the latter possibility, she reduced her contacts with the anti-Nazi nations to a minimum, thereby allaying the apprehension of the Berlin Government regarding an Anglo-Soviet understanding. Yet inwardly she was hoping all the time that the Nazi *Wehrmacht* would become rapidly impotent in trying to destroy the British war machine. Simultaneously she fanatically engaged in augmenting her own defence preparations to face any emergency. Though it is doubtful whether the Soviet Union was well prepared to undertake a destructive campaign in Europe

prior to the outbreak of the European war as had been alleged by the Nazi Propaganda Department, there is no denying the fact that she was at least ready to accept a challenge from any country. That is why Chancellor Hitler during the first phase of the German-Soviet war asserted: "This country is virtually one whole arsenal." He was obviously astonished at the unexpected firmness of the Red Army. Even Britain and America who at first considered the Nazi-Communist clash as affording a breathing space to the allies, became for the time being fully conscious of the ability of the Stalin régime to put up a stubborn resistance against the panzers and stukas of *Der Führer*. As it became clearer that Soviet Russia's gallant fight against National Socialism was a worthy trial of strength, the Anglo-American countries seriously considered the utility of making a common cause with Premier Stalin, with the consequence that they started extending its whole-hearted aid to the *Tavoritch* soldiery.

It is undeniable that prior to the start of the European war and during its initial stage, relations between the Anglo-American group and the Soviet Union were anything but smooth and harmonious. The Whitehall at that time was asseveratingly engaged in playing off Bolshevist Russia against Germany in pursuance of its continental policy matured after the Munich Conference, with the object of deriving benefit for itself from a Nazi-Communist conflict. Moreover, the Anglo-American bitterness against the Soviet Union, which nation was regarded as the tinder box of Europe, could not be easily reconciled. Evidently some of the moves of the Communist régime with the spread of hostilities in Europe created additional breaches in Anglo-Soviet relations, though London continued its efforts to win over the Bolshevist stronghold through the lure of commercial privileges. The attitude of the United States at the same time became extremely unfriendly owing to the existence of a state of war between Soviet Russia and Finland inasmuch as Washington placed an embargo on American exports to the U. S. S. R. But when the Tripartite Alliance Treaty was concluded between Japan, Germany and Italy, Britain and America jointly began an energetic campaign to enlist the support of Premier Stalin to halt Tokyo's new deal in Eastern Asia. Their efforts, however, failed to yield fruitful results, because Soviet Russia thought it advisable to maintain an attitude of aloofness to the new conditions in order to forge ahead with her programme of streamlining the national defence structure. Accordingly, she decided to take advantage of the Anglo-American change of heart economically, but declined to side with the





"Democracies," which policy was clearly reflected in the conclusion of the Japan-Soviet Neutrality Treaty. She was, of course, aware of the possibility of this pact leading to a recrudescence of strained relations with the Anglo-American diplomacy; yet her serious anxiety to safeguard her international position impelled her to sidetrack such an apprehension.

An analysis of the individual activities of the Soviet Union, Britain and America before the beginning of the European war discloses that each of them had been strenuously striving to know their respective minds. If Britain had been able to foresee the present situation during the first stage of the war when the relative potentialities of herself and Germany had not revealed so wide a disparity as now, she might have been inclined to discontinue the war and support Germany, or by going a step further would have formed a united front against the Soviet Union. However, hostilities suddenly flared up between Germany and Soviet Russia at a time when Britain had been almost exhausted both militarily and economically, and thus the Anglo-American line-up was provided with an unexpected chance to readjust its policy of non-compromise with the Third Reich. Both the "democratic" nations were not only given the needed time to replenish their defence preparedness, but also opportunities to extend assistance to the Stalin Government. Their decision to give utmost aids to the Soviet Union was reached after they had carefully ascertained that country's dependability by re-estimating the potentiality of the Red Army. Even then their respective attitudes toward the latest ally was not uniform in character. As against the United States, Britain evinced a more positive eagerness to make use of the Bolshevist Republic in her behalf, with the result that she concluded a military alliance with the Soviet Union ostensibly to frustrate the German Chancellor's attempt to subjugate that country through the formation of an anti-Soviet battle arch, and also to prevent Premier Stalin for making a separate peace with Germany. In addition, the British launched a drive to arouse a nation-wide hatred for Chancellor Hitler in America thereby stimulating the growth of war psychosis in the United States. The new turn of affairs induced America to conclude a trade agreement with the Soviet Union. The terms of it stipulated that the United States should permit her traders to export goods to an unlimited extent against orders received from the Soviet authorities, that this trade should be in preference to those with other countries, that shipping facilities should be guaranteed to insure the arrival of materials and that additional direct aids should be given to

reinforce the resisting capacity of the Red Army. In this manner the trade pact secured more positive assistance than the financial aid offered by the United States to the Soviet Union immediately after the eruption of the German-Soviet struggle to enable the Communist régime to purchase American war materials in adequate quantities. Subsequently, however, Washington indicated its reluctance to permit unlimited exports on the ground that the Soviet gold deposit in America was not sufficient to cover such dealings. As a result, the Soviet Government had to ship further consignments of gold bullion to that country to secure the supply of imports—a mode of payment which had been in abeyance for the past few years.

The British assistance to the Soviet Union was criticized as unsatisfactory. A complaint was also raised in Britain that on account of the shipping of American war materials to Soviet Russia the flow of Lease-Lend articles to the United Kingdom had decreased considerably. Meanwhile, the German Army had been pushing deep into the Soviet territory regardless of the sout resistance of the Red Army. On the other hand, Japan concluded an agreement with Vichy regarding the joint defence of French Indo-China—a development which indicated an increasingly tense international situation. As a counter-move, Prime Minister Churchill and President Roosevelt held a discussion aboard a warship on the Atlantic Ocean, resulting in the release of an eight-point declaration of the new structure of the world, which, however, lacked concrete details. The only significant information gathered from the Atlantic meeting was that the two Chief Executives had discussions on vital issues confronting both nations. The fact that immediately after the issuance of the Atlantic Charter a joint letter was addressed to Premier Stalin regarding the holding of a tri-Power conference in Moscow was indication enough that the question of bolstering the fighting strength of the Red Army as an integral part of the war structure of the "Democracies" must have formed an important item on the agenda. This three-Power pourparler, known as the Moscow Conference, was held one month after its scheduled date and Britain and America were represented by men of comparatively small calibre. Moreover, it lasted only three days, giving the general impression that the participating countries placed more reliance on its dramatic effects than on the actual results obtained. According to various reports, the subject matters of the conference included numerous economic as well as military questions and that the participating Powers had tentatively reached certain decisions before its final session.





The developments arising out of the conference can be tabulated as follows:

(a) A British air force joined the Red Air Force.

(b) A rumour was circulated that an agreement had been reached between General Sir Archibald Wavell, Commander-in-Chief of British Indian Army, and Marshal Semon Timoshenko, Commander of the Southwestern District Army of the Soviet Union, concerning joint defence of Caucasus.

(c) The granting of a series of American loans totalling $1,050,000,000, of which the last one amounting to $1,000,000,000 carried no interest and was repayable five years after the termination of the war—an extremely easy term of repayment.

(d) Britain agreed to the dispatch of American warplanes and war materials to the Soviet Union on a preferential basis.

(e) Britain began perfecting the plan of sending war accessories to the Soviet Union through Iraq and Iran in view of the approach of the frozen condition of the Archangel Port.

(f) The proposal to establish a supply route through Turkey.

(g) The project of a railroad link between Basra and Soviet territory east of the Black Sea.

(h) The construction of a supply route through Iran for which purpose Britain has already sent a party of engineers there.

(i) Britain and America jointly submitted a *demarche* to Finland to suspend hostilities with the Soviet Union.

(j) A story was put out that Britain was sounding Turkey's attitude toward the Soviet Union at the latter's request.

From the observations made earlier and the developments consequent upon the Moscow Conference, it transpires that both Britain and the United States are now busily engaged in extending full-throttle aids to the Soviet Union. While the two "democratic" Powers appear to have co-ordinated their respective Soviet policies to a considerable limit, public opinion in either country is in danger of taking the shape of a political movement. Nevertheless, both Governments are going ahead with their policy of collaboration with the Communist set-up ignoring the trend of public opinion. It seems that the more their aids to Premier Stalin increase in volume, the more the voice of the leftists in the countries will assume a stronger pitch. The controversy in Britain over the question of creating a western military front has steadily become a popular agitation, embarrassing the British Government. In America too, an agitation is going on advocating participation in the European war. Although Britain welcomes such an attitude, she has realized, on second thought, that American entrance into the war will bring about a marked decrease in war supplies to

herself and the Soviet Union. Thus, both London and Washington are on the horns of a dilemma. At present, however strongly Premier Stalin may urge on Britain and America to open attacks on Germany from both sides, east and west, his request will not be complied with in good time. Britain will possibly continue her "secluded warfare" for the time being, while the dispatch of American Doughboys to Europe will be a question of reality only in the remote future. On the contrary, it can be presumed that both Britain and the United States will endeavour to make the Soviet Union bear the brunt of the Nazi onslaught indefinitely by extolling her heroic resistance and giving her the greatest possible assistance short of actual dispatch of troops. They realize that the defeat of Soviet Russia in the end will provide them with intermediate facilities to strengthen their respective war machines, and if the Soviet Union retains control over her Asiatic territory they can hope to make her a vital link in their projected encirclement of Japan. To put it in a nutshell, they are trying to use Bolshevist Russia as their cannon fodder.

Premier Stalin is not quite unmindful of the ulterior motives of the Anglo-American line-up. In fact, he is waxing eloquent at the successes obtained so far in breaking up the anti-Soviet front which has been menacing the independence of the Bolshevist régime for years. The possibility of the Soviet Republic utilizing Britain and America for her own purpose should not be overlooked. It is likely that she will support the war policies of the "Democracies" to a certain limit, but she will never consent to pull their chestnut out of the fire at the risk of her own self-existence. In other words, she will not willingly throw her lot with the "democratic" order of things. By way of supporting Britain and America, she will render aids to the Communist Party in China or to the Chungking régime, at the same time revitalizing her efforts to alleviate the present crisis confronting the nation, externally and internally. So long as the German-Soviet war lasts, Bolshevist Russia will continue to maintain cordial relations with the "Democracies." On the other hand, the Anglo-American "Democracy" desires to pursue a policy of collaboration with the Communist ally until the final restoration of peace both in Europe and in Asia. Thus, it is clear that relations between the Soviet Union and the Anglo-American front are limited to their mutual realistic intentions.

—Naohiko Masuda (The *Chuo Koron*, November, 1941)[1]

1 Naohiko Masuda is a writer of note on international problems.



# BOOK REVIEWS

*THE JAPANESE CONSTITUTION AND POLITICS. By NINICHIRO MATSUNAMI, LL. D. Maruzen & Company, Tokyo. pp. 577. 15.00 yen.*

The author of this deserving volume is well known in Japan for his scholastic attainments in the sphere of legal study. He has, so far, published many notable works, but none of them can excell the merits of the present one. The sincerity of the writer is impressively revealed in the comparative method he has adopted to explain his viewpoints. He clearly states in the preface that he has made a comparative study of the constitutions of other nations, especially that of the United States and Great Britain, with which two countries Japan has had long intercourse. The reader, in perusing the book, will be struck by the argumentative logic and terseness in style. The writer approaches him step by step to enable him to form a correct understanding of the subject as a whole.

In chapter one Dr. Matsunami rightly emphasizes that prior to the promulgation of the present written Constitution there has been in existence in the country an unwritten constitution. In this connection he significantly adds that this unwritten usuage is the oldest one in the world, having been established more than 2,600 years ago. By quoting the views of American professor M. Mathews, he points out that the American Constitution is the product of past experiences gained in the light of such juridical documents as Magna Charta, the Bill of Rights, etc. In the case of the Japanese Constitution, however, it has its roots traceable to the very origin of the Japanese State. He deplores the attitude of certain Japanese constitutional jurists who "imported without discrimination the so-called organic theory" which, according to him, cannot be applied to Japan, although it is possibly applicable to Western countries.

Being an astute exponent of the Japanese Constitution, the author copiously draws on the opinions of many expert authorities on the diverse characteristics of the Japanese State. He urges foreign observers to realize the imperativeness of fully comprehending the

grand principles which went to build up the unwritten constitution, and asserts that to attain that objective a thorough study of Japanese history is essential. He maintains that, unlike other constitutions, the Japanese unwritten constitution developed in a mature form simultaneously with its establishment by the Heavenly Ancestress, Amatérasu Ohmikami, the Sun Goddess. Indeed, nobody can fully understand the intrinsic nature of the Japanese Constitution without having due knowledge of the foundation of the State, for to the very origin of the State are traceable the grand principles of the unwritten constitution, the backbone of the written counterpart. An accurate appreciation of the origin of the State, therefore, enables one to visualize the sovereignty of Japan in right perspective.

Dealing with sovereignty, Dr. Matsunami stresses the fact that in Japan the sovereignty of the State is vested in the *Tenno* (Emperor), who is the sovereign of the State legally, as well as politically and socially. Referring to the preamble of the Constitution and Article I of the same, he avers that Japan is a Tennocratic State, and adds that the *Tenno*'s sovereign rights are absolute—He wields His rights Himself on His own behalf and not for the State as an organ of the State. In the past many of our predecessors had failed to appraise the truth of this fundamental point. In the opinion of Dr. Matsunami this conception is indigenous to the Empire of Japan and it has no parallel among modern States. He then goes on to say that although it may sound strange to foreign ears, nevertheless it is true that the *Tenno* of Japan is the Heavenly Sovereign of the State; He is at the same time above the State and in a certain sense He is the State Himself. Hence, the sovereign rights are vested in the Sacred Throne, which was established when the "heaven and earth separated." In view of this fact, he indicates that in Japan there exists what may be termed "Emperor Worship." By way of clarification, he states that to the majority of Japanese nationals the highest ambition is to lay down their lives for their *Tenno*—an ambition which, in reality, is a virtue with the Japanese. It was solely for the gratification of this ambition that Admiral Togo determinedly set out to destroy the Baltic fleet during the Russo-Japanese War of 1904-5, that Prince Ito, chief framer of the Japanese Constitution, willingly succumbed to the assassin's gunfire at Harbin, and that General and Countess Nogi destroyed themselves in order to accompany the departed Emepror Meiji to the world beyond.

The author invites attention to the fact that with the sacred *Tenno*





as the head, the Japanese people form one vast family; the Imperial House is at the head of the whole nation, and hence, the term "great house" in Japan means "public or government." He also points out that the *Tenno* is not an absolute despotic monarch; in fact, He exercises sovereign rights in accordance with the provisions of the Constitution. In the constitutional preamble He announces:

> We now declare to respect and protect the security of the rights and of the property of Our people, and to secure to them the complete enjoyment of the same, within the extent of the provisions of the present Constitution and the Law.

The age-old conception that the *Tenno* is a divine and mysterious personage, that He is the Son of Heaven, and that He is the supreme and absolute fountain of authority still remains unbroken. The Japanese people keep the name of their *Tenno* always sacred and do not utter it in the course of ordinary conversations. When they desire to speak about their Emperor, they use the ceremonial appellation "His Majesty," just as the Occidental people speak of God as "The Diety" and of Lord Christ as "Our Saviour." Such being the relation between the *Tenno* and His subjects, the author queries: "How can the Emperor become a despotic ruler and His subjects disloyal?" The Japanese people regard their *Tenno* as their father and the Empress as their mother, while to Their Majesties the subjects are Their "beloved children."

Dr. Matsunami is quite exhaustive on this point. He is positive that by understanding "this relation between the Ruler and the ruled, one can obtain the key for opening what might seem to foreigners the mystery-box of Japanese politics." In this connection, he refutes the "illogical" statements of Putman Weale who, in the opinion of the writer, is incompetent to understand the fundamental basis of Japanese polity. Putman Weale says:

> The short-sightedness of Japanese policy has been the ally of republicanism in the Far East, sponsorer of Western influence, and the enemy of peace and dignity of the Japanese Imperial House, which today is swaying ominously with the high wind of democratic revolt, and may yet encounter a terrible end.

As against this utterly incongruous prognostication, Dr. Matsunami is adamantly faithful in his belief that Imperial Nippon will continue as a glorious Empire, and that her existence will remain coeval with heaven and earth. This belief is firmly shared by the entire Japanese nation.

Particularly noteworthy feature of the book is the author's

comparison of Japan's "Emperor Worship" with "State Worship" in Italy and Germany. He explains that in Japan the *Tenno* is the object of worship to the people, His person being sacred and inviolable, and His decisions being looked upon as actually coming from Heaven, whose offspring He is believed to be. The Son of Heaven is the designation given Him by His subjects. The Japanese children in national schools are taught that there exists no other beautiful country like their's in the world, that it is the land of gods of whom the *Tenno* is the son, and that every subject must, if need be, perish for their *Tenno* and the country. These principles inculcated in a race that is combative, expressly proud and courageous, have produced a nation essentially brave and strong.

The author thinks that Japanese "Emperor Worship" has something in common with Fascism, which may be described as the cult of "State Worship," visualizing the invisible State as the ultimate reality and demanding the sacrifice of all individual and group interests at its altar. In Fascism, he believes that the State is absolute, in relation to which all individuals and groups are relative. Consequently, he notes the existence of similarity between "Emperor Worship" and "State Worship," although there are several striking differences. The State is invisible; but the *Tenno*, in a sense, is visible. The former is a human institution, while the latter is a superhuman entity descending from His ancestors through ages eternal. The author's comparison in respect of these two forms of worship is quite extensive.

Alluding to "State Worship" in Germany, he remarks that it is as predominant there as in Italy. To the Germans, the State is more than an agency for the protection and promotion of the common or collective interests of the people. It is a substantial whole in which are centred its own volition, interests and ambitions, quite distinct from those of its citizens collectively considered. The welfare of the State is above the weal of the citizens who must offer their implicit allegiance to it. Being superhuman, the German State is not bound by the principles of morality which guide the conduct of individuals. This conception is all-important in German philosophy. Here again the author is exhaustive in his comparative analysis of the subject.

The *Bushido* (the Way of the Warrior) of Japan, which is a form of stoicism collectively representing loyalty and valour, is adequately discussed in the book. The author says that *Bushido*, for the purpose of understanding, can be likened to European chivalry, but it differs from the latter in that it lacks the individualistic tendency. It also





disfavours the idea of evincing special regards for the female sex, principally because women are liable to enfeeble men's courage and are an obstacle in the performance of duty. Dr. Matsunami draws an analogy between *Bushido* and Confuncianism, and discloses that Japanese hero worship, too, has its root in *Bushido*, with the result that the Japanese are the most patriotic of all nations. In this regard he mentions the system of Japanese life and forcefully indicates that the Japanese from their very birth are disciplined to control their feelings. Because of this training, they at times appear to be callous to pain or to mundane pleasure.

According to Dr. Matsunami, Japanese ancestor worship exercises a powerful influence on the laws and customs of the country, and therefore, a complete understanding of it is absolutely necessary to appreciate fully the niceties of the Japanese Constitution. Quoting Dr. Hozumi, he classifies ancestor worship into three categories: (1) the worship of the Imperial Ancestress—the Sun Goddess, (2) the worship of the patron dieties of different localities, and (3) the worship of family ancestors by members of each family.

The author deserves congratulation for his resourcefulness. In endeavouring to interpret the Japanese Constitution from various angles, he has admirably produced an informative volume replete with satisfactory explanations. What makes the book additionally valuable is that his elastic scope of argument, leaving the confines of the subject, embraces, among other things, religion, morality, psychology and history of the country. He even discusses the origin of the national flag of Japan.

Significantly enough, a translation of the text of the Constitution in English, French and German has been incorporated to enable foreign readers to digest its salient features.

The volume is undoubtedly a useful publication, especially at this time when the Japanese Empire is forging ahead to make the project of a greater East Asia co-prosperity sphere a complete success.

——*Shin-ichi Fujii, LL. D.*

*GUNKAN NO KEITAI (The Classes of Warships). By HAJIMÉ FUKAYA. Umito Sora Sha, Tokyo. pp. 317. 3.00 yen.*

As a result of the signal victory of the Japanese Navy over the American Pacific fleet stationed in the Hawaii Islands, the importance of warships in modern warfare has become a subject of deep study throughout the world. "A nation that controls the sea, controls the

world," is a well-worn saying. Until the revelation of Japan's striking power, the truth of this adage was shown by the naval might of the British Empire, who had prided herself as "the mistress of the seas." The glorious days of ancient Spain and Holland were also due to their respective sea power. Even the Roman Empire, Greece and Egypt owed their early predominance to their superior naval forces.

Since the start of the Anglo-German war, the comparative potentialities of warships and warplanes have become matters of lively discussion, but so far no concrete solution has been arrived at. Quite apart from this controversy, it has been generally admitted that in a modern naval battle a decisive rôle is played by the effective teamwork between warships and warplanes. Then the question arises what types of naval craft a nation should possess to command the seas. It appears that the naval Powers are now busy formulating plans to construct powerful warships which can withstand impacts from down-to-date weapons.

A reliable survey of the evolution of the various classes and types of war vessels is now being eagerly sought. The progress of the current World War has intensified the tendency to find out what experiences in the past stimulated and improved the warship-building industry to its present level. In view of this enthusiasm, the book under review can be regarded as a timely undertaking. It is valuable primarily for the reason that the author is the only authority on this line of study, and secondly because a book of this nature has not yet been produced by any writer. The author in the preface says :

> As I have decided to introduce the changes that have occurred in the diverse styles of warships, I ought to describe the various patterns, characteristic features and comparative strength of the different kinds of naval craft ever built in the world. It is true that no design of warship has ever been contemplated on the spur of the moment. Modern vessels have developed from ancient ones in conformity with the gradual improvements in tactical and ship-building techniques, resulting in the adoption of new weapons. It is, therefore, necessary for us to know properly about the warships in the previous ages as well as the original styles of them, so that we may appropriately discuss the merits and demerits of modern ones. Not only warships, but also other weapons of war have improved in successive ages. Hence, no one can possibly appreciate the remarkable stride hitherto made by the warship-building science, unless he is well aware of the process of ship-building development chronologically from the ancient time. Our unique naval construction owes a great deal to the early influences of Holland, France and Britain, as will be noticed from the styles and construction of our warships during the first phase of the Meiji era.





From the remarks contained in the preface it is clear that the author attempts to justify the fact that the styles of modern naval craft have been developed to meet the exigencies of modern naval warfare. He traces the fundamental evolution of warships age by age and points out the growth of naval construction in each period. At the outset he mentions about the origin of warships and in part says :

> According to traditions, savages in pre-historic ages used to paddle canoes in crossing rivers and lakes, and they always carried with them some kinds of primitive arms or fishing tackles. When it dawned upon them that an increase in the size of canoes and in their stability or safety meant a corresponding increase in their carrying power, they immediately began building larger canoes of greater stability, and moved from one hunting ground to another in quest of better games. Later, barter system to trade commodities between tribes inhabiting different localities came into vogue and boats became important means of water-borne traffic and communication, with the consequence that they began to construct still larger boats. Sometimes these vessels were used during tribal fights on water, which must have been of frequent occurrence in that dim past. However, in most cases they were used for peace time pursuits. At a much later period ships for fighting purposes came to be planned. The Egyptians and the Cretians (the inhabitants of the Crete Island in the Mediterranean Sea) were the first to build such ships. Indeed, the development of Egyptian vessels is an outstanding fact in the history of the construction of sail-boat. In pre-historic ages the Phoenicians took the lead in employing warships.

Chapter I, after describing warships that existed in the remote past, points out that the development of the so-called "galley" ships for war purposes should be regarded as the germinating source of the present-day war vessels. It ends by giving an account of warships that were in use during the Roman Empire civilization. Chapter II delineates the circumstances which favoured the formation of a regular navy, as well as the rise of Spanish navy, adding that cannon were first used at this time. While chapter III records further progress in warships, the succeeding chapter gives information about them in the Middle Ages, and refers to English warships in the Elizabethan Age and the Stuart Dynasty (1688-1766), those in the Restoration Period of England (1660) and those in the latter part of the eighteenth century. Chapter V sketches the proficiency of steam power and iron-clad man-of-wars, in addition to the advancement of the ship-building science, leading to better constructions of sea-going

warcraft, and the consequent revolution in the naval warfare. Modern warships, such as battle-ships, cruisers, aircraft carriers, destroyers, torpedo boats, submarines, special boats, etc., form the subject matters of chapter VI, which also gives a significant comparison of the special features of each type. Whereas in chapter VII appellations of the component parts of every kind of war vessel with necessary explanations are chronicled, the following chapter sums up his observations.

Since the book lengthily deals with the progressive growth of the English Navy, it may as well be termed the "History of the Formation of the British Navy." The reason why the author sanctions a predominant position to British warships is that the upsurgence of naval power up to the present stage has been the handiwork of English naval circles.

The author concludes :

> It is evident that the various types of warships in the world have developed along the same fundamental lines through every age since time immemorial. With the advent of large-scale ship-building, machine-making and arms-manufacturing, their orderly improvements became speedy and their patterns and structures underwent equivalent modifications or alterations. In recent times frequent inventions of new scientific weapons have caused the appearance of different classes of fighting vessels; on the other hand, constant improvements in the art of warfare—both offensive and defensive—are greatly assisting the acceleration of naval construction. A comparative picture of the efficiency of the warships that had been built during the last World War and that of those recently constructed clearly illustrates the rapid upswing of ship-building during the past two decades. As a sequel to the disarmament conferences held in Washington and London, a drastic change was carried out in the construction of naval craft, and each Power, for the sake of expediency, reconditioned old ships by equipping them with up-to-date weapons.
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> From the primitive days the ship-building of every country has been governed by one and the same principle. Therefore, one will be able to estimate the importance of the equipment of modern warships by investigating their early original types along the line of their evolution. The origin of rams with which warships in the latter part of the nineteenth century were armed may be traced to a similar device used in primitive war canoes, which had fallen into decay soon after the downfall of the Roman Empire. The same method was adopted on an improved scale with the popularity of iron-clad ships propelled by steam power in the nineteenth century.

It may be added that warships are no longer a deciding factor in





controlling the seas, especially when they are vulnerable to attacks from bombing warplanes manned by intrepid airmen. This has been conclusively proved by the recent successes achieved by the Japanese air force in sinking a number of American battle-ships in Hawaiian waters and the *Prince of Wales* and the *Repulse*, two British capital-ships, off Kuantan in Malaya.

A detailed description of the construction and characteristics of the ill-fated *Prince of Wales* is given separately in the book as a supplementary feature. Another feature is the simple and brief explanation of technical points concerning warships for the benefit of lay readers.

*BUNRAKU NO KENKYU (STUDY OF BUNRAKU) BY SHUTARO MIYAKÉ. The Soh-ghénsha, Tokyo. pp. 380. 1.50 yen.*

*Bunraku* is the popular term for *ningyo johruri*, or doll-dance, performed to the accompaniment of the *johruri* music on the *samisén*. Occidentals would call it a marionette or puppet performance. In Japan the dolls are sometimes three or four feet tall, and so constructed that their manipulators can move the eyes and mouths. The handlers are clad and hooded in black so as not to detract from the life-like appearances of the dolls.

*Bunraku* has inseparable relation with *kabuki*, the traditional Japanese drama, but it is much more delicate, harmonizing in one the doll-dance, the ballad recital and the music. It can be appreciated fully only by persons of subtle and highly cultivated tastes, who understand the peculiar Japanese temperament. Accordingly, it may often be quite impossible for Occidentals to understand. The book under review may be incomprehensible in parts to the uninitiated, as it is the result of profound research by an authority on Japanese classical drama. He says, he began a special study of *bunraku* in Osaka years ago, but encountered many difficulties. He continues :

> Finding my knowledge of *johruri* inadequate, I took up that subject in all its aspects. From my information, it appears that, though *johruri* is believed generally to have originated five hundred years ago, it actually started during the Eiroku era (1558–1568), when *samisén* was first introduced in Japan. When I went to the Bunraku Theatre in Osaka to improve my knowledge of *johruri*, I found first of all that I must study its origin. Fortunately there are more reliable data available on *johruri* than on *kabuki*, but my study has been confined to *bunraku*, which is a part of *johruri* in its wider application.

The term *bunraku* probably was taken from the name of Bunrakukén Uyémura, a showman of Awaji Island, whose name first appeared in a book published in Osaka more than a hundred years ago. Following the manner of Charles Iamb's *Tales of Shakespeare*, Mr. Miyaké presents anecdotes about those who played important parts in the development of *bunraku* through many vicissitudes, and compares his subject with *kabuki*. The following is an excerpt on the development of the art:

> The origin of *bunraku* is not accurately known. I have investigated in Osaka, but with no tangible results. It has been ascertained, however, that it was started by Bunrakukén Uyémura, a showman of Awaji, which is now a part of Hyogo Prefecture. According to the *Gidayu Taikan* (a book on *johruri*), Bunrakukén build a puppet show house (a barrack-like structure) in the precincts of the Gyorei Shrine in Osaka about the middle of the Kansei era (1789-1800). Another record says, however, that his first puppet show house was built near Kohzu Bridge, in the South Ward of Osaka, and that in January, 1811, he built a second such place in the compound of the Bakuro-cho Inari Shrine. Both the latter seem to have been called Bunrakukén Shibai (or Bunrakukén Drama). In the reforms of the Tempoh era (1854–1859), it was prohibited to conduct any kind of performance in shrine or temple precincts, but Bunrakukén's successor set up a show house on the reclaimed land at the Shimizu-cho waterfront in Osaka and resumed performances. In January of the fifth year of Meiji, he built a puppet show house along present lines at Matsushima, Osaka. In the twentieth year of Meiji, this was removed to the precincts of the Gyorei Shrine, where Bunrakukén had first started. It was destroyed by fire forty-three years later.

Of the origin of doll-drama itself, especially its favoured development on Awaji Island, the author says:

> There are different legends about the origin of doll-drama. The most common one relates the story of a priest, Hyakudayu, of the Ebisu Shirine at Nishinomiya, near Osaka, who made a doll-image of a deceased priest named Dohkun. Whenever it stormed heavily, Hyakudayu would dance the doll in a humourous way to assuage the wrath of the sea-god, and the sea would always become calm. The relation of this dance with the sea-god should be noted.
>
> Of the origin of the *johruri*, an ancient book tells of a blind minstrel in the Ashikaga period who prayed to Yakushi-Nyorai, a Buddhist diety, for restoration of sight every day for a certain length of time and on the final day his sight was restored. In joyous gratitude, the minstrel thereupon recited the Yasuda story from the *Heiké Monogatari* (Tales of the Heiké Family), working it into a ballad of twelve acts.





> Writing of the now moribund doll-drama of Okinawa, Toso Miyara says in his book thereon that it was there called *futoki*, or Buddha, indicating that it, too, was of similar origin.
>
> *Kabuki* sprang from a religious dance known as "Nembutsu Odori," initiated by a woman of Izumo known as Okuni. But this was primarily intended as a public entertainment, whereas *johruri* and doll-dance were founded on devout spiritual faith.

Writing of the special development of doll-dancing and doll-making on the Island of Awaji, Mr. Miyaké says:

> Nothing is known of the period in which Hyakudayu lived. I inquired of the present chief priest at Ebisu Shrine in Nishinomiya to no avail. All I learned is that there still remains a small shrine dedicated to him in the compounds. But it is probably safe to consider Hyakudayu as the originator of doll-dance. The Heian period is cited as the beginning of puppet-making in the *Kairaishiki*, a book on puppets, written by Masafusa Ohyé, a distinguished scholar of the Kamakura period.
>
> And there is a legend in Awaji that tells how one Hyakudayu of Nishinomiya came to Sanjo-mura on Awaji long, long ago. A local wood-carver named Kikudayu took the stranger into his house as a guest. As a consequence of an amourous adventure with Hyakudayu, Kikudayu's daughter in due course bore a son. The child's father died soon thereafter, but the child grew up and succeeded to Kikudayu's profession and made Awaji the nation's greatest centre of doll-making. . . .
>
> Moreover, Awaji formerly was virtually an island of women, who showed special courtesy to visiting males, especially to doll-makers and manipulators. Many eventually settled down to live together, the wives learning their husbands' profession. This explains why puppets and puppeteering developed so amazingly on Awaji. It is said that the Emperor Goyohzei (1587-1611) once was pleased to view a doll made in Awaji.

Of perhaps greater general interst than the legends and factual material mentioned above is the section of this book on the relative merits of *kabuki*, especially that famous *kabuki* drama "Chushingura," the story of the forty-seven *ronin* and their vengeance for the death of their lord.

The last chapter deals with the comparative merits and different modes of expressions in *kabuki* and *bunraku*, as no book has done thus far.

# CHRONICLE OF CURRENT EVENTS

*November 21* After further demonstrating the co-operation and unity between the Government and the people, the 77th extraordinary session of the Diet is closed. In the short 5-day session, all the Government's bills and budget estimates are passed with record speed.

An Imperial Ordinance concerning national service to the State through labour which provides for service by all Japanese men (14 to 40) and unmarried women (14 to 25) for a maximum of 30 days a year is promulgated, effective December 1.

There is no cause for concern about the rice supply situation next year because the stocks of rice at the end of the 1941 rice year (October 31) were 8,390,000 *koku* (a *koku* is about five bushels) which represents 1,900,000 *koku* more than the ideal carry-over of 6,500,000 koku, assures Agriculture and Forestry Minister Hiroya Ino.

*November 22* Following his talks with diplomatic representatives of Britain, Australia, the Netherlands and Chungking, United States Secretary of State Cordell Hull confers with Ambassadors Nomura and Kurusu, at Mr. Hull's apartment at the Wardman Park Hotel. State Department officials report that the conversations with Japanese diplomats expanded the previous discussions.

*November 23* The Government re-fixes the goal of national savings for the 1941–2 fiscal year at ¥17,000,000,000 an increase of ¥3,500,000,000 over the original goal, in order to balance the greatly increased budget of the State.

*November 24* A special one-day gubernatorial conference is held at the Premier's official residence for the purpose of infusing the farthest corners of the land with the spirit of complete general mobilization. At the meeting Premier General Hidéki Tohjo, expressing the irrevocable determination of the Government to achieve the goal of the current struggle, asked self-sacrificing service on the part of government officials.

The Foreign Office announces that the *Tatsuta Maru*, 16,975-ton N.Y.K. liner, will be sent to Los Angeles and Balboa following an understanding reached with the United States Government. The same announcement says that the number of Japanese evacuees from regions where the "freezing" order is in force runs to 10,000.

The Argentine Government rejects the request by Baron Shu Tomii, Japanese Ambassador in Buenos Aires, for extension through 1941 of the Japanese-Argentine Trade Pact.

The United States Navy Department announces that some of the gunboats patrolling the Yangtze River will be withdrawn and transferred elsewhere. Their destination is believed to be the Philippines.

*November 25* A new protocol





providing for extension of the Anti-Comintern Pact for another five years is signed in Berlin on the fifth anniversary of the signing of the original treaty. Seven nations,—China, Rumania, Bulgaria, Finland, Slovakia, Croatia and Denmark newly join in the pact.

*November 26* The American Embassy in Tokyo advises all American residents in Japan, excluding the "Nisei" to go home, in accordance with instructions received from the State Department. The American Consulate-General in Tientsin also urges approximately 350 American residents there to return home.

A further list of Army officers and men who have been honoured for their brilliant services in the fighting at Nomonhan, the battle of Hankow and actions in other parts of the continent is made public by the War Office and Bureau of Decorations.

United States Secretary of State Cordell Hull hands a document to Ambassadors Nomura and Kurusu, when they call at the State Department. State Department officials disclose that the document represents the culmination of Japanese-American talks and rests on certain basic principles with which everyone should be familiar in the light of many repetitions.

*November 27* Japanese Ambassadors Nomura and Kurusu hold a conference with President Roosevelt and Secretary of State Cordell Hull at the White House.

*November 28* President Roosevelt states to the press that American vessels sailing the Pacific route will not be armed "under the existing circumstances." When asked how long he expects these circumstances to continue, the Chief Executive replies, "the answer lies in Tokyo, not in Washington."

*November 29* Premier General Chang Ching-hui of Manchoukuo, on the eve of the first anniversary of the conclusion of the Japan-China-Manchoukuo Joint Declaration, says that unless anti-Axis elements are eliminated, peace and prosperity can never be established in East Asia.

*November 30* Huge mass meetings to commemorate the first anniversary of the conclusion of the Japan-China-Manchoukuo Joint Declaration are held simultaneously in Tokyo, Nanking and Hsinking. Premier General Hidéki Tohjo, in his radio speech felicitating the occasion, declares that European and American countries from sheer selfish motives are pulling wires to make Chungking hamper the construction of a new order in East Asia. Foreign Minister Shighénori Togo, at a dinner party held at the Imperial Hotel in celebration of the anniversary, says that the United States is inclined to apply fanciful principles to East Asiatic nations to interfere with the new order movement.

The White House reveals secret transcripts from President Roosevelt's press conferences during 1937 and 1938 which disclose that the Chief Executive did not proclaim a state of war between Japan and Chungking because otherwise Chungking would be prevented from buying war materials from America owing to Japan's holding of a complete and free access to all United States raw materials.

*December 1* A sixth Japan-American conversation is held, when Japanese Ambassadors Nomura and Kurusu call on Secretary of State Cordell Hull. The Japanese diploma-

tic representatives, in the course of the interview, demand an explanation of some points in Mr. Hull's note.

The War Office announces that Lieutenant-General Saburo Ando has been appointed a member of the Supreme War Council; Major-General Ken-ichiro Kyo, chief of the Soldiers' Affairs Section of the Kumamoto Division; Major-General Toyojiro Nakashiro, chief of the Soldiers' Affairs Section of the Ranan Division; Major-General Kozuyé Matsumoto, chief of the Soldiers' Affairs Section of the Imperial Guard Division.

*December 2* Japanese Amdassadors Nomura and Kurusu call on Undersecretary of State Sumner Welles at the State Department at the inviation of Mr. Welles. Mr. Welles made, for President Roosevelt's information, certain inquiries of the Japanese Government.

Mr. Yoshiaki Hatta, Commerce and Industry Minister in the Hiranuma Cabinet, is appointed full-time Railways Minister and Agriculture and Forestry Minister Hiroya Ino installed concurrently as Overseas Affairs Minister. This step is expected to strengthen the position of the Tohjo Cabinet and at the same time to enable Mr. Togo to devote all his attention to foreign affairs.

The Navy Office and Bureau of Decorations release a seventh list of 87 living naval officers and men who were decorated with the Order of the Golden Kite for their distinguished services in the China affair.

The N.Y.K. liner *Tatsuta Maru* which is to carry back Japanese evacuees from the United States sails from Yokohama for Los Angeles in its second trans-Pacific voyage since the imposition of the freezing act.

*Decemb r 3* Giving a long resumé of the Japan-American talks, Secretary of State Cordell Hull tells the press that the talks revolved around the United States Government's 14-point declaration of July, 1937, and that the policy Japan is following is diametrically opposed to the traditional American Far Eastern policy.

*December 4* Finance Minister Okinori Kaya, in the first-day session of the East Asia Economic Conference held at the Imperial Hotel, declares that British and American freezing order has not dealt any serious blow to the interests of Japan, Manchoukuo and China and, on the contrary, the order has spurred Japan to redouble its efforts toward the establishment of a new economic order in the East Asia co-prosperity sphere.

*December 5* Japanese Ambassadors Nomura and Kurusu hand the Japanese Government's reply to President Roosevelt's inquiries, when they call on Secretary of State Cordell Hull. The White House, after the conversations, publishes the Japanese document without making any comment.

*December 6* The Government-General of Malaya recalls all men in the armed services to their posts and publishes a decree prohibiting the departure from Malaya of all non-British subjects without special permission. Thai Premier Luang Pibul Songgram declares in an exclusive interview with a Bangkok Chronicle correspondent that Thailand will fight to the last ditch in case it should be involved in war.

The affairs regarding the stock exchange and the insurance business have been transferred from the Commerce and Industry Ministry to





the Finance Ministry, announces the Board of Information. The jurisdiction over the matters on the People's Rehabilitation Bank, the control of foreign exchange bills, the distribution of industrial salt and camphor and the monopoly sale of alcohol have been shifted from the Finance Ministry to the Commerce and Industry Ministry.

*December 7* The Hongkong Government issues mobilization orders, according to a U.P. cable, while Domei reports that General Douglas MacArthur, Commander-in-Chief of the United States and Philippine forces, will make an important announcement to his armies within the 24 hours following his scheduled conference with President Manuel Quezon of the Commonwealth.

*December 8* An Imperial Rescript declaring war on the United States and Great Britain is issued and at the same time the Government announces Japan's immutable policy to insure the stability of East Asia.

Foreign Minister Shighénori Togo hands American Ambassador Joseph Clark Grew a note which says that "the Japanese Government cannot but consider, in view of the attitude of the United States, that it is impossible to reach an agreement through further negotitions." The Foreign Office publishes the summary of the Japan-U.S. talks.

Three United States battleships (the 31,800-ton *West Virginia*, the 29,000-ton *Oklahoma* and the 32,600-ton *Arizona*) are sunk, three battleships and four large-sized cruisers seriously damaged as a result of an air blitz carried out by the Imperial Navy on Hawaii. Japanese submarines torpedo the 19,900-ton American aircraft carrier *Enterprise* off Honolulu.

The Imperial Army and Naval Air Forces carry out lightning attacks on Davao (in the Philippines), Hongkong, Wake and Guam, while units of the Japanese Army make a landing in the face of the enemy on the Malay Peninsula, commence operations against Hongkong, march into the International Settlement of Shanghai, seize British and American interests in North China, and peacefully advance into Bangkok in accordance with the agreement between Japan and Thailand.

America, Britain, Australia, Canada, the Netherlands East Indies, Nicaragua, Costa Rica, Chungking and Cuba declare war on Japan, while Egypt severes diplomatic relations with Japan.

The one-day session of the Central Co-operative Council of the National Service Association is held and President Masayuki Tani of the Board of Information clarifies Japan's war aims at the meeting.

*December 9* His Imperial Highness General Prince Naruhiko Higashikuni, member of the Supreme War Council, is installed concurrently as commander-in-Chief of the General Defence Headquarters.

Mr. S.A. Lozovsky, Vice Foreign Commissar of the U.S.S.R., reaffirms at a press conference his statement of December 1, when he announced Soviet neutrality in the event of a Pacific War.

*December 10* The mainstays of the British Far Eastern Fleet are practically destroyed when the Japanese Naval Air Force sinks two British battleships (the 35,000-ton *Prince of Wales* and the 32,000-ton *Repulse*) and a large-sized destroyer off Kuantan, on the eastern coast of the Malay Peninsula, while the

Japanese lose only three planes.

The Japanese Army forces land at Guam in co-ordination with landing parties of the Navy which, after eliminating the enemy's fierce resistance, completely occupy important points around Agara, the capital of the island. Successful landing is also made on the northern part of the Island of Luzon in the Philippines.

*December 11* Germany and Italy decide to wage war in concert with Japan against the United States and Great Britain and an agreement to this effect is signed in Berlin by representatives of the three Powers. The agreement consists of five articles including stipulations for a pledge against separate or independent peace-making and a joint action toward the goal of new order construction.

An understanding is reached between Japan and Thailand for the conclusion of a Japan-Thai Offensive and Defensive Alliance.

The greater part of the United States air force in the Philippines is crushed by the Japanese Naval Air Force when 45 American planes are shot down and 36 destroyed at Manila. A fleet of the Japanese Navy bombards Baker Island, 600 miles southwest of Hawaii.

*December 12* A military agreement is concluded between Japan and French Indo-China on the basis of the Japanese-French Indo-China Joint Defense Agreement of July, 1941.

Units of the Japanese Army and Navy land on the southern part of Luzon. Navy airmen have shot down 77 American planes and destroyed 125 in the Philippines since the beginning of the war, announces the Navy Department of the Imperial Headquarters. The Japanese Army completely occupies Kowloon, situated opposite Hongkong, as well as the Island of Guam and wipes out a British mechanized division in Malaya.

*December 13* Three American planes are downed and 40 destroyed in Luzon by a Japanese air blitz, while the Japanese Army forces, which have penetrated deep into British Malaya, occupy a certain important enemy base on the west coast of Malaya.

*December 14* The Japanese Army land forces start a mass offensive against Hongkong in close co-operation with the air force.

*December 15* The 78th extraordinary session of the Diet is convoked with the object of preparing the country and its Government for the war upon which the nation entered on December 8.

*December 16* The opening ceremony of the extraordinary wartime session of the Diet is held in the House of Peers, in the presence of His Majesty the Emperor. Premier General Hidéki Tohjo, in his Diet speech, stresses his faith in Japan's final victory, declaring that the Japanese Empire will fight until the enemy is downed.

The Japanese Army and Naval units land on British Borneo. Japanese warships shell Johnston Island, 800 miles southwest of Honolulu, while the British forces in Malaya are reportedly making a general retreat. The United States Navy Department announces that Japanese warships for the last 24 hours have been shelling the Island of Maui in Hawaii.

*December 17* Two hundred and five persons are killed, 259 injured and 1,341 houses completely destroyed on account of a severe earthquake in the Tainan Province, Taiwan.





*December 18* The 78th extraordinary Diet session is closed with a ceremony held in the House of Peers. In the course of the session, Diet members pass all the Government's proposals and budget estimates.

Correcting previous communiqués regarding the damages inflicted upon the United States air and naval forces in the Battle of Hawaii, the Navy Department of the Imperial Headquarters announces that five capital ships, two cruisers and one oil tanker are sunk; three battleships, two light cruisers and two destroyers seriously damaged; one bettleship and four cruisers partly damaged; and 464 planes destroyed.

The Japan-Germany Exchange Radio Broadcast Agreement is signed at the Foreign Vice-Minister's official residence by Shichiro Komori, president of the Broadcasting Corporation of Japan, and Dr. E. Wickert, representative of the German Broadcasting Corporation.

The British authorities have confirmed reports that Netherlands East Indies and Australian troops have landed on Timor, small Portuguese possession, says a Domei dispatch from Stockholm.

*December 19* As Governor-General Young of Hongkong rejects the final Japanese advice to surrender, the Japanese Army and Naval units land on the British colony. Penang in Malaya is completely occupied by the Japanese.

Mr. Mamoru Shighémitsu, Ambassador to the Court of St. James, is appointed Ambassador to the National Government of China in succession to Kumataro Honda who is recuperating from a recent illness.

Foreign Minister Shighénori Togo sends a message of friendship to the Governments of Brazil, Argentina, Chile and Peru in which he emphasizes that the real aim of the war is to eradicate U.S.-Britain evils.

*December 20* Japanese Army and Naval units effect landing on Mindanao in the Philippines, breaking enemy resistance.

# DOCUMENTARY MATERIAL

## WAR WITH AMERICA AND BRITAIN

### (1) *The Imperial Rescript, Released December 8, 1941*

We, by grace of heaven, Emperor of Japan, seated on the Throne of a line unbroken for ages eternal, enjoin upon ye, Our loyal and brave subjects:

We hereby declare war on the United States of America and the British Empire. The men and officers of Our army and navy shall do their utmost in prosecuting the war, Our public servants of various departments shall perform faithfully and diligently their appointed tasks, and all other subjects of Ours shall pursue their respective duties; the entire nation with a united will shall mobilize their total strength so that nothing will miscarry in the attainment of our war aims.

To insure the stability of East Asia and to contribute to world peace is the far-sighted policy which was formulated by our Great Illustrious Imperial Grandsire and Our Great Imperial sire succeeding Him, and which We lay constantly to heart. To cultivate friendship among nations and to enjoy prosperity in common with all nations has always been the guiding principle of Our Empire's foreign policy. It has been truly unavoidable and far from Our wishes that Our Empire has now been brought to cross swords with America and Britain. More than four years have passed since China, failing to comprehend the true intentions of Our Empire, and recklessly courting trouble, disturbed the peace of East Asia and compelled Our Empire to take up arms. Although there has been re-established the National Government of China, with which Japan has effected neighbourly intercourse and co-operation, the régime which has survived at Chungking, relying upon American and British protection, still continues its fratricidal opposition. Eager for the realization of their inordinate ambition to dominate the Orient, both America and Britain, giving support to the Chungking régime, have aggravated the disturbances in East Asia. Moreover, these two Powers, inducing other countries to follow suit, increased military preparations on all sides of Our Empire to challenge us. They have obstructed by every means our peaceful commerce, and finally resorted to a direct severance of economic relations, menacing gravely the existence of Our Empire. Patiently have We waited and long have We endured, in the hope that Our Government might retrieve the situation in peace. But our adversaries, showing not the least spirit of conciliation, have unduly delayed a settlement; and in the meantime, they have intensified the economic and political pressure to compel thereby Our Empire to submission. This trend of affairs would, if left unchecked, not only nullify Our Empire's efforts of many years for





the sake of the stabilization of East Asia, but also endanger the very existence of Our nation. The situation being such as it is, Our Empire for its existence and self-defence has no other recourse but to appeal to arms and to crush every obstacle in its path.

The hallowed spirits of Our Imperial Ancestors guarding Us from above, We rely upon the loyalty and courage of Our subjects in Our confident expectation that the task bequeathed by Our forefathers will be carried forward, and that the sources of evil will be speedily eradicated and an enduring peace immutably established in East Asia, preserving thereby the glory of Our Empire.

### (2) *Japanese Note to the United States, Made Public December 8, 1941* (*Unofficial Translation*)

The Government of Japan, prompted by a genuine desire to come to an amicable understanding with the Government of the United States in order that the two countries by their joint efforts may secure the peace of the Pacific area and thereby contribute toward the realization of world peace, has continued negotiations with the utmost sincerity since April last with the Government of the United States regarding the adjustment and advancement of Japanese-American relations and the stabilization of the Pacific area.

The Japanese Government has the honour to state frankly its views concerning the claims the American Government has persistently maintained as well as the measures the United States and Great Britain have taken toward Japan during these eight months.

It is the immutable policy of the Japanese Government to insure the stability of East Asia and to promote world peace, and thereby to enable all nations to find each its proper place in the world.

Ever since the China affair broke out owing to the failure on the part of China to comprehend Japan's true intentions, the Japanese Government has striven for the restoration of peace and it has consistently exerted its best efforts to prevent the extension of warlike disturbances. It was also to that end that in September last year Japan concluded the Tripartite Pact with Germany and Italy.

However, both the United States and Great Britain have resorted to every possible measure to assist the Chungking régime so as to obstruct the establishment of a general peace between Japan and China, interfering with Japan's constructive endeavours toward the stablization of East Asia. Exerting pressure on the Netherlands East Indies, or menacing French Indo-China, they have attempted to frustrate Japan's aspiration to realize the ideal of common prosperity in cooperation with these regions.

Furthermore, when Japan in accordance with its Protocol with France took measures of joint defence of French Indo-China, both American and British Governments, wilfully misinterpreted it as a threat to their own possessions and inducing the Netherlands Government to follow suit, they enforced the assets-freezing order, thus severing economic relations with

Japan. While manifesting, thus, an obviously hostile attitude, these countries have strengthened their military preparations perfecting an encirclement of Japan, and have brought about a situation which endangers the very existence of the Empire.

Nevertheless, to facilitate a speedy settlement, the Premier of Japan proposed, in August last, to meet the President of the United States for a discussion of important problems between the two countries covering the entire Pacific area. However, the American Government, while accepting in principle the Japanese proposal, insisted that the meeting should take place after an agreement of view had been reached on fundamental and essential questions.

Subsequently, on September 25 the Japanese Government submitted a proposal based on the formula proposed by the American Government, taking fully into consideration past American claims and also incorporating Japanese views. Repeated discussions proved of no avail in producing readily an agreement of view. The present Cabinet, therefore, submitted a revised proposal, moderating still further the Japanese claims regarding the principal points of difficulty in the negotiation and endeavoured strenuously to reach a settlement. But the American Government, adhering steadfastly to its original assertions, failed to display in the slightest degree a spirit of conciliation. The negotiation made no progress. Thereupon, the Japanese Government, with a view to doing its utmost for averting a crisis in Japanese-American relations, submitted on November 20 still another proposal in order to arrive at an equitable solution of the more essential and urgent questions, which, simplifying its previous proposal, stipulated the following points :

(1) The Government of Japan and the United States undertake not to dispatch armed forces into any of the regions, excepting French Indo-China, in South Eastern Asia and the Southern Pacific area.

(2) Both Governments shall co-operate with a view to securing the acquisition in the Netherlands East indies of those goods and commodities of which the two countries are in need.

(3) Both Governments mutually undertake to restore commercial relations to those prevailing prior to the freezing of assets.

The Government of the United States shall supply Japan the required quantity of oil.

(4) The Government of the United States undertakes not to resort to measures and actions prejudicial to the endeavours for the restoration of general peace between Japan and China.

(5) The Japanese Government undertakes to withdraw troops now stationed in French Indo-China upon either the restoration of peace between Japan and China or the establishment of an equitable peace in the Pacific area ; and it is prepared to remove the Japanese troops in the southern part of French Indo-China to the northern part upon the conclusion of the present agreement.

As regards China, the Japanese Government, while expressing its





readiness to accept the offer of the President of the United State to act as " introducer " of peace between Japan and China as was previously suggested, asked for an undertaking on the part of the United States to do nothing prejudicial to the restoration of Sino-Japanese peace when the two parties have commenced direct negotiations.

The American Government not only rejected the above-mentioned new proposal, but made known its intention to continue its aid to Chiang Kai-shek ; and in spite of its suggestion mentioned above, withdrew the offer of the President to act as the so-called " introducer " of peace between Japan and China, pleading that time was not yet ripe for it. Finally on November 26, in an attitude to impose upon the Japanese Government those principles it has persistently maintained, the American Government made a proposal totally ignoring Japanese claims, which is a source of profound regret to the Japanese Government.

From the beginning of the present negotiation the Japanese Government has always maintained an attitude of fairness and moderation, and did its best to reach a settlement, for which it made all possible concessions often in spite of great difficulties. As for the China question which constituted an important subject of the negotiation, the Japanese Government showed a most conciliatory attitude. As for the principle of non-discrimination in international commerce, advocated by the American Government, the Japanese Government epressed its desire to see the said principle applied throughout the world, and declared that along with the actual practice of this principle in the world, the Japanese Government would endeavour to apply the same in the Pacific area, including China, and made it clear that Japan had no intention of excluding from China economic activities of third Powers pursued on an equitable basis. Furthermore, as regards the question of withdrawing troops from French Indo-China, the Japanese Government even volunteered, as mentioned above, to carry out an immediate evacuation of troops from Southern French Indo-China as a measure of easing the situation. It is presumed that the spirit of conciliation exhibited to the utmost degree by the Japanese Government in all these matters is fully appreciated by the American Government.

On the other hand, the American Government, always holding fast to theories in disregard of realities, and refusing to yield an inch on its impractical principles, caused undue delays in the negotiation. It is difficult to understand this attitude of the American Government and the Japanese Government desires to call the attention of the American Government especially to the following points :

(1) The American Government advocates in the name of world peace those principles favourable to it and urges upon the Japanese Government the acceptance thereof. The peace of the world may be brought about only by discovering a mutually acceptable formula through recognition of the reality of the situation and mutual appreciation of one another's position. An attitude such as ignores realities and imposes one's selfish views upon others will scarcely serve the purpose of facilitating the consummation of

negotiations.

Of the various principles put forward by the American Government as a basis of the Japanese-American agreement, there are some which the Japanese Government is ready to accept in principle, but in view of the world's actual conditions, it seems only a utopian ideal, on the part of the American Government, to attempt to force their immediate adoption.

Again, the proposal to conclude a multilateral non-aggression pact between Japan, the United States, Great Britain, China, the Soviet Union, the Netherlands, and Thailand, which is patterned after the old concept of collective security, is far removed from the realities of East Asia.

(2) The American proposal contains a stipulation which states : " Both Governments will agree that no agreement, which either has concluded with any third Powers, shall be interpreted by it in such a way as to conflict with the fundamental purpose of this agreement, the establishment and observation of peace throughout the Pacific area." It is presumed that the above provision has been proposed with a view to restrain Japan from fulfilling its obligations under the Tripartite Pact when the United States participates in the war in Europe, and, as such, it cannot be accepted by the Japanese Government.

The American Government, obsessed with its own view and opinions, may be said to be scheming for the extension of the War. While it seeks, on the one hand, to secure its rear by stabilizing the Pacific area,it is engaged, on the other hand, in aiding Great Britain and preparing to attack, in the name of self-defence, Germany and Italy—two Powers that are striving to establish a new order in Europe. Such a policy is totally at variance with the many principles upon which the American Government propose to found the stability of the Pacific area through peaceful means.

(3) Whereas the American Government under the principles it rigidly upholds, objects to settling international issues through military pressure, it is exercising in conjuncition with Great Britain and other nations pressure by economic power. Recourse to such pressure as a means of dealing with international relations should be condemned as it is at times more inhumane than military pressure.

(4) It is impossible not to reach the conclusion that the American Government desires to maintain and strengthen, in collusion with Great Britain and other Powers, its dominant position it has hitherto occupied not only in China but in other areas of East Asia. It is a fact of history that the countries of East Asia for the past hundred years or more have been compelled to observe the status quo under the Anglo-American policy of imperialistic exploitation and to sacrifice themselves to the prosperity of the two nations. The Japanese Government cannot tolerate the perpetuation of such a situation since it directly runs counter to Japan's fundamental policy to enable all nations to enjoy each its proper place in the world.

The stipulation proposed by the American Government relative to French Indo-China is a good exemplification of the above-mentioned American policy. That the six countries—Japan, the United States, Great





Britain, the Netherlands, China and Thailand—excepting France, should undertake among themselves to respect the territorial integrity and sovereignty of French Indo-China and equality of treatment in trade and commerce would be tantamount to placing that territory under the joint guarantee of the Governments of those six countries. Apart from the fact that such a proposal totally ignores the position of France, it is unacceptable to the Japanese Government in that such an arrangement cannot but be considered as an extension to French Indo-China of a system similar to the Nine Power Treaty structure which is the chief factor responsible for the present predicament of East Asia.

(5) All the items demanded of Japan by the American Government regarding China such as wholesale evacuation of troops or unconditional application of the principle of nondiscrimination in international commerce ignore the actual conditions of China, and are calculated to destroy Japan's position as the stabilizing factor of East Asia. The attitude of the American Government in demanding Japan not to support militarily, politically or economically any régime other than the régime at Chungking, disregarding thereby the existence of the Nanking Government, shatters the very basis of the present negotiation. This demand of the American Government falling, as it does, in line with its above-mentioned refusal to cease from aiding the Chungking régime, demonstrates clearly the intention of the American Government to obstruct the restoration of normal relations between Japan and China and the return of peace to East Asia.

In brief, the American proposal contains certain acceptable items such as those concerning commerce, including the conclusion of a trade agreement, mutual removal of the freezing restrictions, and stablization of the yen and dollar exchange, or the abolition of extraterritorial rights in China. On the other hand, however, the proposal in question ignores Japans' sacrifices in the four years of the China affair, menaces the Empire's existence itself and disparages its honor and prestige. Therefore, viewed in its entirety, the Japanese Government regrets that it cannot accept the proposal as a basis of negotiation.

The Japanese Government, in its desire for an early conclusion of the negotiation, proposed that simultaneously with the conclusion of the Japanese-American negotiation, agreements be signed with Great Britain and other interested countries. The proposal was accepted by the American Government. However, since the American Government has made the proposal of November 26 as a result of frequent consultations with Great Britain, Australia, the Netherlands and Chungking, and presumably by catering to the wishes of the Chungking régime on the questions of China, it must be concluded that all these countries are at one with the United States in ignoring Japan's position.

Obviously it is the intention of the American Government to conspire with Great Britain and other countries to obstruct Japan's efforts toward the establishment of peace through the creation of a new order in East Asia, and especially to preserve Anglo-American rights and interests by keeping Japan

and China at war. This intention has been revealed clearly during the course of the present negotiation. Thus, the earnest hope of the Japanese Government to adjust Japanese-American relations and to preserve and promote the peace of the Pacific through co-operation with the American Government has finally been lost.

The Japanese Government regrets to have to notify hereby the American Government that, in view of the attitude of the American Government, it cannot but consider that it is impossible to reach an agreement through further negotiations.

### (3) *Summary of Negotiations, Made Public December 8, 1941* (*Unofficial Translation*)

Negotiations between the Governments of Japan and the United States of America were begun at Washington in spring of this year (1941). In the middle of April, the American Government submitted an informal draft proposal. It contained stipulations on the following items :

(1) The concepts of the United States and of Japan respecting international relations and the character of nations.
(2) The attitudes of both Governments toward the European war.
(3) Action toward a peaceful settlement between China and Japan.
(4) Commerce between both nations.
(5) Economic activity of both nations in the Pacific area.
(6) The policies of both nations affecting political stablization in the Pacific area.
(7) Neutralization of the Philippine Islands.

The proposal was intended to serve as a basis far peace in the entire Pacific area. But the proposal contained a number of points unacceptable to the Japanese Government. For instance, with reference to the Tripartite Pact between Japan, Germany and Italy, the American Government asked the Japanese Government to give an undertaking not to menace the security of the United States when the latter should participate in the European war on the plea of self-defence. Again, as regards the China affair, the American Government would undertake to use its good offices for the initation of peace negotiations between the Japanese Government and the Chungking régime on such terms as were acceptable to the United States.

Accordingly, the Japanese Government sent a counter-proposal in the middle of May, modifying the American proposal. Concerning the Tripartite Pact it was explicitly stated that Japan's obligation to render military assistance would arise as stipulated under the said treaty, while with regard to the China affair, it was provided that the American Government, accepting the premises of the three Konoyé Principles, the Sino-Japanese Basic Treaty and the Joint Declaration of Japan, Manchoukuo and China, and relying upon Japan's policy of neighbourly friendship, would urge upon the Chungking régime to enter into negotiations with the Japanese Government for the restoration of peace, and it was further stipulated that in case Chungking





refused to accept the American advice, the United States was to cease from aiding the Chungking régime. Negotiations were continued further when in the latter part of June a new counter-proposal was submitted by the American Government, which, as compared with its proposal of April, set forth American claims in a more concrete manner. Discussions were continued to be held, revolving round this June proposal.

In July, soon after the formation of the third Konoyé Cabinet the Japanese Government took measures of joint defence of French Indo-China in accordance with the Protocol concluded between Japan and France, where upon the American Government applied economic pressure by freezing Japanese assets. But the Japanese Government still hoped for a peaceful settlement, and in August Premier Prince Konoyé sent a personal message to President Roosevelt, setting forth fully the peaceful intentions of Japan, and proposing a meeting without delay between the responsible heads of the two Governments with a view to averting the crisis in the relations of the two countries. While accepting in principle the Konoyé proposal, the American Government stoutly maintained its stand that it could not see its way to putting it into practice unless an agreement of view had been first reached on the pending issues, especially on the questions of the Tripartite Pact, the stationing of Japanese troops in China, and the non-discriminatory treatment in international commerce, and moreover, it held fast to its June proposal, refusing to make any concession. Accordingly, the Japanese Government submitted on September 6 a proposal, followed by yet another proposal submitted on September 25 which took into account the American proposal of June and incorporated Japanese claims. Negotiations were continued until October 2, when the American Government requested clarification of Japan's intentions regarding the application of the four principles long advocated by the United States as fundamental principles of international relations—namely :

(1) Respect for the territorial integrity and the sovereignty of each and all nations.
(2) Support of the principle of non-interference in the internal affairs of other countries.
(3) Support of the principle of equality, including equality of commercial opportunity.
(4) Non-disturbance of the status quo in the Pacific except as the status quo may be altered by peaceful means.

At the same time, it demanded upon the Japanese Government to clarify further its views concerning the three questions mentioned above. As a result, the negotiations struck an impasse. In the meantime the Konoyé Cabinet resigned in the middle of October.

Such divergence of view as mentioned above between the two Governments was produced largely because the American Government obstinately adhered to utopian principles based on selfish views for dealing with international relations, and insisted upon the application thereof in China and elsewhere, regardless of the real conditions of East Asia. It was evident

that so long as the American Government persisted in this attitude, there was little chance of bringing negotiations to a successful conclusion.

The present Cabinet in its solicitude for the peace of the Pacific decided to continue the negotiation. With a view to effecting a settlement on an equitable basis, the Japanese Government formulated the following proposal concerning the three principal issues in the negotiations—namely (1) the right of self-defence in connection with the Tripartite Pact, (2) non-discriminatory treatment in international commerce, and (3) evacuation of troops from China and French Indo-China.

(1) The American Government undertakes not to enlarge unduly the meaning of " self-defence."

(2) The Japanese Government recognizes the principle of non-discrimination in international commercial relations to be applied to all the Pacific area, including China, on the understanding that the said principle is to be applied uniformly to the rest of the world.

(3) Following the restoration of peace between Japan and China, the Japanese troops despatched to China in connection with the China affair will be stationed for the necessary duration in specified areas, and the rest of the troops will be withdrawn upon the conclusion of peace and in accordance with the agreement between Japan and China. The troops in French Indo-China will be withdrawn immediately either upon the settlement of the China affair or the establishment of peace in East Asia on an equitable basis.

Negotiations were conducted on the basis of the above proposal. Meanwhile the Japanese Government requested the American Government to use its good offices, upon the conclusion of the Japanese-American negotiation, for the conclusion of a similar understanding with Great Britain and other countries concerning relevant subjects. Moreover, in order to do the utmost in the negotiation, it dispatched Ambassador Kurusu post-haste to Washington to assist Admiral Nomura.

On the other hand, the American Government repeatedly urged that there would be no need for Japan to maintain the Tripartite Pact after the consummation of a Japanese-American agreement, and expressed its hope that the said treaty would cease to exist or become a dead letter. As regards the principle of non-discrimination in international commerce, the American Government insisting on its unconditional application to China, proposed the economic development of China jointly by the Powers. To this proposal, the Japanese Government replied to the effect that with regard to the commercial non-discrimination principle, Japan hoped for its application throughout the world and that it would recognize its application to China in accordance with the realization of this principle throughout the world, and also that the American proposal for the joint international development of China was unacceptable to Japan as it would open the way for the joint international control of China. On these grounds, the Japanese Government requested the American Government to withdraw the proposal in question.

On November 17 and thereafter Admiral Nomura, together with Ambassador Kurusu, repeatedly met the American President and the Secretary of





State and strongly urged upon the latter two the necessity of bringing about speedily an amicable conclusion of the negotiation. Discussions were extended over a few meetings at which the President stated that he was prepared to act as an " introducer " of peace between Japan and Chugking, and the Secretary of State emphasized, that Japanese-American negotiations would prove difficult as long as Japan co-operated with Germany, and it was necessary to remove this fundamental difficulty. Despite these discussions, it became clear that the difficulty lay as before in the questions of the Tripartite Pact, of the international commercial non-discriminatory treatment and of China. In order to avert the rupture of diplomatic relations between the two countries, the Japanese Government, presented on November 20, the following new proposal calculated to achieve an equitable solution of the more essential and urgent questions.

(1) Both the Governments of Japan and the United States undertake not to make any armed advancement into any of the regions, excepting French Indo-China, in South Eastern Asia and the Southern Pacific area.

(2) The Governments of Japan and the United States shall co-operate with a view to securing the acquisition of those goods and commodities which the two countries need in the Netherlands East Indies.

(3) The Governments of Japan and the United States mutually undertake to restore their commercial relations to those prevailing prior to the freezing of the assets.

The Government of the United States shall supply Japan a required quantity of oil.

(4) The Government of the United States undertakes not to indulge in measures and actions prejudicial to the endeavours for the restoration of general peace between Japan and China.

(5) The Japanese Government undertakes to withdraw troops now stationed in French Indo-China upon either the restoration of peace between Japan and China or the establishment of an equitable peace in the Pacific area.

The Government of Japan declares that it is prepared to remove the Japanese troops now stationed in the southern part of French Indo-China to the northern part of the said territory upon the conclusion of the present agreement.

Regarding the above proposal, the Secretary of State contended that it was impossible for the American Government to accept the item 4 of our proposal and cease aiding the Chiang Kai-shek régime unless Japan clarified its relations with the Tripartite Pact and gave assurances regarding its adoption of a peaceful policy, and that the President's offer to act as " introducer " of Sino-Japanese peace was predicated upon Japan's adoption of a peaceful policy. Thereupon, the Japanese Government instructed the two Ambassadors to request reconsideration by the American Government, pointing out to the Secretary of State that, in case direct negotiations were opened between Japan and Chungking through " introduction " by the President, the continuation of aid to the Chiang Kai-shek régime by the United States, the

peace introducer, would constitute an interference with the realization of peace, and that the American contention was therefore inconsistent.

Meanwhile, the American Government consulted the representatives of Britain, Australia, the Netherlands and Chungking, and on November 22 the Secretary of State told our two Ambassadors that withdrawal of troops from southern French Indo-China alone would not be enough to ease the tense situation in the Southern Pacific and that he considered the time was not yet ripe for the so-called "introduction" of peace between Japan and Chungking by the President.

Subsequently, the American Government continued consulations with the representatives of the Powers aforementioned and on November 26 the Secretary of State presented to our Ambassadors, as a basis for future negotiations, a proposal to the following effect stating that, although the American Government had carefully studied the Japanese proposal of the 20th and consulted with the countries concerned, they could not unfortunately bring themselves to agree to our proposal.

(a) In the new proposal, the American Government reiterated, with reference to political relations, the above-mentioned four principles as the fundamental principles to be practically applied to mutual relations between Japan and the United States. However, it changed the item 4 to "the principle of reliance upon international co-operation and conciliation for the prevention and pacific settlement of controversies and for improvement of international conditions by peaceful methods and processes." As regards economic relations, the American Government elaborated the third political principle concerning the equality of opportunity and equal treatment in commerce.

(b) As measures to be adopted by the Governments of Japan and the United States it proposed as follows:

(1) The Government of the United States and the Government of Japan will endeavour to conclude a multilateral non-aggression pact among the British Empire, China, Japan, the Netherlands, the Soviet Union, Thailand and the United States.

(2) Both Governments will endeavour to conclude among the American, British, Chinese, Japanese, the Netherlands and Thai Governments an agreement whereunder each of the Governments would pledge itself to respect the territorial integrity of French Indo-China and, in the event that there should develop a threat to the territorial integrity of Indo-China, to enter into immediate consultation with a view to taking such measures as may be deemed necessary and advisable to meet the threat in question.

Such agreement would provide also that each of the Government party to the agreement would not seek or accept preferential treatment in its trade or economic relations with Indo-China and would use its influence to obtain for each of the signatories equality of treatment in trade and commerce with French Indo-China.

(3) The Government of Japan will withdraw all military, naval, air and police forces from China and from Indo-China.

(4) The Government of the United States and the Government of Japan





will not support—militarily, politically, economically—any Government or régime in China other than the National Government of the Republic of China with capital temporarily at Chungking.

(5) Both Governments will give up all extraterritorial rights in China, including rights and interests in and with regard to international settlements and concessions, and rights under the Boxer Protocol of 1901.

Both Governments will endeavour to obtain the agreement of the British and other Governments to give up extraterritorial rights in China, including rights in international settlements and in concessions and under the Boxer Protocol of 1901.

(6) The Government of the United States and the Government of Japan will enter into negotiations for the conclusion between the United States and Japan of a trade agreement, based upon reciprocal most favoured-nation treatment and reduction of trade barriers by both countries, including an undertaking by the United States to bind raw silk on the free list.

(7) The Government of the United States and the Government of Japan will, respectively, remove the freezing restrictions on Japanese funds in the United States and on American funds in Japan.

(8) Both Governments will agree upon a plan for the stabilization of the dollar-yen rate, with the allocation of funds adequate for this purpose, half to be supplied by Japan and half by the United States.

(9) Both Governments will agree that no agreement which either has concluded with any third powers shall be interpreted by it in such a way as to conflict with the fundamental purpose of this agreement, the establishment and preservation of peace throughout the Pacific area.

(10) Both Governments will use their influence to cause other Governments to adhere to and to give practical application to the basic political and economic principles set forth in this agreement.

Regarding the above proposal, our Ambassadors refuted the American claims pointing out their unreasonableness. But the Secretary of State failed to show any sign of concession, and on November 27 the President told our two Ambassadors that, although he still hoped for an amicable conclusion of the Japanese-American negotiations, he considered that it would be futile to try to surmount the crisis by a *modus vivendi* so long as the fundamental policies of the two countries were not in accord.

The Japanese Government, therefore, requested reconsideration of the American Government, because, despite the fact that our proposal of November 20 was made after fully considering the claims of both sides on the most equitable basis, the American Government, maintaining that it could not agree to this proposal, made a new proposal which entirely ignored the realities in East Asia and in particular completely changed its attitude with respect to the China question—a fact which led the Japanese Government to doubt the sincerity of the American Government, On December 2, however, the American Under-Secretary of State Welles, stating that he was acting under Presidential order, made an inquiry to our Government regarding our true intentions, saying that, according to their information, movements and re-

inforcement of Japanese troops were recently taking place in the region of French Indo-China. To this inquiry the Japanese Government replied that, in view of the recent marked activities of the Chungking forces in the neighbourhood of the frontier between French Indo-China and China, Japan had made partial reinforcement of its troops in northern French Indo-China as a precautionary measure and that this naturally had resulted in a movement of the troops in the southern area. Meanwhile the American Government rapidly reinforced the encircling front against Japan and led public opinion to its own advantage and thus prepared the ground with a view to meeting the situation arising from the rupture of the negotiations.

The Japanese Government made clear its attitude regarding the above-mentioned American proposal in its Memorandum to the American Government under date of December 7.

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## AGREEMENT BETWEEN JAPAN, GERMAN AND ITALY FOR JOINT PROSECUTION OF WAR

### (1) *The Agreement Announcement of the Board of Information, December 11, 1941*

In the unflexible determination not to lay down arms until the common war against the United States and the British Empire is successfully concluded, the Imperial Japanese Government, the German Government and the Italian Government have agreed upon the following stipulations.

Article 1 Japan, Germany and Italy shall prosecute the war forced upon them by the United States of America and the British Empire with all forceful means at their command until it ends in their victory.

Article 2 Japan, Germany and Italy pledge that, wihout complete understanding between themselves, they will not conclude armistice or peace with either the United States of America or the British Empire.

Article 3 Japan, Germany and Italy shall, even after the termination of the war in their victory, co-operate most closely for the purpose of realizing a righteous new order in the meaning of the Tripartite Pact which they concluded on September 27, 1940.

Article 4 The present Agreement shall come into effect the date of its signature and shall remain in force as long as the Tripartite Pact of September 27, 1940, is in force. The High Contracting Parties shall, at an appropriate time before the expiration of the said period of validity, reach an understanding concerning the manner of subsequent co-operation provided in Article 3 of the present Agreement.

### (2) *Statement of Foreign Minister Togo, December 11, 1941*

It is a matter for sincere congratulation that an agreement has been promptly signed among Japan, Germany and Italy in Berlin today, December 11, closely following Japan's declaration of war on the United States of America and the British Empire, solemnly pledging their co-operation in





prosecuting their joint war with the United States of America and the British Empire to a complete conclusion, in abstaining from concluding a separate peace and in constructing the new order of the world.

Germany and Italy, who are closely bound with Japan by the Three-Power Pact, have today declared war upon the United States of America and joined the conflict on Japan's side. Further, by virtue of the present agreement, they have manifested their intentions to prosecute the joint war to a glorious victory. This, together with marvellous achievements attained by the Imperial armed forces, is unfolding a bright future before the Japanese Empire, which is resolutely proceeding with construction of the new order of the world. We are overwhelmed with emotion realizing that all this has been entirely due to the august virtue of H. I. M. the Emperor.

At this juncture, when the world stands at a great turning-point, unprecedented in history, it is a source of great pleasure that Japan, with her confidence strengthened in winning a glorious victory and with her determination renewed, is marching toward construction of an equitable, new order as well as of a moral world in close co-operation with her allies. Germany, Italy and others.

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## MILITARY PACT BETWEEN JAPAN AND FRENCH INDO-CHINA, ANNOUNCEMENT BY THE ARMY AND NAVY DEPARTMENTS OF THE IMPERIAL HEADQUARTERS, DECEMBER 12, 1941

A military agreement was concluded between Japan and French Indo-China. It was signed at 8 : 30 p.m. December 8, 1941, between the Highest Commanders of the Japanese Army and Navy Forces in French Indo-China and the Government of French Indo-China. This agreement was based on the Japanese-French Indo-Chinese Common Defence Agreement concluded in July.

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## PACT OF ALLIANCE BETWEEN JAPAN AND THAILAND

### (1) *The Pact, Announced by the Board of Information, December 21, 1941*

Since the agreement of basic views concerning the conclusion of an alliance pact between Japan and Thailand was reached between our Ambassador, Teiji Tsubokami, and the Thai Prime Minister, Luang Pibul Songgram, on the 11th of this month (December, 1941), discussions were held regarding the drafting of the pact, which resulted in a satisfactory conclusion. Following the completion of necessary procedure, therefore, the Pact of Alliance between Japan and Thailand was signed between Ambassador Tsubokami and Prime Minister and concurrently Foreign Minister Pibul Songgram in Bangkok at 10 a.m. (noon according to Japan time) December 21, 1941.

The Imperial Government of Japan and the Royal Government of Thailand, firmly convinced that the establishment of a new order in East Asia the only way of realizing prosperity of that region and the

indispensable condition for the restoration and promotion of world peace, and animated by a firm and inflexible determination to eliminate all baneful influences which are obstacles to such purpose, have agreed as follows :

Article 1 An alliance is established between Japan and Thailand on the basis of mutual respect for their independence and sovereignty.

Article 2 In case either Japan or Thailand finds hereself in an armed conflict vis-a-vis one or more third Powers, Thailand or Japan shall immediately range herself on the side of the other country as her ally and shall aid the latter with all political, economic and military means.

Article 3 The details relative to the execution of Article 2 shall determined, by common accord, between the compentent authorities of Japan and Thailand.

Article 4 Japan and Thailand, in case of war prosecuted in common, engage not to conclude an armistice or a peace without their complete mutual accord.

Article 5 The present Pact shall come into effect simultaneously with its signature and shall remain valid for the duration of ten years. The Contracting Parties shall consult between them regarding the renewal of the present Pact at a suitable time before the expiration of the said duration.

(2) *Foreign Minister Togo's Statement, December 21, 1941*

Japan and Thailand have for many years been bound to each other in bonds of traditional friendship as nations of the Oriental race. To strengthen further these bonds of close friendship, the Treaty of Amity and Friendship was concluded between the two countries in June of last year. Then at the beginning of this year, the border dispute betweenThailand and French Indo-China was peacefully settled through the mediation by Japan, as the result of which Thailand succeeded in recovering her lost territories which had been her long-standing aspiration. At the same time the Protocol concerning political understanding between Japan and Thailand was concluded, resulting in further increase in the warmth of their mutual cordiality.

On the other hand, Thailand has for many years been made an object of political intrigue and economic exploitation by Great Britain, in whose fetters she groaned. The present Thai Prime Minister, Luang Pibul Songgram, has long advocated autonomy in dealing with state affairs of Thailand. In order to realize the purpose through co-operation with Japan, a friendly Power in East Asia, he has exerted his efforts to promote and solidify the amicable relations between Japan and Thailand.

When Japan commenced war against the United States and the British Empire on December 8, our Government, with a view to repelling British invasion of Thailand, instructed Ambassador Tsubokami to negotiate with Prime Minister Pibul Songgram to obtain Thailand's assent to the passage of Japanese forces through the latter's territory. The Prime Minister, perceiving the general trend of affairs, agreed to Japan's proposal and an





understanding with regard thereto was reached on the same day. Since then, in order to adjust the Japanese-Thai relations to the new situation as well as to accelerate the promotion of the close friendship between the two countries, Ambassador Tsubokami proceeded with the negotiations with Prime Minister Pibul Songgram. Through the courageous decision of the Prime Minister, an agreement of views concerning the conclusion of an offensive alliance between Japan and Thailand was reached on December 11. Subsequently, a draft treaty was decided upon, and following the completion of internal procedures, the Pact of Alliance between Japan and Thailand was signed between Ambassador Tsubokami and Prime Minister and concurrently Foreign Minister Pibul Songgram at 10 a.m. (noon, according to Japan Time) on the 21st of this month in a grand chapel of the Royal Palace in Bangkok.

The Alliance Pact, which is epoch-making in the history of Greater East Asia, has thus come into being. Thailand has, at a time when the war against the United States and the British Empire, which will determine the destiny of East Asia for centuries to come is being prosecuted, expressed clearly and concretely her determination to prosecute the present war in co-operation with Japan until victory is won. This is indeed a matter for profound felicitation for the sake of the establishment of a new world order as well as the rise of East Asia.

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

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